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Abstract 
 
In response to a request from the California Debt and Investment Advisory Commission, we 
propose a model to estimate default probabilities for bonds issued by cities. The model can be used 
with financial data available in Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports that cities are required to 
publish. The study includes modeled default probability estimates for 261 California cities with 
population over 25,000.  Our model relies on case study evidence, logistic regression analysis of 
major city financial statistics from the Great Depression – the last time a large number of cities 
defaulted – as well as logistic regression analysis of more recent city financial statistics. 
Independent variables in our model include (1) the ratio of interest and pension expenses to total 
revenue, (2) the annual change in total revenue, (3) the ratio of general fund surplus (or deficit) to 
general fund revenues and (4) the ratio of general fund balance to general fund expenditures. 
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Executive Summary 
California local agencies have faced substantial fiscal stress in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis. Several cities have filed for bankruptcy, defaulted on bond payments or 
declared fiscal emergencies. However, the vast majority of California local bond issuers 
continue to perform on their obligations. 
The fiscal troubles faced by individual governments typically receive substantial 
publicity. Such news reports reinforce dire predictions from high profile analysts that a 
municipal market crisis is imminent. As a result, bondholders may be dissuaded from 
investing in the obligations of all municipal bond issuers – even those that are relatively 
healthy. This phenomenon threatens to exacerbate municipal bond market illiquidity, 
which, according to Ang & Green (2011), already costs issuers an extra 1.1% in annual 
interest. 
With the collapse of the municipal bond insurance business and questions 
concerning the credibility of bond ratings, new methods of credit risk assessment are 
required. In response to a request by the California Debt and Investment Advisory 
Commission, we have created an empirically-based methodology for assigning credit 
scores to municipalities, using quantitative techniques that are resistant to bias. These 
scores take the form of default probabilities and are based on a modeling procedure often 
applied to corporate borrowers. Using this methodology, we have assigned default 
probability scores to over 260 California cities with population over 25,000 that have filed 
2011 or 2012 Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports. 
In bond market terms, a default is usually defined as the failure on the part of an 
issuer to pay principal and/or interest in full and on a timely basis. It is this definition of 
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default that we use in this study.  This means we do not consider the concept of a technical 
default which often relates to the failure of an issuer to carry out other obligations under 
the bond agreement, such as the prompt filing of continuing disclosures. Further, we do not 
consider failure to pay contractors, employees, retirees or beneficiaries promised sums as 
defaults for the current purpose – the concept narrowly applies to bondholders. 
Since our model applies to cities themselves, it does not consider the specific 
attributes of their individual bond issues. Thus, general obligation bonds issued by a city 
should be expected to have less risk than our estimates suggest, while certificates of 
participation and other securities not explicitly backed by a diverse stream of tax revenues 
may be more risky. 
Our model of municipal default risk is based on four fiscal indicators. These are: (1) 
the ratio of interest and pension expenses to total governmental fund revenue, (2) the 
annual change in total governmental fund revenue, (3) the ratio of the city’s general fund 
surplus or deficit to its general fund revenue and (4) the ratio of the city’s end of year 
general fund balance to its general fund expenditures. In the study, we provide statistical 
and case study evidence to support the choice of these variables and appropriate 
coefficients. 
We hope that the proposed model will help municipal bond investors and other 
stakeholders in city government solvency better comprehend the risks faced by municipal 
issuers.  We also hope that other researchers and practitioners will become interested in 
this topic and our analytical approach, so that they will build upon and improve our 
findings. 
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Introduction 
The issue of municipal solvency has frequently made the headlines in recent years. 
Meredith Whitney’s 2010 appearance on 60 Minutes was but one of a number of dire 
predictions for municipal bondholders. In 2012, the bankruptcies of Stockton and San 
Bernardino attracted significant media attention, as has the state takeover of Detroit, 
Michigan earlier this year. 
Unfortunately for bondholders and the many other stakeholders in city solvency, the 
debate about municipal credit has been often generated more heat than light. Whitney’s 
analysis fed into a narrative about skyrocketing public employee pension costs triggering a 
tsunami of municipal bankruptcies. 
These politically charged predictions have yet to be borne out by the facts on the 
ground. In the 60 Minutes interview, Whitney predicted 50-100 sizable defaults (CBS News, 
2010). She later stated that this would be a “something to worry about” within 12 months 
of her appearance which occurred in December 2010. When it became apparent that this 
dire forecast was failing to materialize, Michael Lewis (2011) wrote an influential piece in 
Vanity Fair quoting Whitney as saying “who cares about the stinking muni-bond market?” 
and attempting to rehabilitate her by turning the reader’s attention to fiscal problems in 
California cities, public employee pensions and the risk of “cultural” as opposed to financial 
bankruptcy. 
For those who do care about the “stinking” municipal bond market, the discussion 
left much to be desired. Investors are still wondering how much risk they actually shoulder 
when purchasing municipal bonds issued by California cities and how much extra interest 
they should expect to receive in compensation for taking on this risk. The question of the 
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appropriate interest rate resonates far beyond the municipal bond market, since it directly 
affects municipal debt service costs, which in turn impact tax rates, service levels and cities’ 
ability to add infrastructure by borrowing. 
As we discuss in this study, defaults by cities have been quite rare since the Great 
Depression. Doty (2012) estimates that annual default rates on general obligation bonds 
have been consistently below 0.1% in recent decades. Indeed, a researcher is compelled to 
unearth 80-year old data just to obtain a statistically meaningful sample of general 
obligation bond defaults on the part of US cities. Even when this dark period in the history 
of municipal finance is investigated, we find the defaults were often the result of 
idiosyncratic factors that don’t portend ill for modern investors. Finally, pension 
underfunding is not a new phenomenon: as Munell (2012) documents, it was also a serious 
concern in the 1970s – a period that witnessed some highly publicized city financial 
emergencies, but no spate of municipal bond defaults.  
All that said, defaults have occurred and will continue to occur, perhaps with 
somewhat greater frequency than they have in recent decades. Clearly, some cities are 
more at risk than others, and so stakeholders would benefit from objective, widely 
available measures of municipal credit risk. 
While credit rating agencies have the potential to better inform the public’s 
understanding of municipal credit risk, they face several barriers in doing so. First, since 
they rely primarily on bond issuers for their revenue, they have limited incentive to 
evaluate cities they are not paid to rate. Second, much of their investor-oriented research is 
sold as premium content and thus cannot be freely distributed. Third, rating agencies have 
lost credibility in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. And, finally, the three major 
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rating agencies were sued by the Connecticut attorney general – also in 2008 – for 
assigning overly harsh ratings to municipal bond issuers relative to corporate and 
structured finance issuers. Two of the three agencies recalibrated their municipal ratings in 
response to the suit, which was settled in 2011 with no admission of responsibility but the 
extension of credits to the state of Connecticut for future ratings services. 
We believe that the informational vacuum created by the rating agency problem can 
be filled by academic research. This study represents our initial contribution to this 
academic project, and we hope that it will motivate others to add their insights. Our 
approach involves the use of statistical and case study analysis to create a municipal bond 
default probability model targeted at California cities with population greater than 25,000.  
The discussion proceeds as follows. First, we provide a literature review which 
discusses previous efforts to model municipal credit quality. We find that most of the 
literature uses ratings or bond yields as a proxy for credit risk, and offer objections to these 
approaches.  
Next, we review the Depression-era municipal bond default experience and propose 
a simple logit model based on a set of data collected from this period. This analysis 
identifies two significant variables intuitively related to default risk:  the ratio of interest to 
revenue and the change in annual revenue. 
After this, we provide a comprehensive review of California city bond defaults and 
bankruptcies with case studies of the most recent payment difficulties. The case study 
evidence suggests that exhaustion of the general fund – an element that is not available in 
the Great Depression data set – has been a major driver in recent bankruptcy filings and 
attendant defaults. 
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We then survey post-Depression defaults in US cities outside California. As part of 
this discussion, we see how New York and Cleveland – both of which defaulted in the 1970s 
– ranked against peer cities with respect to variables of interest. We also provide 
information that supplies much needed context to popular media reporting about 
municipal bond distress. Specifically, we find that bankruptcy does not necessarily involve 
default (and vice versa) and that most bankruptcies have occurred in small towns, many of 
which did not have significant volumes of outstanding municipal bonds (if any). 
Finally, we propose a second model based on more recent data that enables us to 
test the relative significance of general fund surplus/deficit and general fund balance 
variables, which we hypothesize to be default drivers in the modern context.  We then 
hybridize this model with the Depression-era model proposed earlier to create a final 
specification. 
Given the relative dearth of municipal bond defaults, we found a necessity to depart 
from orthodox modeling techniques in creating our specification. To further aid future 
research, we also provide an appendix that analyzes the Depression-era data using 
academic best practices.  
A second appendix investigates the possibility of using data from the California State 
Controller’s Office Cities Annual Report as a basis for municipal bond default probability 
estimation and the final appendix provides our default probability scores for 261 California 
cities with population greater than 25,000. 
The study is supplemented by a web site that contains supporting data and 
analytics. This web site will become publicly available on or about May 8, 2013.  The 
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address for this site is http://www.publicsectorcredit.org/ca. An Excel workbook 
providing an implementation of our model is available from the authors upon request. 
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Literature Review 
Previous Depression-Era Municipal Default Research 
Dr. George Hempel’s contribution to our understanding of Depression-era municipal 
defaults is widely regarded in the municipal bond industry. Aside from his most commonly 
cited study, The Post War Quality of State and Local Debt (1971), some of Hempel’s other 
work is relevant. Particularly noteworthy was his contribution to a 1973 study published by 
the now-defunct US Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR). This work 
contains a wealth of statistics as well as detailed case studies of eight high profile defaults 
from the Depression era.   
In addition to default counts and descriptive material, Hempel also presented an 
econometric default model in his 1971 NBER study. Unfortunately, the model was based on 
data from only 24 municipal issuers in the State of Michigan, 17 of which defaulted. This 
sample has three shortcomings: small overall size, geographic distribution not representative 
of the nation as a whole and an in-sample default rate inconsistent with population default 
rates. Contemporaneous estimates published in The Bond Buyer (1938) indicate that there 
were about 30,000 municipal issuers in the 1930s.  The approximate default count of 4800 
issuers in that decade implies a population default rate of 16%. This contrasts to a rate of 
71% in Hempel’s sample. 
Hempel collected 11 independent variables for the sample issuers. These were: 
• Population 
• Dollar Amount of Notes Outstanding 
• Dollar Amount of Debt Outstanding 
• Per Capita Debt 
• Total Assessed Property Values 
• Dollar Amount of Taxes Levied 
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• Tax Levy Per $1,000 Assessed Value 
• Debt / Assessed Property Values 
• Percentage of Current Taxes Delinquent 
• Tax Levy Per Capita 
• Assessed Property Values Per Capita 
 
This set of variables captures many of the factors theorized to cause municipal bond 
defaults including size of the issuer, debt burden as well as the willingness and ability of local 
government and the citizenry to generate required tax revenue. No variables capture other 
costs that municipal leaders might choose to pay instead of debt service – such as municipal 
employee salaries or pensions. Also, some of Hempel’s variables are derived from others, 
introducing a risk of multicollinearity. For example, Per Capita Debt is the quotient of Dollar 
Amount of Debt Outstanding and Population.  
After collecting the data, Hempel subjected it to factor analysis, multiple discriminant 
analysis and multiple regression analysis. He reported a multiple regression equation that 
contained 8 of the 11 variables, which were significant at p < .1. While the overall regression 
had an r2 of 64%, a number of the variables had signs inconsistent with theory, perhaps due 
to multicollinearity. Hempel addressed multicollinearity by further reducing the set of 
independent variables to the following four (shown here with their coefficients and standard 
errors): 
Hempel's (1971) Municipal Default Model 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
Tax Levy per $1,000 Assessed Value -0.00310 0.00247 
Tax Levy per Capita -0.00115 0.00108 
Debt / Assessed Property Values +0.3521 0.17000 
Percentage of Current Taxes Delinquent +0.07209 0.07277 
 
Hempel does not report any goodness of fit measures for the overall equation, but 
notes that it had a higher r2 than other alternatives he evaluated, and that all variables have 
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the expected sign. On the other hand, two of the four variables are not significant at p < .05, 
while the two best predictors are theoretically related. 
In the interest of using Depression-era data to predict future defaults, it is fortunate 
that certain variables fell out of Hempel’s specification. Given the substantial change in prices 
and wealth since the 1930s, it would be difficult to use the Dollar Value of Notes Outstanding, 
the Dollar Value of Debt Outstanding or Per Capita Debt to model current issuers. Tax Levy 
per Capita, which remained in Hempel’s specification, has a similar challenge. Variables that 
take the form of ratios, such as Debt/Assessed Property Values or Tax Levy per $1000 
Assessed Value are more appropriate for analysis and forecasting independent of time 
period. 
Hempel (1973) later expanded the sample to 45 Michigan cities – 28 of which 
defaulted – and 23 independent variables. Many of the added variables were 1922 values 
most likely obtained from that year’s Census of State and Local Governments. He identified a 
regression equation with nine exogenous variables significant at p < .05. 
Hempel's (1973) Municipal Default Model 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
Log of 1932 Population -0.07678 0.0321 
Assessed Property Value Per Capita in 1932 +0.0001585 0.0000523 
Growth of Population from 1922 to 1932 -0.02146 0.0113 
Growth of Debt Relative to Population Growth -0.007912 0.00213 
Debt/Assessed Property Values in 1932 +0.4885 0.258 
Tax Levy Per $1000 Assessed Value in 1932 +0.00919 0.00242 
Tax Levy Per Capita in 1932 -0.007197 0.00322 
Percentage of Current Taxes Delinquent in 
1932 
+0.2095 0.0962 
Notes Outstanding Per Capita in 1932 +0.009159 0.00246 
 
Hempel noted the presence of multicollinearity but did not present an alternative 
equation that addressed it. Two of the nine variables presented above – Growth of Debt 
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Relative to Population Growth and Tax Levy Per Capita in 1932 – have coefficient signs that 
are inconsistent with intuition. Hempel reported that the nine variable regression had an 
adjusted r2 of 51%, while alternatives that remedied multicollinearity had adjusted r2 of 
between 39% and 45%. 
In his discussion of Hempel’s findings, Forbes (1973) questions the use of Depression-
era data for modeling purposes, while admitting that the paucity of more recent defaults 
forces this choice. In particular he noted that local governments received more state aid – at 
the time of his writing – than they did in the 1930s. This institutional change could reduce 
the relevance of the historic default data. 
Predicting Credit Ratings as a Proxy for Estimating Default Risk 
Rubinfeld (1973) proposed a multiple regression model for predicting credit ratings. 
Since credit ratings are intended to convey information about the likelihood of default, 
exogenous variables that explain credit ratings could also be used as predictors of default. 
Using a sample of 128 New England municipal bond issuers, he found that the following 
independent variables were predictive of the credit rating at the 10% significance level: 
• Percentage of Taxes Uncollected in the Previous Year 
• Ratio of Direct Net Debt to Assessed Valuation 
• Median Family Income 
• Full Valuation of the Property Tax Base 
• Overlapping Debt 
 
The first two of these exogenous variables are consistent with those in Hempel’s 1973 
study. Overlapping Debt refers to the indebtedness of other issuers who rely on the same tax 
base. For example, if property owners pay taxes to both their city and county and if both 
governmental entities carry debt, the county’s debt would be considered overlapping debt 
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viz.-a-viz. the city and vice versa. This variable, along with Median Family Income and Full 
Valuation of the Property Tax Base, would have to be restated as a ratio to be useful in a 
default prediction model. 
Carelton & Lerner (1969) attempted to use statistical techniques to match Moody’s 
bond ratings using a random sampling of issuers extracted from Moody’s 1967 Municipal 
and Government Bond manual. They tested six variables – all of which they found to be 
significant. These were: 
• Whether the issuer was a School District 
• Ratio of Debt to Assessed Valuation 
• Ratio of Debt to Population 
• Log of Population 
• Log of Debt 
• Average Collection Rate 
 
Using a large sample of 976 cities, Farnham & Cluff (1984) tested 23 variables to 
determine whether they were predictive of Moody’s bond ratings. They found 12 of the 
variables to be significant α = .05. The method used was an “N-chotomous” probit analysis. 
The authors chose this method because the four possible ratings in the dependent variable 
were thought to be of unequal lengths, i.e. many more cities fell into the A rating category 
than into the Aaa category. Their analysis included several variables not considered by other 
authors – including housing stock attributes, form of government and geographical location. 
Four of the housing stock attributes proved to be significant. Farnham & Cluff’s variables are 
listed in the following table. 
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Farnham & Cluff's (1984) Independent Variables 
Variable Significant at 5% Level? 
Gross Debt / 1000 Population * 
Total General Revenue * 
Percent Change in Total Revenue * 
Assessed Valuation * 
Population   
Percent Change in Population   
Percent Nonwhite * 
Percent Eighteen Years and Under   
Population Density * 
Income Per Capita   
Ratio of Non-Workers to Workers * 
Number of Manufacturing Establishments   
Percent One-Unit Housing Structures * 
Percent Housing Units Occupied   
Percent Housing Units Owner Occupied * 
Percent Housing Units Built Before 1940 (as of 1970) * 
Median Value of Owner Occupied Housing Units * 
Median Years of Education * 
Local Documents Available   
Council-Manager Form of Government   
City Located in Northeast Region   
City Located in Northcentral Region   
City Located in South   
 
The papers reviewed above are part of a large literature that attempts to estimate 
municipal bond ratings. Loviscek & Crowley (1990) compare the studies described here with 
eleven others that had the same objective. 
Since Loviscek & Crowley published their review, at least two additional papers 
modeling municipal bond ratings have appeared. Moon & Stotsky (1993) analyzed data for 
892 US cities with population over 25,000, of which 727 were rated. They first modeled the 
decision by city officials to seek a rating and then factors determining the ratings actually 
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assigned. This methodology highlights the fact that by choosing to be rated, cities self-select 
into the samples used in previous studies. This suggests that studies which use ratings as a 
proxy for default probability suffer from selection bias. 
Moon & Stotsky (1993) found that cities choosing to remain unrated were likely to 
receive a low rating. They tested twenty variables potentially affecting rating levels, and 
found 15 to be significant. The variables they evaluated were as follows: 
Moon & Stotsky's (1993) Independent Variables 
Variable Significant at 5% Level? 
Median Housing Value * 
Proportion of Housing Units that were Built Before 1940  * 
Proportion of Housing Units that were Built After 1970   
Proportion of Housing Units that are Owner-Occupied  * 
Per Capita income  * 
Percentage Change in Population from 1970 to 1980  * 
Proportion of the Population that is Non-White  * 
Population Density  * 
Total Debt   
Per Capita Debt  * 
Ratio of Debt to Income  * 
Ratio of Surplus Revenues to General Revenues   
Ratio of Intergovernmental Revenues to General Revenues   
Council-Manager form of government  * 
Commission Form of Government   
City Located in Midwest   * 
City Located in South  * 
City Located in West   * 
Population Between 100,000 and 500,000 * 
Population Greater Than 500,000 * 
 
Most recently, Palumbo & Zaporowski (2012) analyzed ratings for 965 county and 
city governments rated by Moody’s in 2002. This population encompassed all such units that 
issued rated full faith and credit debt and that could be matched against Census, Bureau of 
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Economic Analysis (BEA) and Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data sets. Of the 15 variables 
they examined, 13 proved to be significant at the 5% level as shown below. 
Palumbo & Zaporowski's (2012) Variables 
Variable Significant at 5% Level? 
Per Capita Income * 
Percentage Change in Population 1990-2000 * 
Unemployment Rate  * 
Percentage Change in Earnings Per Worker 1986-2001 * 
Economic Diversity Index from BEA * 
State Aid Per Capita * 
State General Obligation Bond Rating * 
Debt to Market Value (Ratio of Full Faith and Credit Debt to 
Population Weighted Median Value of Housing) * 
Non-Guaranteed Debt Per Capita   
Per Capita Interest Payments for Nonutility Debt   
Per Capita General Revenues * 
State Imposed Taxation Limit * 
State Imposed Expenditure Limit * 
 
 
Objections to Rating Based Analysis 
Researchers who model ratings rather than defaults, implicitly assume that the 
former predict the latter.1 However, if ratings do not change in response to underlying credit 
conditions experienced by municipal bond issuers, they may not be an effective proxy for 
default risk. Under SEC rules, rating agencies are required to publish transition matrices 
showing the distribution of rating changes over a given period. A review of the transition 
matrices published by Moody’s Corporation (2012), Standard & Poors Corporation (2012a) 
                                                          
1 In fairness to the authors of these studies, it is worth pointing out that most do not make the claim that ratings 
proxy default probability. When modeling credit ratings, researchers may have goals other than estimating default 
probability. For example, they may be interested in modeling rating agency behavior. 
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and Fitch, Inc. (2012) suggests that about 90% of municipal bond ratings remain unchanged 
within a given year. 
For example, an S&P transition matrix (for non-housing municipal issuers) shows that 
89.11% of AA rated issuers remained AA the following year, while 0.18% were upgraded to 
AAA, 1.62% were upgraded to AA+ and a total of 9.09% were downgraded to various rating 
categories ranging from AA- down to BB+.  
The S&P matrix represents all rating change activity that occurred between 1986 and 
2011. During most of this period, a substantial proportion of municipal bond ratings 
reflected insurance “enhancements”. So-called monoline insurers like Ambac, FGIC and MBIA 
– which were rated AAA – sold bond insurance policies to municipalities guaranteeing that 
any missed bond payments would be covered by the insurer. Consequently, the ratings 
assigned to these insured issuers were AAA – reflecting the estimated credit quality of the 
insurer. During the 2007-2008 financial crisis, all monoline bond insurers went out of 
business or suffered ratings downgrades (Palumbo & Zaporowski, 2012). 
While the insurance was in place, ratings might have appeared to remain stable 
despite changes in municipal credit conditions, simply due to the stability of the insurer’s 
credit rating. However, Fitch’s NRSRO ratings transition exhibit states that the ratings 
analyzed are “unenhanced” which means they reflect the underlying credit quality of the 
issuer excluding any insurance benefit. We expect that that is also the case for the S&P and 
Moody’s tables. 
Insurance coverage aside, municipal ratings stability could be explained by some 
combination of three factors. First, underlying credit conditions for most issuers do not 
materially change from year to year. Second, ratings grades are too coarse to capture many 
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credit quality changes. And, third, rating agencies do not perform sufficient surveillance 
activities to detect and respond to many changes in issuer credit quality. To the extent that 
the second and third causes are explanatory, they pose challenges to the use of ratings as a 
proxy for default probability. 
Little evidence is available to determine the relative weight of each of these three 
factors. One item that may be relevant is the criticism rating agencies received for their 
inadequate monitoring of Residential Mortgage Backed Securities (RMBS) and Collateralized 
Debt Obligations (CDO) prior to the financial crisis of 2007 and 2008. The United States 
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (2011) found that: 
Resource shortages impacted the ability of the credit rating agencies to conduct 
surveillance on outstanding rated RMBS and CDO securities to evaluate their credit risk.  
The credit rating agencies were contractually obligated to monitor the accuracy of the 
ratings they issued over the life of the rated transactions.  CRA surveillance analysts were 
supposed to evaluate each rating on an ongoing basis to determine whether the rating 
should be affirmed, upgraded, or downgraded.  To support this analysis, both companies 
collected substantial annual surveillance fees from the issuers of the financial 
instruments they rated, and set up surveillance groups to review the ratings.  In the case 
of RMBS and CDO securities, the Subcommittee investigation found evidence that these 
surveillance groups may have lacked the resources to properly monitor the thousands of 
rated products. At Moody’s, for example, a 2007 email message disclosed that about 26 
surveillance analysts were responsible for tracking over 13,000 rated CDO securities. (p. 
314). 
 
Since these findings relate to structured securities rather than municipal bonds, it is 
possible that they are not relevant. On the other hand, it is reasonable to think that if rating 
companies under-invested in surveillance for their most profitable asset class – structured 
finance - (Cornaggia, Cornaggia & Hund, 2011), they probably made similar under-
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investments in the surveillance of other asset classes. It is the co-author’s contention, - based 
on his experiences at a major rating agency - that surveillance procedures for structured 
assets were actually superior to those undertaken for municipal bonds. 
Estimating Default Probability from Market Prices 
A number of researchers have attempted to derive default probabilities from bond 
yields or Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads (Longstaff, Mithal & Neis, 2004). In theory, bond 
yields should be a function of their credit risk. More specifically, yields should compensate 
investors for the expected loss arising from a potential default. In the literature, expected loss 
is defined as the product of default probability and loss given default (LGD). LGD is simply 
the complement of a bond’s rate of recovery, and is also called “loss severity”. 
Theoretical bond yields contain a number of components aside from expected loss. 
Bohn, Arora and Agarwal (2004) propose an equation for corporate bond yields that includes 
the risk free rate of interest, the level of investor aversion to risk, the bond’s maturity date, 
issuer size (as a proxy for liquidity) and the correlation of the bond’s default risk with that of 
other instruments. Yields may also be affected by call provisions that give issuers the option 
to redeem their bonds prior to maturity. 
With respect to municipal bonds, a further complexity arises as a result of their tax 
status. Since interest on most municipal bonds is exempt from federal, state and local income 
taxation, their yields are not comparable to those on taxable securities. Some adjustment to 
the municipal bond yield must be made in order to make it “taxable equivalent”. One 
approach is to convert the tax free yield to a taxable yield based on the highest prevailing 
marginal tax rate, on the assumption that municipal investors are predominantly high 
income individuals. However, given the complexities of the tax code, the heterogeneity of 
 DRAFT 17 DRAFT 
individual investors and the participation of institutional investors (with different tax 
considerations), the use of the top marginal rate is a relatively strong assumption. Chalmers 
(1998) finds that interest rate differentials between long term US Treasuries and federally 
insured municipals (which are assumed to have no default risk) are not consistent with the 
tax benefits available to individuals in the top tax bracket. 
The literature includes a number of efforts to decompose municipal bond yields into 
default risk and other components. Wu (1991) found that the risk aversion factor was not 
significant, but his functional form excluded recovery rates. Wu, Wang & Zhang (2006) 
offered a more comprehensive model that included a static recovery rate assumption. The 
authors attributed a substantial portion of municipal bond yields to liquidity factors. 
In corporate credit markets, analysts often derive default probabilities from CDS 
spreads rather than bond yields. Credit Default Swaps are insurance contracts against 
default. If the issuer defaults, the CDS seller (or insurer) pays the protection buyer the face 
value of the bond and takes the bond in exchange. Deriving default probabilities from CDS 
spreads is easier than using bond yields because CDS have fewer complexities, such as call 
provisions. The applicability of CDS implied default probabilities to the municipal market is 
greatly limited, however, by the fact that CDS trades against a relatively small number of 
municipal issuers, and trading volume is low even for those issuers for which CDS are 
available. 
A final concern regarding market implied default probabilities pertains to how 
efficiently markets price credit risk. Decomposing yields into default probabilities and other 
components implicitly assumes that bond prices are efficient, i.e. that they accurately reflect 
all available information. This assumption is consistent with the strong form of the Efficient 
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Markets Hypothesis (EMH) markets advanced by Fama (1970). More recently EMH 
generally, and the strong form of the hypothesis in particular, have come under attack 
(Summers, 1986; Crotty, 2011). Most tests of EMH have involved equities rather than bonds. 
In a 2003 survey of EMH literature, Malkiel (2003) identified only one study addressing bond 
market efficiency, and that paper found inefficiency in the pricing of corporate bonds (Keim 
& Stambaugh, 1986). Since large capitalization stocks experience much higher trading 
volumes than municipal bonds, it is not clear that EMH applies at all to the latter asset class. 
Indeed, there is a substantial literature documenting the lack of liquidity and transparency in 
the municipal bond market – suggesting the existence of substantial inefficiencies (Ang & 
Greene. 2011). 
In summary, the task of deriving default probabilities from municipal bond yields is 
impeded by both the complexities of decomposing yields into their components and the 
likelihood that observed yields do not efficiently incorporate credit risk insight. 
Default Probability Modeling Using Logit and Probit Techniques 
More recent efforts to model bond default probabilities have used logit and probit 
techniques. An obvious advantage of logit and probit over Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) for 
default probability modeling is that the dependent variable is restricted to a range of 0 to 1. 
In addition, the use of a binary endogenous variable, like default/non-default, violates a 
number of assumptions of the OLS model. (Menard, 2002). 
Because corporate bankruptcy has been much more common than municipal default, 
the academic literature contains many more efforts to model the former. Ohlson (1980) was 
first to apply a logit model to corporate bankruptcy modeling.   
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Shumway (2001) built upon previous logit models by using panel rather than cross 
sectional data.  This approach addresses the fact that most bankrupt firms were solvent for 
many years before going into distress, and that it is thus useful to analyze a time series of 
data for each firm.  
The literature also contains applications of probit models to corporate bankruptcy 
starting with Zmijewski (1984). Moody’s RiskCalc is a commercial private firm default 
probability model that uses probit. The RiskCalc methodology document written by 
Falkenstein, Boral & Carty (2000) suggests that the choice of probit over logit was not a 
significant one, as the two models usually produce similar results. On the other hand, Altman 
& Sabato (2007) assert that logit models have outperformed probit models in the corporate 
bankruptcy field. 
Probit and logit models are functionally similar, with the key difference being the fact 
that probit is based on a cumulative normal probability density function, whereas logit uses a 
logarithmic distribution. This latter distribution has more observations in its left and right 
tails and fewer observations at its center. Ameniya (1980), in his extensive survey of binary 
choice and other discrete choice models concludes that “it does not matter much whether 
one uses a probit model or a logit model, except  in  cases  where  data  are  heavily 
concentrated in the tails due to the characteristics of the  problem being studied (p. 1487).” 
Although the published literature does not appear to include general obligation 
municipal bond default probability models that employ logit and probit techniques, 
Bialaszewski (1985) applied a logit model to a set of municipal revenue bonds – issues which 
are supported by user fees and other operating revenues collected by the issuing agency 
rather than with tax revenues. Bialaszewski collected financial, economic and demographic 
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data for 36 defaulted revenue bonds and for 36 comparable bonds that did not default. She 
then created models using data at issuance, two years prior to default, one year prior to 
default and at the time of default. Different variables were significant in each model. She 
reported that her one year prior to default model accurately classified 87% of the 
observations into defaulting and non-defaulting categories, where these categories were 
defined in terms of a “cut point” in the calculated probabilities. Her cut point of 65.8% was 
set to produce the highest degree of accurate classification. It may be more appropriate to 
use a fixed cut point of 50%, since probability estimates over that level could be reasonably 
characterized as default predictions, while probabilities under this level could be seen as 
predictions of non-default. The significant variables in Bialaszewski’s regression were: (1) 
Total Population, (2) Percentage of Population that is Non-White, (3) Debt Service as a 
Percentage of Total Revenue, (4) Welfare Payments as a Percentage of Total Revenue and (5) 
Short Term Debt as a Percentage of Cash and Security Holdings. 
Since the observations involved revenue bonds, the theoretical case for some of the 
variables in this specification is not immediately apparent. For example, welfare payments 
are financed by a municipality’s general fund, and should thus not be expected to compete 
with revenue bondholders for priority. On the other hand, non-white population and welfare 
dependency levels may be indicators of poverty. Impoverished residents may be less able to 
pay fees required to service debt incurred by the facilities that defaulted. 
Finally, the use of race-based criteria for evaluating municipal bonds has been subject 
to criticism. Yinger (2010) finds that general obligation municipal bond ratings penalize 
communities with relatively high non-white populations despite the lack of evidence that 
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these communities are more likely to default. He characterizes this result as a form of 
redlining and argues for municipal bond rating regulation to curtail this practice. 
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Great Depression Review and Analysis2 
 
Since 1940, interest or principal payment defaults on US municipal bonds have been 
rare. This is especially true of general obligations bonds – those backed by the full faith and 
credit of a state, county, city or other governmental unit with taxing authority. By contrast, 
there were about 4800 reported municipal bond defaults during the 1930s (ACIR 1973; 
Fons, Randazzo & Joffe, 2011).  
With the assistance of colleagues and a data entry vendor, Joffe (2012) collected 
information on approximately 5000 defaults from the period 1920 to 1939. The primary 
sources were contemporary Moody’s Municipal and Government Bond Manuals (now 
published and owned by Mergent Corporation), and back issues of the Daily Bond Buyer and 
weekly Bond Buyer. Joffe (2012) also found and catalogued defaults from state-level bond 
listings and other documents housed in state archives, Reconstruction Finance Corporation 
records, local newspaper accounts and other sources. 
In their book, This Time is Different, Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff (2009) 
marshaled older data in their analysis of banking and sovereign debt crises. Due to the 
paucity of recent defaults, a similar approach may be applicable to US municipal bonds.  In 
contrast to some areas of fixed income - such as mortgage backed securities - institutional 
change in the municipal sphere over the last century has been incremental rather than 
revolutionary. Political and budgetary processes at the state and local level have evolved 
relatively slowly in the context of a stable national political framework.  Older municipal 
                                                          
2 This section contains previously published research that originally appeared in Fons, Randazzo and Joffe (2011) 
and Joffe (2012).  However the statistical analysis presented below has been updated for this report.  
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defaults are thus more relevant to modern experience than older defaults in other asset 
classes. 
The goal of this chapter is to mine the Depression-era municipal bond default record 
to learn whatever insights it can offer for present day credit research. This is done by 
providing a brief description of the 1930s municipal credit crisis and by developing a 
quantitative default probability model.  
The Depression Era Municipal Default Wave 
According to US Treasury statistics reported by The Bond Buyer, the dollar volume of 
municipal bonds outstanding more than quadrupled between 1913 and 1931 – a period 
during which the CPI rose 54%. The boom in municipal issuance during this period is largely 
attributable to the inception of the federal income tax and the popularization of automobile 
travel. Municipal bond interest was exempt from income taxes since the levy’s 1913 
inception, creating demand for these securities among high income investors. On the supply 
side, automobiles created a need for paved roads – which states, counties and cities often 
financed with bonds. Communities also used bonds to finance drainage, irrigation and levee 
projects to support agricultural developments and to fund school construction.  
Those concerned about today’s municipal credit quality correctly point to the rapid 
growth in municipal bonds outstanding in recent years.  But the growth in municipal bonds 
outstanding between 1913 and 1931 far exceeded the rate of increase over the eighteen 
years up to 2010 – and both of these booms were outpaced by growth following World War 
II, during the years 1946 to 1964. While the pre-Depression municipal bond boom ended 
with a spike in defaults, the post-War expansion was not followed by a similar circumstance.  
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Bank Closings, Bank Holidays and Municipal Bond Defaults 
It is also worth considering that the peak in estimated municipal default rates 
coincided with a nationwide outbreak of bank failures and bank holidays. In a 1933 survey of 
1,241 state, city and county financial officials, Martin Faust (1934, 1936) found that slightly 
more than half of their governmental units had funds in closed banks. The municipalities 
surveyed had a total of over $98 million tied up in these failed institutions.  Faust estimates 
that the aggregate balance in failed banks for all state and local governments would have 
been $450 million – more than 2% of the principal outstanding on municipal bonds at the 
time.  Contemporary accounts attributed many of the defaults to the closure of banks in 
which funds intended for bondholders had been deposited.  
A major source of distress for municipalities in North Carolina, Louisiana, Arkansas, 
Tennessee and other southern states was the November 1930 collapse of Caldwell & 
Company and its affiliates.  Founder Rogers Caldwell, dubbed the “J.P. Morgan of the South” 
had built a large business marketing municipal bonds issued by southern states. Bond 
proceeds were typically held at Caldwell’s Bank of Tennessee until they were required by the 
issuer. According to John McFerrin’s (1939) history of Caldwell and Company, most issuers 
required that their deposits be supported by high quality collateral – typically other 
municipal bonds. Caldwell often pledged such bonds as collateral initially, and then 
substituted illiquid, high-risk real estate bonds without notifying the issuer. In addition to 
following deceptive practices, Caldwell looted bank assets to finance an extravagant lifestyle.  
On November 7, 1930, a Tennessee state audit declared Caldwell & Company 
insolvent. News of this declaration triggered runs on Caldwell and numerous affiliated banks 
throughout the South. In Tennessee alone, $9 million in county and municipal deposits were 
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lost. Caldwell’s failure triggered a run on affiliates, including Central Bank and Trust 
Company in Asheville, North Carolina, which was followed by runs on other area banks. 
Property Tax Delinquencies 
While the vast majority of the enumerated defaults occurred in special districts, 
school districts and small towns, the Depression-era did witness several spectacular defaults 
by large issuers including Cleveland and Detroit. New York City, the nation’s largest 
municipality back then, also experienced a brief default in December 1933. Chicago, then the 
nation’s second largest city, narrowly avoided default by refinancing its bonds at lower 
interest rates. Cook County – which encompasses the city – failed to make scheduled interest 
and principal payments, as did a number of independent taxing districts within the city’s 
limits. 
As statistics collected at the time by Dun & Bradstreet (Bird, 1936) suggest, major city 
defaults during the Great Depression were preceded by substantial spikes in tax delinquency 
rates. For example, the tax delinquency rate in Detroit rose from 10.8% in fiscal year 1930 to 
17.2% in 1931, 25.0% in 1932 and 34.8% in 1933 – the year in which it defaulted.  In New 
York and Chicago, delinquency rates peaked at 26.5% and 42.4% respectively. 
Although many of the property tax delinquencies were undoubtedly the result of 
economic distress, the early 1930s was also a period of organized tax revolts. This long-
forgotten tax resistance movement is described in David Beito’s 1989 book Taxpayers in 
Revolt. Beito argues that the resistance was in large measure a reaction to substantial 
increases in property taxes during the preceding decade. This increased burden was often 
accompanied by stable or falling property values, since the 1920s was a time of weak real 
estate prices. 
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Beito traces the history of the property tax resistance movement in Chicago where 
anti-tax activism was most potent. The Chicago resistance was led by the Association of Real 
Estate Taxpayers (ARET), an organization originally formed by relatively affluent investors, 
but which later attracted broad support among the City’s skilled blue collar workers worried 
about maintaining their foothold in the middle class.  At its peak, ARET leaders hosted a 
thrice-weekly radio program and the organization had 30,000 members. 
As the following table indicates, large cities were especially vulnerable to property tax 
delinquencies due to their heavy reliance on real estate taxes. According to 1931 Census data 
on which this table is based, the average city received about two thirds of its revenue from 
this one source. 
 
Share of Total Revenues from Property Taxes, Cities Over 300,000, 1931 
City Property Tax Revenue Share 
Baltimore, MD 66.8% 
Boston, MA 69.3% 
Buffalo, NY 69.6% 
Chicago, IL 67.2% 
Cincinnati, OH 58.9% 
Cleveland, OH 67.4% 
Detroit, MI 61.2% 
Houston, TX 74.6% 
Indianapolis, IN 86.8% 
Jersey City, NJ 70.9% 
Kansas City, MO 64.2% 
Los Angeles, CA 52.5% 
Louisville, KY 69.3% 
Milwaukee, WI 67.1% 
Minneapolis, MN 72.3% 
New Orleans, LA 61.8% 
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City Property Tax Revenue Share 
New York, NY 70.8% 
Newark, NJ 69.1% 
Philadelphia, PA 71.8% 
Pittsburgh, PA 81.2% 
Portland, OR 65.7% 
Rochester, NY 66.5% 
San Francisco, CA 59.5% 
Seattle, WA 47.5% 
St. Louis, MO 62.5% 
Washington, DC 56.1% 
 
While over-reliance on one revenue source can be attributed to the relative lack of 
municipal finance sophistication at the time, part of the problem was beyond the control of 
city governments. According to Census statistics reported by C. E. Rightor (1938) in 
Municipal Finance, roughly 4-1/2% of major city revenue was derived from alcohol taxation 
in 1916. This revenue source disappeared with Prohibition, and did not return until the 18th 
Amendment was repealed in 1933. Additional policing costs associated with Prohibition-
related organized crime must have further contributed to the cities’ fiscal distress. 
Public Employee Pensions 
Contemporary concerns about municipal bond defaults are often linked to public 
pensions, but underfunding is not unique to our era. During the Great Depression, many 
retired government workers were eligible for pensions. Buck (1936) notes that before the 
establishment of pensions, older municipal employees would continue to report for work 
even though they could no longer perform their jobs (at least not to the satisfaction of 
contemporary management). Supervisors, guided by a humanitarian impulse rather than a 
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concern for the bottom line, were reluctant to fire these older employees. Administrators 
thus reached the conclusion that it would be less expensive to pension off the older workers 
at a percentage of their former salary. 
Many cities had not yet created pension funds and those that did often failed to make 
actuarially appropriate contributions. A 1937 National Municipal League Consulting Service 
survey of Atlanta’s finances reported serious underfunding in the city’s three pension funds: .  
It is obvious from these figures that the firemen's fund with a cash balance of $491.38 
is no fund at all. Nor are the reserves of either the general or police funds even a faint 
approximation of what they should be to guarantee the payment from the fund of its 
probable obligations. ... Firemen this year who paid money into their pension fund saw 
it go out again immediately to pay other firemen's pensions. Their sacrifice in no way 
built up for them any protection. They have in fact nothing to rely on but the naked 
promise of the city as their security for old age. We would recommend therefore that in 
all the pension funds the employee's contribution be treated as a trust fund and 
invested for him in securities or in the purchase of an annuity. 
That said, the NML consultants were not advocates of full funding:  
We believe on the other hand that it is not necessary for a public body deriving its 
income from taxes to accumulate a fund as if it were a private insurance company. 
Unless there are some predictable sharp upturns in the curve of natural retirement 
there is no reason why the City should not pay pensions out of income. The integrity 
and solvency of the city should be a sufficient guarantee to the employee that the city 
will fulfill its pension contract. In fact if the city went bankrupt any fund it might have 
accumulated would probably disappear in the crash. 
Atlanta public employee pensions at the time were generous – at least by the 
standards of today’s private sector. Employees could retire on 50% of their salary after 25 
years of service, regardless of age. Survivor benefits were also provided.  Atlanta avoided 
default during the Depression and evidence reviewed thus far does not attribute any case of 
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municipal default during the 1920-1939 timeframe to employee pensions. Although pensions 
were available to Depression-era public employees, legal protections for these benefits have 
increased in recent decades. It may be appropriate to conclude that pension benefits were 
junior to debt service in a government’s priority of payments during the 1930s, while today 
these two types of obligation appear to be almost pari passu, that is, on equal footing. 
Data Selection 
Today, the municipal bond market covers a broad range of issuers. This diversity was 
also present – albeit to a lesser extent – in the years prior to World War II. The municipal 
bond default list compiled in Joffe (2012) includes 5079 issuers who failed to make timely 
and complete principal or interest payments (or who obliged investors to accept refunding 
bonds in lieu of cash at maturity) at some time between 1920 and 1939. Most of the 
defaulting issuers were school districts, small towns and special tax districts – created to 
build roads and other infrastructure. 
Financial data for special assessment districts and for school districts is more limited 
than for other issuer categories. Moody’s bond manuals provide some data, but it is 
incomplete and not in a consistent format. The best data is available for states and large cities 
because they reported their financial statistics to annual Censuses at the time.  
Comprehensive financial data for smaller cities and counties was collected by decennial 
Censuses in 1922 and 1932. 
Since annual Census data is available for a substantial number of larger cities, and 
since these cities experienced a significant number of defaults, the statistical analysis is most 
readily applicable to this subset of issuers.  
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For fiscal years 1930 and 1931, the Census Bureau reported financial statistics for 
311 US cities with population over 30,000 (as of April 1, 1930). After 1931, the collection 
effort was scaled back, perhaps due to budgetary pressures at the federal level. In fiscal years 
1932 and 1933, the Bureau reported similar statistics for 94 cities with population over 
100,000 (also as of April 1, 1930). In fiscal 1934, Honolulu was added to the annual data set. 
Thus annual time series of fiscal data are available from the Census for 94 cities during the 
Depression period while more limited data is available for an additional 217 cities. In all, a 
total of 1000 city/year observations are available for the period FY 1930-1935. Data 
reported for each entity include revenues by category, expenditures by category, as well as 
various classifications of assets and debt. 
Of the 311 cities in the sample, 46 had defaults on general obligation bonds between 
1930 and 1936, implying a cumulative default rate of 15% for this sample. The overall 
municipal default rate during this period was about 16%. Among the non-defaulting cities, 
some had “forced refundings” in which investors were obliged to exchange maturing bonds 
for new ones with later maturities. Many others had defaults on special assessment bonds 
which were not general obligations of the cities. In the following analysis, none of these 
instances are classified as a default – but adjusting the default classifications in light of these 
circumstances is a reasonable task for future research. 
Some defaults were attributed at the time to bank closures or bank holidays. Since 
FDIC insurance is now available, it would be reasonable to exclude defaults that really were 
the result of banking issues. However, reclassifying such defaults should only be done after 
an intensive reading of contemporary newspapers to confirm that they were fully 
attributable to banking problems. In certain cases, city officials may have used bank closures 
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or holidays as a pretext to obscure fiscal problems that rendered the city unable or unwilling 
to pay even if funds had not been temporarily frozen. Thus, these classification adjustments 
are also left to future research. 
Once a city defaults, its data may become idiosyncratic as it suspends interest 
payments and possibly writes down principal. For example, Miami’s interest costs fell from 
$2.2 million in 1929 to $0.3 million in 1933. News sources indicate that the city first 
defaulted in 1930. Since the purpose of the analysis is to predict default, post-default 
observations are dropped from the data set, resulting in the loss of 43 observations. Of the 
remaining 957 city/year pairs in the sample, 125 are associated with defaulting cities. 
Although several hundred series are available in the Census data, most of them relate 
to small components of revenue and expenditure. This still leaves a number of aggregate 
revenue, expenditure, debt and asset series that may yield useful explanatory variables. 
Below, variables are evaluated in ratio form to maximize their modern relevance despite the 
substantial increase in population, price levels and per capita economic output that have 
occurred over the last 80 years. 
Conceptual Model and Variable Selection 
The ratio most commonly used in discussions of sovereign credit is the debt-to-GDP 
ratio, and that concept is sometimes applied to lower levels of government. The fiscal Census 
data do not include GDP or any other indicia of economic activity. More recently, regional 
income account statistics have been reported for states, metropolitan areas and counties in 
recent years, but most series do not extend back to the Depression era.   
Although reliable measures of total economic output are not available at the 
municipal level, other demographic and macroeconomic variables can be employed. Previous 
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studies have used population, assessed valuation and per capita income as independent 
variables in default probability or rating prediction models. 
Given fiscal data is available, the use of demographic and macroeconomic variables 
may not be necessary. The choice of whether to pay or default upon debt service obligations 
is made by the political leaders of a governing unit. The most immediately accessible data 
available to these officials include the size of the interest or principal payment that needs to 
be made, what financial resources are available to the government to make the payment and 
what other spending priorities are competing with the debt service obligation.  
Consequently, the model constructed here is derived solely from fiscal measures.  We present 
several alternative models in Appendix 1 that do include socioeconomic variables.  The 
models presented in the Appendix 1are also subjected to alternate specifications and 
estimation strategies as checks on the robustness of the results presented here. 
Rating agencies use a number of purely fiscal metrics that can be estimated directly 
from the municipal Census data set. One commonly used metric is the ratio of interest costs 
to revenue. The rationale for including this ratio is that a default becomes likely when 
interest costs become so onerous that they threaten to crowd out other spending priorities. 
When the interest burden is low, it is not rational for a political leader to default, because he 
or she then loses access to capital markets and is thus compelled to reduce spending or raise 
taxes. As interest expenses rise, this disincentive is increasingly likely to be outweighed by 
the near term political costs of cutting spending on popular programs. 
This theoretical underpinning does have a couple of limitations that should be noted. 
First, defaults often occur when a principal payment – rather than an interest payment – 
becomes due. In the Depression era, cities were more vulnerable to principal repayment 
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defaults because the concept of serialized maturities had yet to become popular. Large bond 
issues were typically scheduled to mature all at once. Many obligors accumulated revenues in 
“sinking funds” to meet these large debt repayments, while others expected to pay off the 
maturing bonds by issuing new ones. When sinking fund assets declined in value and the 
new issue market dried up, many governments were unable to redeem or roll over maturing 
issues. In the aftermath of the Depression experience, public finance specialists began to 
advocate serialized maturities, under which a large bond issue is broken down into a number 
of smaller tranches whose principal becomes due at varying dates – often one year apart. 
Second, revenue may not be an ideal denominator, since political leaders may have 
the option of running surpluses or deficits. While many state and local governments are and 
have been subject to balanced budget requirements, these are typically prospective rather 
than retrospective and are often subject to evasion. On the other hand, using expenditures 
rather than revenues as a denominator is also an imperfect measure. Local governments 
cannot sustain large annual deficits indefinitely, so revenues appear to be a better indicator 
of their long term fiscal capacity. 
A review of the 957 city/year observations shows that defaulting cities tended to have 
higher interest to revenue ratios than those that did not default. This is reflected in the box 
and whisker plot below. Further, a one sided t test of the defaulting and non-defaulting 
sample means fails to reject the null hypothesis that defaulting cities have higher interest to 
revenue ratios than non-defaulting cities at p < .0001. The sample mean for defaulting cities 
is 16.1% versus 11.0% for cities that did not default. 
 
 
 DRAFT 34 DRAFT 
Figure: Box and whisker plot highlighting differences between defaulting and non-defaulting cities  
 
Several of the Non-Defaulting observations with high Interest to Revenue Ratios were 
associated with two cities in Virginia: Norfolk and Portsmouth. Ackerson and Chamberlain 
(1935) report that Virginia implemented unique municipal default legislation in 1932. The 
Virginia law – which remains on the books3 – authorizes the Governor to investigate and 
withhold state aid to defaulting municipalities and to directly pay the withheld money to 
bondholders. Since gubernatorial action under this law is triggered by a petition from 
holders of affected bonds, the law does not appear to directly stop defaults, but does create 
an incentive on the part of local officials to avoid default.   
                                                          
3 Section 15.2-2659 of the Virginia Statutes states: Whenever it appears to the Governor from an affidavit filed 
with him by or on behalf of the owner or owners of any general obligation bonds of any locality, or by any paying 
agent for the bonds that the locality has defaulted in the payment of the principal of or premium, if any, or interest 
on any of its outstanding general obligation bonds, the Governor shall immediately make a summary investigation 
into the facts set forth in the affidavit. If it is established to the satisfaction of the Governor that the locality is in 
default in the payment of its bonds or the interest on them, the Governor shall immediately make an order 
directing the Comptroller to withhold all further payment to the locality of all funds, or of any part of them, 
appropriated and payable by the Commonwealth to the locality for any and all purposes, until the default is cured. 
The Governor shall, while the default continues, direct in writing the payment of all sums withheld by the 
Comptroller, or as much of them as is necessary, to the owners of the bonds in default, or the paying agent for the 
bonds, so as to cure, or cure insofar as possible, the default as to the bonds or interest on them. 
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Aside from the absolute burden of debt services, changes in available resources may 
be expected to enter into the default decision. For example, if revenues are declining, officials 
may face the choice of reducing public services below baseline levels or defaulting. Thus 
year-on-year revenue changes should be predictive of default. This analysis is supported by 
the Depression-era data. A one sided t test for defaulting and non-defaulting governments 
rejects the null hypothesis that annual revenue changes for the former group are not less 
than the latter at p < 0.001. The mean revenue change for defaulting observations is -2.3% 
versus +0.1% for the non-defaulting cases. Unfortunately, the use of this variable entails the 
loss of some observations. Revenue change is not directly observable from the Census data of 
any one year; for any given annual Census; it must be calculated by comparing revenues from 
the current Census to the prior one. The first Census used in the data set is that of 1930, so 
1929 revenues are required to make data from that year usable. While 1929 census data is 
available, it only included 250 of the 311 cities in the 1930 census, resulting in the loss of 61 
observations. Of the remaining 896 observations, 117 are associated with a defaulting city. 
A city’s liquid assets may be expected to act as a cushion against default. The Census 
data contains several categories of cash. Given the great variance of city size in the sample 
and the need to produce a time-independent model, any cash balance must be scaled. Since 
cash may be used to pay interest or principal, it can be reasonably scaled by converting it to a 
proportion of outstanding debt.  
The t-test shows that Cash in Public Trust Funds as a Percentage of Gross Debt fails to 
reject the null hypothesis that this factor does not correctly differentiate defaulting and non-
defaulting cities at p=.01 . Since data is available for all cities in 1930, the full 957 
observations can be included in the test. The mean cash balance for the 832 non-default 
 DRAFT 36 DRAFT 
observations is 0.92% of debt, while the mean for the 125 default observations is only 0.16%. 
The t statistic for the Public Fund Cash to Debt Ratio was somewhat higher than two other 
ratios tested - All Cash Assets as a Percentage of Gross Debt and All Assets as a Percentage of 
Gross Debt - although both of these ratios are significant at the 5% level. 
Theoretically, a city could sell fixed assets to remedy a shortfall, but it may not be 
feasible to do so quickly enough to avert a default. Other cash balances, such as those in 
pension funds, could in theory be borrowed to make debt service payments, but there may 
be legal barriers to accomplishing that. While controlling for these factors may add 
explanatory power to the model, doing so does not appear to be feasible in this current 
analysis. 
Finally, it is reasonable to argue that a cash balance three or four years prior to a 
default is less relevant than the amount of cash available closer to the time of the actual 
default. The data set contains 21 observations in which the data’s as of year is coincident 
with the city’s default date, i.e. the fiscal data is from the year in which the city actually 
defaulted. (The other 25 defaults occurred in smaller cities after 1931, when the census 
stopped collecting their financial data.) The average Cash in Public Trust Funds as a 
Percentage of Gross Debt for these 21 observations is only 0.06% versus 0.83% for the 
remaining 936 observations. 
If data for the smaller cities post-1931 could be collected, it may be possible to 
implement a balanced-panel logit regression like that described by Shumway (2001). This 
approach would allow the cash variable to play a stronger role in the model. In recognition of 
this potentiality, the cash variable (identified as the cash to debt ratio) is included in two of 
the models described in the next section, but it falls out in the final specification. 
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Population appears in a number of the models found in the literature and is also 
considered by rating agencies.  In theory, population should be inversely related to default on 
the grounds that smaller cities are likely to be less diversified (and thus more risky) and that 
they are also more likely to have operational problems that would trigger a default. 
This theory does not appear to be supported by summary statistics from the 311-city 
data set. The 46 cities that defaulted had an average population of approximately 321,000 
while the 265 non-defaulting cities had an average population of roughly 127,000. 
Population averages provide a distorted view because they overweight larger cities. At the 
time (much like now), New York was the nation’s largest city by a considerable margin. The 
fact that it defaulted adds substantially to the average population of defaulting cities. 
One way to address this bias is to rank the cities from 1 to 311 and then compute the 
average rank of defaulting and non-defaulting cities. This analysis yields an average rank of 
128 for defaulting cities and 161 for non-defaulting cities - also counter to theory.  Population 
is excluded from the fiscal-ratio model presented in the next section, however as mentioned 
above, Appendix 1 contains extensions of the model that include population and other 
socioeconomic and demographic variables. 
Statistical Methodology 
The current study applies a binary response technique to a larger number of 
geographically representative issuers than Hempel (1971, 1973) could access. Since 
municipal bankruptcy is a rare event, it is preferable to use a model that differentiates 
between observations in the tail – suggesting a choice of logit over probit. 
As detailed above, analysis of the data set identified three fiscal variables that have 
both empirical and theoretical support. These are: (1) interest to revenue ratio, (2) revenue 
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percentage change and (3) cash (in public trust funds) to (gross) debt ratio.  Summary 
statistics for these variables are presented in the table below. 
Table: Summary Statistics, Depression Era Sample 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
DEFAULT 957 0.131 0.337 0 1 
Interest_as_Pct_of_Revenues 957 0.117 0.054 0 0.388 
Receipts_Percent_Change 896 0.005 0.124 -0.333 1.282  
Public_Cash_Pct_of_Gross_Debt 957 0.008 0.079 0 1.455 
 
 As mentioned earlier, there are fewer observations for the variable 
Receipts_Percent_Change as this variable requires receipts (revenue) data from two years, 
and the 1929 Census contained data for fewer cities than did the 1930 Census.   
The equation below states the model described above mathematically: 
(	
) = () 
where 	
  is the binary dependent variable indicating whether or not city  is in 
default in year , (∙) is the cumulative standard logistic distribution function,  is a 
matrix that contains the three fiscal-ratio variables summarized in the table above.  Finally, 
 is a vector of coefficients to be estimated by maximum likelihood.  The results of 
estimating this equation are given in the first column of the table below. 
Table: Logit Analysis, Depression Era Sample 
VARIABLES DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT 
Interest_as_Pct_of_Revenues 14.48*** 15.03*** 14.94*** 25.47*** 
 
(1.765) (1.618) (1.815) (3.857) 
Receipts_Percent_Change -2.212** -2.167** -2.104** -1.182 
 
(0.878) (0.861) (0.973) (1.242) 
Public_Cash_Pct_of_Gross_Debt -31.44 
   
 
(35.060) 
   Constant -3.746*** -3.884*** -3.862*** -4.767*** 
 
(0.301) (0.253) (0.283) (1.068) 
Estimation strategy Logit Logit Firthlogit Firthlogit 
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Standard errors in parentheses Robust Robust Homoskedastic Homoskedastic 
State and year fixed effects? No No No Yes 
Observations 896 896 896 896 
Chi2 95.6 95.14 73.97 148.2 
 
In the first column of the table above, one can see that the estimated coefficients on 
Interest_as_Pct_of_Revenues, Receipts_Percent_Change, and Public_Cash_Pct_of_Gross_Debt 
have the theoretically predicted sign; namely, high interest expense relative to revenues 
increases probability of default, while a positive revenue change or high cash reserves 
reduces the probability of default.  However, the coefficient on 
Public_Cash_Pct_of_Gross_Debt has a high standard error and the hypothesis that the true 
coefficient is zero cannot be rejected at conventional confidence thresholds.   
In the interest of developing a parsimonious model, the next column estimates a 
restricted version of the equation; in particular in this new specification the variable 
Public_Cash_Pct_of_Gross_Debt is dropped.  As one can see from comparing the coefficient 
estimates across the first two columns, dropping the cash variable does not substantially 
change the magnitude of the other coefficients. 
It is possible that a failure to include certain unobserved factors, for example state 
rules that affect a city's likelihood of defaulting, are biasing the estimates.  It is also possible 
that the fiscal ratio variables had differential impacts on cities in different states (that is, 
there may be heterogeneous effects as well as fixed effects.) While a more detailed analysis 
of these possibilities is left for future research, given the panel nature of the data, it is 
straightforward to implement a fixed-effect strategy as a first pass at controlling for 
unobserved state and time effects (even if this does not address the possibility of 
heterogeneous effects.) A complication that arises in a fixed-effect logit context, due to the 
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so-called separation problem (where a lack of variation in the dependent variable for cities 
in some states prevents the possibility of estimation) requires that a new estimation 
strategy must be employed if fixed effects are to be included.   
The specification reported in column three includes the same variables that were 
included in the specification in column two.  However, the estimation strategy differs (the 
coefficients in column three were estimated using Stata's firthlogit package; note, this 
package does not allow for estimating robust standard errors.)  Comparing the coefficient 
estimates across columns two and three, one can see that the different estimation 
strategies produce very similar estimates.  That is, the coefficient estimates are virtually 
identical, whether the estimation strategy is logit or firthlogit. 
Finally, the column four presents estimates from a model with the same estimation 
strategy as in column three, but which includes state and time fixed effects along with two 
fiscal ratio variables.  From the results in column four, one may conclude that the results in 
columns two and three may understate the magnitude of the effect of the variable 
Interest_as_Pct_of_Revenues while the magnitude of Receipts_Percent_Change may be 
overstated.   
The coefficient estimates from column two can be used to estimate the default 
probabilities for cities in-sample and out-of-sample as shown below.  The default probability 
formula implied by the model is: 
(	
|) =
1
1 + (.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Where IR = Interest_as_Pct_of_Revenues, and ∆R = Receipts_Percent_Change.   Although one 
may prefer to use estimates from the fixed-effect model from column four, we presented 
default probability predictions using the results from column two because they are simpler 
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and aid in exposition.  If one wanted to use column four’s results, the constant term should 
then reflect the fixed-effect for California, which is -2.073 (so the constant would be -4.767-
2.073 = -6.84, and the coefficients on ∆R and IR would be -1.182 and 25.47 respectively. 
Limitations  
The use of varying numbers of observations per city (i.e. an unbalanced panel) gives 
greater weight to the larger cities in estimating the model's coefficients.  In addition, the 
exclusion of socioeconomic variables which have been used in much of the previous 
municipal credit literature is unorthodox.  As already mentioned, we address these issues by 
providing a set of alternative models using the Depression-era data set in the Appendix. 
Further data supplementation may facilitate comparisons between city financials in 
the fiscal year of default to those one, two or three years away from defaulting. It may also 
permit model specifications that could incorporate a measure of the city’s cash reserves. 
The explanatory variables in the foregoing analysis were based on composite 
financials for all governmental units within the city. A better approach would involve using 
only data from the municipal government itself – which is identified as the “city corporation” 
in the Census reports. 
Despite these limitations, the empirical analysis presented here supports the common 
sense view that revenue declines and large debt service costs lead to defaults. The model also 
allows us to quantity these vulnerabilities in a way that may permit reasonable estimation of 
default probabilities for current issuers. Although the data is many decades old, it addresses 
a timeless issue affecting municipal leaders in a liberal democracy: how to trade off service 
demands from the electorate with the need to maintain credibility among bond investors.  
 DRAFT 42 DRAFT 
Municipal Bond Defaults in California: History and Case Studies  
Over California’s 160 year history, city bond defaults have been relatively rare. 
Default activity has varied over time, peaking during the Depression. This chapter surveys 
the entire history of payment defaults by California cities, with sections on each of the five 
cities filing municipal bankruptcy petitions since 2001. It concludes with a brief discussion 
of defaults attendant to the dissolution of Redevelopment Agencies and a review of city 
fiscal emergencies. 
Pre-1930 
For the period from statehood through 1930, Hillhouse (1935) lists eight defaults 
ascribed to California cities, but a review of original sources indicates that not all of these 
are legitimate defaults in the contemporary sense. 
The highest profile municipal bond default in California’s early years was that of 
Placerville in 1866. Three years earlier, the city issued $100,000 in bonds to finance a rail 
connection to Folsom, where service from Sacramento terminated at the time. The funds 
were invested in the newly created “Placerville and Sacramento Valley Railway Company”. 
The company was unable to complete the railroad, terminating it 12 miles short of the city. 
Meanwhile, Placerville suffered declining population due to the end of the Gold Rush. In 
1866, the city stopped making interest and principal payments. In 1873, city leaders 
decided to avoid personal liability by disbanding the municipal government. In 1900, the 
city government was re-established and an accommodation was made with the holders of 
$34,500 still outstanding.  
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Holders of $7000 in Placerville fire department bonds issued earlier in 1863 did not 
fare as well. In the case of Wichman v. City of Placerville (1905), 81 Pac. 537, the California 
Supreme Court invalidated their bonds. Placerville was incorporated by the State 
legislature in 1859 and then reincorporated on April 6, 1863 when it was authorized to 
issue the railroad bonds. The previous city corporation issued the fire department bonds 
on April 3. The court held that the bonds were obligations of a liquidated city corporation 
and thus not the responsibility of the new government.  California courts invalidated a 
number of other city bonds listed among Hillhouse’s defaults. These cases are listed below: 
City Issue Case Description 
Sacramento General obligations 
issued in 1854. 
Bates v Gregory 
(1891) 26 Pac 891 
City was reincorporated in 1863. Bonds 
matured in 1874 but were not 
presented for payment until 1887. 
Court ruled that under the statute of 
limitations, the city’s liability for the 
bonds lapsed in 1878. 
San Diego Railroad Aid bonds 
issued in 1874 
McCoy v. Briant 
(1878), 53 Cal 247 
and Lehman v. City 
of San Diego 
(1897), 83 Fed 669 
In McCoy v. Briant, bonds were invalid 
because Board of Trustees failed to 
pass a resolution authorizing them. In 
Lehman v. City of San Diego, bonds 
were issued after statutory 
authorization was repealed but 
antedated so that they would appear to 
be valid. 
San 
Francisco 
Dupont Street and 
Montgomery Avenue 
street construction 
bonds issued in 1872 
and 1877 respectively 
Shapter v. San 
Francisco (1901), 
110 Fed. 615 and 
Liebman vs. City 
and County of San 
Francisco (1885), 
24 Fed. 705 
The Dupont Street bonds were held to 
be a special assessment and thus an 
obligation of neighborhood property 
owners rather than a general obligation 
of the city. The Montgomery Avenue 
bonds were determined to be 
obligations of a public works 
corporation, rather than city general 
obligations. The public works 
corporation’s taxing authority had 
previously been invalidated in Mulligan 
v. Smith (1881), 59 Cal 206. 
Santa Cruz Water works bonds 
issued in 1885 
Santa Cruz Water 
Company v. Kron 
(1887), 15 Pac 772 
Bond issued after enabling state 
legislation was passed but prior to its 
effective date. 
Sources: Dean (1912), Court Filings 
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Hillhouse also lists a San Francisco default on Improvement Obligations, but his 
reference - Sakolski (1932) - suggests that the payment failures dating to the 1850s were 
not related to bonds. Apparently, San Francisco, like many gold rush era boomtowns issued 
scrip to compensate vendors before taxes were collected. San Francisco was unable to 
redeem the scrip with cash in a timely manner and its value depreciated. Sakolski describes 
the exploits of one speculator, Peter Smith, who bought a substantial amount of the scrip at 
a discount and then profited by obtaining judgments against the city – compelling it to 
redeem the IOUs by selling its real estate holdings. State and local governments across the 
country have resorted to issuing scrip at various times. The state of California did so in 
2009 during a budget impasse. Although the use of scrip may be characterized as a default 
in the popular press, it does not meet the definition of a payment default used by 
contemporary bond market participants or in this study. 
The last default listed by Hillhouse involved the City of Stockton in 1870. In that 
year, voters overwhelmingly approved $300,000 to fund the proposed Stockton & Visalia 
Railroad (Tinkham, 1923). The Council expected the new railroad to lay 15 miles of new 
track terminating at the San Joacquin River and connecting it to the rest of the Central 
Valley. The railroad laid one mile of new track connecting Stockton to a pre-existing 
railway line, and then demanded payment from the City (Burrill, 2011). Stockton’s City 
Council refused to levy taxes required to service the bonds, which appear to have been held 
by the railroad. After extended litigation, the city and the railroad reached an out of court 
settlement (Tinkham, 1923). 
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Depression Era 
California local government issuers experienced a substantial number of defaults 
during the Great Depression. Most of these defaults affected irrigation and reclamation 
districts as well as special assessment districts (older equivalents of today’s Mello Roos 
issuers). Prior to the Depression, many special assessment districts had been created to 
pave roads and build other local infrastructure under the state’s 1915 Improvement Act. 
Available documents contain reports of 11 California towns and cities that defaulted 
on general obligation bond payments. These defaults are listed in the following table. 
City Population Date Comments Source 
Alturas 2,400 As of 11/1936 Defaults on both General Obligation 
and 1915 Act Bonds. Cause not given. 
Voters approved issuance of refunding 
bond issue in December 1936. 
Moody's 
Government 
Securities Manual 
1937, p.228 
Arcadia 5,216 1/1/1932 Defaults on water, street and library 
general obligation bonds. Three 
corporate taxpayers who accounted for 
30% of the town's property tax revenue 
became delinquent. 
Bond Buyer, 
4/7/1934, p. 825.  
Benicia 2,913 10/1/1932 Cured by May 1933. Cause not given. Bond Buyer, 
5/27/1933, p. 1115. 
Blythe 1,020 1930 Population fell after a 1922 flood. 
Special assessment defaults began in 
1927. General obligations defaulted in 
1930. City clerk told The Bond Buyer 
that "the taxes were so prohibitive that 
no taxes could be collected. At one 
time our tax rate was over $36 per 
hundred." 
Bond Buyer, 
7/2/1935, p. 1763 
Brawley 11,300 As of 
10/1/1935 
26% of fiscal 1935 tax levy uncollected 
within the fiscal year. 
Moody's 
Government 
Securities Manual 
1936, p.173 
Calexico 6,299 As of 
9/11/1933 
Property tax revenue decline due to 
lower assessments and higher 
delinquencies. 
Moody's 
Government 
Securities Manual 
1934, p.202 
Calipatria 1,554 As of 11/18/33 Only 65% of tax levy was collected in 
1931. 
Moody's 
Government 
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Securities Manual 
1934, p.202 
Culver 
City 
7,500 As of 6/30/34 Fall in property tax collections Moody's 
Government 
Securities Manual 
1936, p.175 
 
Imperial 1,943 As of 
11/17/1933 
50% of fiscal 1933 tax levy uncollected 
within the fiscal year. 
Moody's 
Government 
Securities Manual 
1934, p.204 
Lynwood 10,000 As of 7/25/39 Tax delinquencies rate exceeded 30% in 
the mid-1930s but had fallen 
substantially by the time the default 
was reported. 
Moody's 
Government 
Securities Manual 
1940, p.150 
Oroville  3,698 1/1/1933 Cured by May 1933. Cause not given. Bond Buyer, 
5/25/33, p. 1093.  
Vacaville 1,556 11/1/1932 Default not due to lack of funds, but 
rather a clerical oversight.  Missed 
coupon paid in full less than one month 
late. 
Bond Buyer, 
11/30/32, p. 2892.  
 
None of the defaulting cities had population of more than 12,000. According to the 
1932 Census of State and Local Governments, 40 of the state’s cities had populations in 
excess of 12,000 at the time – suggesting that solvency problems during the Depression 
were confined to smaller cities. However, it should be noted that several larger cities 
experienced defaults in special assessment districts. Los Angeles, already the state’s largest 
city, contained thirty defaulting districts. San Diego and Oakland also had assessment bond 
defaults. 
Property tax delinquencies appear to be the primary cause of Depression era 
defaults. As noted in the table, a number of cities experienced delinquency rates in excess 
of 30%. It is reasonable to assume that the bonds were issued with the expectation that the 
bulk of property taxes would be paid on a timely basis. When this did not occur, towns and 
cities with substantial debt burdens became unable to meet them. This is consistent with 
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the nationwide trend described in the previous chapter. It is why we include Annual 
Revenue Change as a factor in our models. 
Post 1940 
After the Depression, benign credit conditions returned. Only three defaults by a city 
(as opposed to a special assessment district) appear to have occurred between 1940 and 
1993.  In 1965, Redondo Beach defaulted on an unrated $9 million harbor bond issue. 
According to a contemporary Moody’s Government Securities Manual (1968), the bonds 
were secured by revenues from the boat harbor and taxes collected in the harbor area in 
excess of the amount realized in fiscal 1958. The bonds were thus tax supported but not a 
general obligation or general fund obligation of the city. According to the Wall Street 
Journal (1965), “The city blamed the default on a number of factors including construction 
delays, unusually severe winter storms in 1962 and the failure of expected offshore oil 
revenue to materialize.” The Journal report went on to state that the 1959 feasibility study 
for the harbor project had been “overly optimistic”. 
In 1982, Parlier defaulted on general obligation bond payments, as well as debt 
service obligations to a bank and the Farmers Home Administration. The city’s population 
was reported as 2902 or 5093 by different sources perhaps because it was in the process of 
annexing an unincorporated area known as West Parlier. According to the US Advisory 
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1984), the city had $110,000 in general 
obligation bonds outstanding and defaulted on a $6000 debt service payment. As of 
December 15, 1982 the city had total debts of $819,089 and cash of only about $2000.  A 
Los Angeles Times article (Taylor, 1982a) attributed the city’s financial distress to a cost 
overrun on a recently completed community center, and the initial failure of an industrial 
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park project to attract tenants. Interest in the park suffered after a carcinogen was found in 
the town’s well water.  The Times coverage also cited fiscal mismanagement which included 
the lack of a “meaningful audit” of the city’s books between 1975 and 1982.  The ACIR 
report notes that the city ran persistent deficits ahead of the financial crisis, culminating in 
a fiscal 1982 shortfall that amounted to 36% of revenues. 
Once the extent of the crisis was determined, the city took drastic action to avoid a 
municipal bankruptcy and cure its various defaults. Measures included terminating 16 of 
the 22 city employees. The terminations included all of Parlier’s police officers as Fresno 
County took responsibility for local law enforcement (Taylor, 1982b). By June 30, 1983 the 
city had resolved all of its defaults. 
In 1993, the small city of Arvin defaulted on $2.945 million of Certificates of 
Participation used to finance temporary housing for farmworkers. In early 1994, it 
defaulted on $7.89 million in Certificates of Participation used to finance a golf course 
(Altman, 1994). Although the city considered a chapter IX filing, it appears to have reached 
an accommodation with certificate owners. According to Mysak (2010), bondholders 
received about 28 cents on the dollar for the defaulted golf course COPs. 
In 1998, the City of Healdsburg issued $7 million in bonds on behalf of Nuestro 
Hospital Group to purchase the local hospital (California Healthline, 1998). The bonds did 
not constitute a claim on tax revenues and apparently went into default when the hospital 
generated insufficient revenue to service them. We were unable to locate further 
information about this default, which is listed in Mergent Corporation’s municipal bond 
database. 
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Since 2001, five California cities have made municipal bankruptcy filings under 
Chapter IX of the federal bankruptcy: Desert Hot Springs (2001), Vallejo (2008), Stockton 
(2012), Mammoth Lakes (2012) and San Bernardino (2012). Four of these situations also 
involved municipal bond defaults.  We describe each of these cases in separate sections 
below. 
Desert Hot Springs 
Although Desert Hot Springs December 19, 2001 bankruptcy filing (case number 
6:01-bk-30756-DN Central District of California) followed an adverse court decision, its 
financial problems were not wholly attributable to the lawsuit. In fact, the city’s 1999 
default on unrated revenue anticipation notes occurred well before the bankruptcy filing. 
According to financial statements attached to offering documents available on the 
MSRB EMMA system, the city experienced large and growing all-fund deficits in fiscal 1995, 
1996 and 1997. The city also experienced a large general fund deficit in fiscal 1997 – 
amounting to 36% of revenues. 
On August 27, 1997, the City issued $1,275,000 in Revenue Anticipation Notes 
bearing a 4.75% interest rate and due the following year. These notes, rated F-2 by Fitch, 
were apparently redeemed with proceeds from a second set of Revenue Anticipation Notes 
issued on September 30, 1998. This second issue, totaling $1,415,000 was unrated and 
carried an 8.25% interest rate – a clear signal of the city’s financial distress. 
Selected fiscal statistics for Desert Hot Springs gathered from contemporaneous 
financial statements are provided in the accompanying tables. All governmental fund 
revenues fell 4% in fiscal 1997 but rose 7% and 8% in 1998 and 1999 respectively.  These 
robust increases were primarily attributable to intergovernmental revenue; real estate 
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assessment and property tax revenues were relatively weak during this period, despite the 
strong national housing market. A later filing on EMMA (City of Desert Hot Springs, 2004) 
shows that assessed valuations rose 3% in fiscal 1998 and fell 1% in fiscal 1999. Overall, 
valuations remained stagnant throughout the mid and late 1990s, dropping slightly from 
$490.6 million in fiscal 1994 to $487.0 million in 1999. 
Interest expense accounted for 17% of all fund revenue in 1996 and 15% in 1997 
and 1998.  Also, in 1998, Pension Contributions became a significant budgetary factor, 
following the city’s entry into the CalPERS.  In 1999, the city’s interest expense fell due to 
the default. 
While aggregate governmental fund balances remained positive ahead of the city’s 
default, Desert Hot Springs’ general fund balance fell below zero in fiscal 1996 and became 
increasingly negative ahead of the 1999 default. General fund exhaustion appears to be the 
key driver of the Desert Hot Springs default – a theme that repeats in the Vallejo, Stockton 
and San Bernardino cases described below. 
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City of Desert Hot Springs - All Governmental Funds
Statement of Revenues, Expenditures and Changes in Fund Balances
1996 1997 1998 1999
Revenues
Taxes 3,910,047      3,778,247      3,921,255      3,461,885      
Permits and fees 186,355          158,992          250,835          549,967          
Intergovernmental 956,230          1,008,842      1,491,961      2,089,252      
Licenses 145,208          120,710          115,212          113,607          
Interest 582,585          323,448          343,186          256,268          
Miscellaneous 268,671          398,663          56,404            202,337          
Total Revenues 6,049,096      5,788,902      6,178,853      6,673,316      
Expenditures
General government 1,743,931      1,872,688      1,775,738      2,052,264      
Public safety 2,078,876      2,987,568      2,666,403      2,393,606      
Public works 467,096          525,026          911,993          730,159          
Parks and recreation 466,688          576,999          74,700            41,053            
Capital outlay 851,832          425,726          771,725          60,478            
Principal 918,297          2,523,996      416,657          22,253            
Interest 1,009,056      860,125          895,990          365,347          
Economic development 192,688          100,204          193,161          307,922          
Prior year expenditures 603,889          207,344          165,894          652,175          
Total Expenditures 8,332,353      10,079,676    7,872,261      6,625,257      
Excess (Deficiency) of Revenues over Expends. (2,283,257)    (4,290,774)    (1,693,408)    48,059            
Other Financing Sources (Uses) + Adjustments 427,784          424,579          118,580          (302,887)        
Net Change in Fund Balances (1,855,473)    (3,866,195)    (1,574,828)    (254,828)        
Beginning Fund Balances 11,246,073    9,390,600      5,524,405      3,949,577      
Ending Fund Balances 9,390,600      5,524,405      3,949,577      3,694,749      
Pension Contributions 40,957            203,951          200,000         
Annual Revenue Change -4.30% 6.74% 8.00%
(Interest + Pension) / Revenue 16.68% 15.57% 17.80% 8.47%
Source:  Audited Financial Reports, FY 1996-1999. 
Pension contributions for 1999 not available; estimated value entered.
Total Governmental Funds
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City of Desert Hot Springs - General Fund
Statement of Revenues, Expenditures and Changes in Fund Balances
1996 1997 1998 1999
Revenues
Taxes 2,235,026    2,200,461    2,337,528    2,160,812    
Permits and fees 168,770       141,281       169,281       512,408       
Intergovernmental 582,359       606,870       598,647       740,025       
Licenses 145,208       120,710       115,212       113,607       
Interest 35,048          3,297            30,161          5,503            
Miscellaneous 233,125       335,812       53,369          171,578       
Total Revenues 3,399,536    3,408,431    3,304,198    3,703,933    
Expenditures
General government 1,375,135    1,417,084    1,448,594    1,617,127    
Public safety 2,075,894    2,955,166    2,263,685    1,690,046    
Public works 93,952          81,959          233,801       177,311       
Parks and recreation 53,277          121,020       74,700          21,867          
Capital outlay -                     134,974       
Principal -                     46,095          42,152          
Interest -                     3,994            122,047       38,000          
Economic development -                     
Prior year expenditures 10,297          1,126            
Total Expenditures 3,608,555    4,625,318    4,319,953    3,545,477    
Excess (Deficiency) of Revenues over Expends. (209,019)      (1,216,887)  (1,015,755)  158,456       
Other Financing Sources (Uses) + Adjustments (663,407)      417,079       1,026            105,441       
Net Change in Fund Balances (872,426)      (799,808)      (1,014,729)  263,897       
Beginning Fund Balances 214,503       (657,923)      (1,457,731)  (2,472,460)  
Ending Fund Balances (657,923)      (1,457,731)  (2,472,460)  (2,208,563)  
Pension Contributions 40,957          203,951       200,000       
Annual Revenue Change 0.26% -3.06% 12.10%
(Interest + Pension) / Revenue 0.00% 1.32% 9.87% 6.43%
Source:  Audited Financial Statements, FY 1996-1999.
Pension contributions for 1999 not available; estimated value entered.
General Fund
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In 2000, voters ratified additional property taxes and utility taxes that were 
projected to raise $1.8 million in additional revenue (Deborah, 2000). The city may have 
been able to cure its default and avoid bankruptcy had it not suffered a legal setback in 
2001. 
As reported by Gold (2001) in the Los Angeles Times, Desert Hot Springs chose to 
enter Chapter 9 after losing a decisive battle in an 11 year fight with Silver Sage 
Developers. The litigation began in 1990 after the City Council threw out the company’s 
plan to build a mobile home park. The developer sued, claiming that the Council’s decision 
violated the Fair Housing Act by discriminating against low income families. The initial jury 
award to Silver Sage of $3 million was later reduced to $1 by a second jury. But, in July 
2001, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reinstated the $3 million award and added another $3 
million for interest and legal fees. On December 18, a federal judge declined to block Silver 
Sage from seizing city assets to satisfy the judgment. Desert Hot Springs filed for Chapter IX 
bankruptcy to forestall the asset seizure. 
Gold’s 2001 article also notes that developers had been hesitant to start projects in 
Desert Hot Springs because of the legal uncertainty. This effect may explain the relatively 
stagnant real estate assessments mentioned earlier. 
Vallejo 
On May 23, 2008, Vallejo became the largest city to file a Chapter IX bankruptcy 
petition (case number 2:08-bk-26813 Eastern District of California) since Congress first 
allowed municipal bankruptcies in 1934. Vallejo’s bankruptcy involved a default on 
Certificates of Participation (COPs). These certificates, unlike General Obligations or 
General Fund Obligations, are not senior claims on a city’s tax revenue. Instead, they 
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represent the investor’s share in lease revenues the city agrees to pay on certain facilities. 
As noted in the COPs offering materials, “the City could choose to fund other services 
before making Lease Payments” and that holders have limited recourse in the event of a 
default or bankruptcy (Wulf, Hansen and Company, 2003). 
According to documents filed with the court and posted on the city’s web site, 
bankruptcy was necessitated by the fact that the city’s general fund had been exhausted 
and was expected to continue running large deficits in FY 2009. Media coverage in early 
2008 also attributed the situation to high police and fire employee costs as well as 
unwillingness on the part of public safety unions to make concessions (see, for example, 
Jones, 2008 and Rohrs, 2008). 
Data retrieved from CAFRs and other reports during this period confirm the 
exhaustion of the general fund, but show large positive balances in other funds. A February 
28, 2008 staff memo showed $137 million in cash balances across all funds (Mayer, 2008). 
Governmental Fund balances reported as of June 30, 2008 in the CAFR were $105 million.4 
It would appear that the city could have avoided or postponed bankruptcy by 
lending money from other governmental funds to the general fund. The city may not have 
chosen this option because of a strict reading of Governmental Accounting Standards. 
Mayer (2008) states that these standards “as applied by the City and examined by our 
external auditors, permit short-term interfund borrowing … only to the extent that there is 
a demonstrated ability to repay these loans.” Further, staff appears to have underestimated 
the costs of the Chapter IX process. In a May 6, 2008 staff memo, bankruptcy costs were 
                                                          
4 As discussed by GASB (2006), the concept of fund balance varies across fund types, so aggregating balances 
across all funds may be misleading. 
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estimated at $750,000 to $2 million (City of Vallejo, 2008). A 2011 Wall Street Journal 
article put the final cost at $9 million (White, 2011). 
During each year between 1999 and 2003, the city issued COPs totaling more than 
$54 million. After the city filed its bankruptcy petition, Vallejo capped interest payments 
below the contractual rate. As the bankruptcy progressed, the City completely suspended 
interest and principal payments twice (City of Vallejo, 2011). At the end of the bankruptcy, 
the COPs were replaced with new lease agreements. Creditors are still entitled to receive all 
principal originally lent, but later than expected and with less interest than required by the 
original COPs. The city’s remaining debt, composed mostly of revenue bonds issued by 
Enterprise (i.e., business type or non-governmental) funds, was not adjusted. 
The accompanying tables show Total Governmental and General Fund values for FY 
2005-2009. The bankruptcy filing occurred at the end of FY 2008. Annual government-
wide revenue fell 5% in 2006, rose 4% in 2007 and fell almost 10% in 2008. While this last 
observation is consistent with the idea that falling revenue is predictive of default, it would 
not have been available until well after the bankruptcy filing since the CAFR in which it 
appeared was published several months after the fiscal year end. Some cities, including 
Vallejo, publish interim financials, so it may have been possible to estimate this value 
during the fiscal year. 
Interest and retirement costs as a proportion of total revenue were not especially 
high. In the year of the default, the ratio peaked at 11.36%. Overall, the parameters derived 
from the Depression data do not effectively predict the Vallejo default. On the other hand, 
large general fund deficits and low balances seem to have been the major contributors. As 
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suggested above, city management did not take all possible measures to stave off 
insolvency and appear to have been surprised by the high cost of the bankruptcy filing.  
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City of Vallejo - All Governmental Funds
Statement of Revenues, Expenditures and Changes in Fund Balances
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Revenues
Taxes 55,161,490    57,550,479    59,919,619    58,729,898    55,815,958    
Licenses, permits and fees 11,852,968    6,000,434      4,677,963      3,327,060      2,440,614      
Fines and forfeitures 1,450,743      3,887,337      1,683,911      1,827,945      1,560,809      
Intergovernmental 55,423,739    49,780,261    48,824,041    38,546,090    36,743,052    
Use of money and property 6,419,396      6,702,584      7,789,616      6,891,090      4,520,458      
Charges for services 14,692,748    11,326,489    17,925,042    20,234,105    20,026,448    
Other 2,717,589      4,448,399      4,543,088      1,833,312      841,040          
Total Revenues 147,718,673 139,695,983 145,363,280 131,389,500 121,948,379 
Expenditures
Current:
Legislative and advisory 311,994          323,174          270,743          292,370          215,485          
Executive 1,413,534      1,374,916      1,425,841      736,846          621,003          
Finance 1,286,935      1,864,644      1,926,168      1,159,374      1,696,164      
Human resources 973,717          1,282,442      1,319,304      723,493          553,254          
Law 628,677          764,614          871,733          892,284          863,429          
Development services 3,078,353      3,650,863      2,786,231      3,248,627      2,633,028      
Community development 52,217,190    39,856,041    46,712,048    33,707,475    39,056,197    
Fire services 22,742,661    24,723,674    28,072,502    28,063,568    23,107,207    
Police services 32,898,573    36,630,148    40,252,109    41,185,818    34,354,261    
Public works 12,204,692    13,793,065    13,486,711    14,077,984    12,713,924    
Nondepartmental 6,120,498      6,826,980      7,284,198      11,045,020    11,426,993    
Capital outlay 5,867,421      5,218,215      18,761,691    14,039,215    7,499,257      
Debt Service:
Principal 5,056,682      1,657,337      3,966,314      1,497,254      1,464,697      
Interest and fiscal agent fees 2,463,555      2,705,865      2,667,960      2,589,723      2,336,172      
Total Expenditures 147,264,482 140,671,978 169,803,553 153,259,051 138,541,071 
Excess (Deficiency) of Revenues over Expends. 454,191          (975,995)        (24,440,273)  (21,869,551)  (16,592,692)  
Total Other Financing Sources (Uses) 509,605          (1,613,209)    724,900          3,666,290      (513,905)        
Net Change in Fund Balances 963,796          (2,589,204)    (23,715,373)  (18,203,261)  (17,106,597)  
Beginning Fund Balances 148,931,220 149,895,016 147,305,813 123,590,440 105,387,179 
Ending Fund Balances 149,895,016 147,305,812 123,590,440 105,387,179 88,280,582    
Pension Contributions 9,599,955      11,293,291    11,734,043    12,332,457    10,372,222    
Annual Revenue Change -5.43% 4.06% -9.61% -7.19%
(Interest + Pension) / Revenue 8.17% 10.02% 9.91% 11.36% 10.42%
Source:  Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports, FY 2005-2009.
Total Governmental Funds
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City of Vallejo - General Fund
Statement of Revenues, Expenditures and Changes in Fund Balances
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Revenues
Taxes 51,579,991 53,083,876 55,617,416 53,821,263 51,071,916 
Licenses, permits and fees 7,436,293    3,440,959    2,749,888    2,431,928    1,846,301    
Fines and forfeitures 1,372,316    1,410,820    1,483,923    1,428,818    1,430,689    
Intergovernmental 11,191,393 14,321,658 11,553,159 12,718,335 11,908,871 
Use of money and property 558,743       546,224       262,559       473,351       599,651       
Charges for services 6,782,717    2,193,226    5,867,269    7,682,796    8,061,261    
Other 213,559       2,826,607    3,017,544    117,944       131,494       
Total Revenues 79,135,012 77,823,370 80,551,758 78,674,435 75,050,183 
Expenditures
Current:
Legislative and advisory 311,994       323,174       270,743       247,668       215,485       
Executive 1,170,568    1,310,691    1,312,440    736,846       621,003       
Finance 1,274,935    1,864,644    1,926,168    1,159,374    1,696,164    
Human resources 973,717       1,282,442    1,319,304    723,493       553,254       
Law 628,677       764,614       871,733       892,284       863,429       
Development services 2,199,270    2,338,949    2,726,448    2,812,419    2,457,265    
Community development -                     416,290       559,173       795,304       744,688       
Fire services 20,715,988 22,533,874 25,238,098 25,286,403 20,424,746 
Police services 32,013,022 35,264,688 38,050,873 38,204,475 31,487,056 
Public works 4,615,794    5,055,339    4,052,169    4,210,768    3,987,009    
Nondepartmental 5,902,455    5,041,656    6,228,746    9,868,036    9,894,757    
Capital outlay 114,776       -                     -                     -                     -                     
Debt Service:
Principal 127,330       581,866       543,912       286,700       219,899       
Interest and fiscal agent fees 5,962            125,755       78,727          99,577          50,157          
Total Expenditures 70,054,488 76,903,982 83,178,534 85,323,347 73,214,912 
Excess (Deficiency) of Revenues over Expends. 9,080,524    919,388       (2,626,776)  (6,648,912)  1,835,271    
Total Other Financing Sources (Uses) 649,886       (3,919,060)  (1,208,499)  3,140,555    (1,022,443)  
Net Change in Fund Balances 9,730,410    (2,999,672)  (3,835,275)  (3,508,357)  812,828       
Beginning Fund Balances 4,125,934    13,856,344 10,856,672 7,021,397    3,513,040    
Ending Fund Balances 13,856,344 10,856,672 7,021,397    3,513,040    4,325,868    
Pension Contributions 9,599,955    11,293,291 11,734,043 12,332,457 10,372,222 
Annual Revenue Change -1.66% 3.51% -2.33% -4.61%
(Interest + Pension) / Revenue 12.14% 14.67% 14.66% 15.80% 13.89%
Source:  Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports, FY 2005-2009.
General Fund
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Mammoth Lakes 
The Town of Mammoth Lakes filed a Chapter IX bankruptcy petition with the 
Eastern District of California Bankruptcy Court (Case Number 2:12-bk-32463) on July 3, 
2012. The town, which had 8234 residents in 2010, did not default on any of its bonded 
indebtedness and the bankruptcy case was dismissed on November 16, 2012. 
Mammoth Lakes filed for bankruptcy after it lost a law suit to Mammoth Lakes Land 
Acquisition LLC (MLLA), exhausted its appeals and failed to convince the plaintiff to reduce 
the amount of the judgment. MLLA sued the town because it reneged on a 1997 
development agreement in which MLLA improved the municipal airport in exchange for 
the right to build a hotel/condominium project at the site. The town did not grant approval 
for the hotel/condominium project because of safety concerns expressed by the Federal 
Aviation Administration, but officials were aware of these concerns when they signed the 
1997 agreement (Goodwin Proctor, 2011). The original judgment of $30 million awarded in 
2008 increased to over $42 million by early 2012 due to attorneys’ fees and interest. 
According to the Mammoth Lakes financial statements, the town had no general 
obligation bonds or revenue bonds outstanding when it filed, but did have about $2.5 
million in Certificates of Participation issued in 2000 and 2004. The 2000 COPs were rated 
while the 2004 issue was unrated and sold privately to Citizen’s Bank. After the bankruptcy 
filing, S&P downgraded the 2000 COPs issue from BB to C (Standard & Poors, 2012a). 
In the city’s initial plan of adjustment, it stated its intention to continue servicing the 
2000 COPs on time and in full. On the other hand, it planned to extend the term of the 2004 
Citizen’s Bank COPs by three years (Town of Mammoth Lakes, 2012a). 
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Ultimately, no default occurred because the Town reached a settlement with MLLA. 
Under the settlement, MLLA agreed to accept $29.5 million plus interest paid over 23 years. 
The town accommodated the annual cost of the settlement through budget cuts and by 
increasing its revenue forecast (Town of Mammoth Lakes, 2012b). Once the settlement was 
reached, the bankruptcy case was dismissed and S&P upgraded the 2000 COPs to BB+ 
(Standard & Poors, 2012b). 
Stockton 
The City of Stockton filed a Chapter IX petition on June 28, 2012 (case number 2:12-
bk-32118) after it was unable to secure concessions from creditors during the AB 506 
mediation process.5 Most of Stockton’s municipal bonds are insured by Ambac, National 
Public Finance Guarantee and Assured Guarantee.  
During the AB506 discussions the City stopped making debt service payments on 
2004 Lease Revenue Bonds. These bonds are secured by parking garage revenues and are 
not a general obligation of the City. The bond insurer, National Public Finance Guarantee, 
initially received payments from a reserve fund administered by the bond trustee. Once 
that fund was exhausted the trustee took possession of the three parking facilities covered 
by the lease agreement and diverted a portion of the proceeds to debt service (Wells Fargo, 
2013). 
In February 2013, the City reached an agreement with Ambac to scale back 
payments on 2003 Certificates of Participation, but the other two insurers continued to 
                                                          
5 Assembly Bill 506 requires cities contemplating a bankruptcy filing to engage in a neutral evaluation 
process with creditors. During the neutral evaluation process, which can last up to 90 days, the city is 
shielded from legal action on the part of creditors. 
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press their objections to the bankruptcy filing in court. They were joined by Franklin 
Templeton, which holds uninsured City obligations. On April 1, 2013, Judge Christopher 
Klein upheld the City’s bankruptcy filing clearing the way for it to reduce debt service 
payments without facing legal action. 
Stockton’s reasons for filing a bankruptcy were given in a recent news release: 
On July 1, 2012, the City had less than $2 million in cash, all of which would have been 
entirely depleted within the first few days of the fiscal year. It was not even enough to 
make the City’s July payroll. Thus, the City would not have been able to pay its 
employees, let alone its creditors, during any month of the 2012-2013 fiscal year. ... The 
City could not balance its budget outside of chapter 9, absent massive giveups by 
creditors who refused to make such concessions. The proposed 2012-2013 budget that 
City staff submitted to the City Council in May 2012 confirmed what the City already 
knew: It could not close its $26 million “gap” and balance its budget without chapter 9 
protection. Its anticipated revenues remained depressed. And while it had already made 
across-the-board reductions in employee costs, the costs of healthcare, pensions, and 
debt service in particular were trending upward (City of Stockton, 2013). 
As of this writing, the City’s 2012 CAFR has not been filed and no data for total 
governmental funds is available for the most recent fiscal year. The accompanying tables 
show data for fiscal 2008-2011. General fund estimates for 2012 and 2013 were derived 
from the city’s most recent budget report submitted to the City Council in March 2013. No 
more recent financial statistics appear to be available on Stockton’s web site. 
The 2011 data reflect $15 million in adverse prior period adjustments to the city’s 
general fund balance – part of $109.7 million in such adjustments across all funds. The 
adjustments are described in footnote 14 of the CAFR starting at page 129 (although the 
adjustments described in the note to not appear to account for the full $109.7 million in 
adjustments mentioned on page 4).  
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The General Fund adjustments included $12.3 million in allowances for doubtful 
accounts, $1.2 million in accrual adjustments, and $0.5 million for double counted parking 
citation revenue. Most of the adjustment to other Governmental Funds was attributable to 
a change in accounting method for city loan programs. Although the note does not explicitly 
say this, the adjustments appear to address the possibility that a large proportion of these 
loans will not be fully repaid. 
The fact that audited financials had to be adjusted post-filing compromises their 
usefulness for analyzing a city’s credit risk. If the data are not reliable, they may not 
provide meaningful insight. In this connection, it is worth noting that the vast majority of 
the adjustments are related to accrual accounting issues such as allowances for doubtful 
loans. These concepts are less concrete than cash values like total revenue, interest 
expense and pension cost. Thus they are more vulnerable to restatement. 
As in the case of Vallejo, Stockton’s filing is closely associated with general fund 
exhaustion. Although the city reported a $12 million general fund balance at the end of 
fiscal 2011 – just prior to its default – this amounted to less than 7% of annual 
expenditures.  
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City of Stockton - All Governmental Funds
Statement of Revenues, Expenditures and Changes in Fund Balances
2008 2009 2010 2011
Revenues
Taxes
Property 63,998,000 58,640,000 45,549,000 41,051,105
In lieu of sales tax 10,164,000 9,823,000 7,087,000 8,118,132
Utility user 30,861,000 30,854,000 30,717,000 30,993,997
Sales (levied by City) 9,409,000 7,921,000 7,652,000 7,875,429
Franchise fees 11,537,000 11,608,000 11,354,000 11,502,735
Business license 10,772,000 9,699,000 9,717,000 9,855,031
Hotel/motel room 2,287,000 1,962,000 1,749,000 1,798,740
Document transfer 686,000 702,000 559,000 583,418
Other 246,000 234,000 203,000 154,983
Licenses and permits 5,273,000 4,335,000 4,257,000 3,584,311
Federal grants and subsidies 13,617,000 12,976,000 26,034,000 33,243,873
Other shared revenue (sales and use tax levied by state) 36,098,000 31,245,000 28,856,000 30,060,798
Other governmental 59,976,000 53,498,000 47,779,000 47,929,416
Charges for services 55,244,000 31,462,000 26,174,000 21,261,669
Fines and forfeitures 3,321,000 4,499,000 5,090,000 3,538,020
Use of money and property 12,922,000 13,234,000 11,962,000 14,966,292
Investment income:
Interest income 13,100,000 11,375,000 5,352,000 1,338,707
Refunds and reimbursements 4,253,000 4,113,000 5,186,000 9,789,326
Miscellaneous 8,515,000 13,429,000 8,449,000 7,594,326
Total revenues 352,279,000 311,609,000 283,726,000 285,240,308
Expenditures
Current:
General government 22,285,000 24,272,000 21,818,000 30,900,316
Public safety 168,372,000 163,339,000 152,714,000 152,526,746
Public works 18,464,000 16,113,000 14,029,000 13,528,150
Library 13,432,000 12,485,000 11,041,000 10,252,107
Parks and recreation 27,185,000 22,376,000 17,948,000 19,669,013
Capital outlay 135,071,000 105,384,000 84,194,000 66,974,739
Debt service:
Principal retirement 1,017,000 3,973,000 11,739,000 22,661,216
Cost of issuance 777,000 99,000 846,000 0
Interest and fiscal charges 10,771,000 11,938,000 12,523,000 12,705,728
Total expenditures 397,374,000 359,979,000 326,852,000 329,218,015
Excess (Deficiency) of Revenues over Expenditures (45,095,000) (48,370,000) (43,126,000) (43,977,707)
Total Other Financing Sources (Uses) 53,608,000 7,122,000 39,911,000 4,869,469
Special Items 0 (8,736,000) (288,000) 3,269,612
Net Change in Fund Balances 8,513,000 (49,984,000) (3,503,000) (35,838,626)
Prior Period Adjustments 0 0 0 (109,666,067)
Beginning Fund Balances 303,721,000 312,234,000 262,250,000 258,748,200
Ending Fund Balances 312,234,000 262,250,000 258,747,000 113,243,507
Pension Contributions 17,715,000  20,512,027  21,110,516  21,030,435    
Annual Revenue Change -11.54% -8.95% 0.53%
(Interest + Pension) / Revenue 8.09% 10.41% 11.85% 11.83%
Source: CAFRs
Total Governmental Funds
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City of Stockton - General Fund
Statement of Revenues, Expenditures and Changes in Fund Balances
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Revenues
Taxes
Property 37,077,000       33,030,000       29,170,000       28,318,427       26,375,894       25,988,000       
In lieu of sales tax 10,164,000       9,823,000         7,087,000         8,118,132         8,392,001         9,937,924         
Utility user 30,861,000       30,854,000       30,717,000       30,993,997       31,504,354       31,943,600       
Sales (levied by City)
Franchise fees 11,537,000       11,608,000       11,354,000       11,502,735       12,464,835       11,611,700       
Business license 10,134,000       9,197,000         9,289,000         9,249,774         8,915,457         8,900,000         
Hotel/motel room 2,287,000         1,962,000         1,749,000         1,798,740         1,932,630         1,940,000         
Document transfer 686,000             702,000             559,000             583,418             603,313             495,000             
Other 2,000                 1,000                 2,000                 
Licenses and permits 377,000             641,000             392,000             339,636             395,949             370,109             
Federal grants and subsidies 467,000             55,000               44,417               
Other shared revenue (sales and use tax levied by state) 31,900,000       27,522,000       25,623,000       26,550,862       29,504,817       29,696,242       
Other governmental 24,872,000       25,299,000       27,160,000       26,370,481       27,624,762       31,872,634       
Charges for services 10,213,000       11,894,000       13,043,000       10,763,721       1,907,657         1,890,668         
Fines and forfeitures 3,302,000         4,492,000         5,045,000         3,452,493         1,729,835         1,115,605         
Use of money and property 2,462,000         3,669,000         7,082,000         7,417,175         6,651,317         
Investment income:
Interest income 1,316,000         1,126,000         888,000             (387,403)           260,885             (6,328)                
Net increase (decrease) in value of investments 302,000             593,000             178,000             
Refunds and reimbursements 3,709,000         3,583,000         2,300,000         9,092,383         872,486             298,596             
Miscellaneous 6,086,000         10,763,000       6,091,000         1,075,037         (291,469)           (60,500)             
Total Revenues 187,287,000    187,226,000    177,784,000    175,284,025    158,844,723    155,993,250    
Expenditures
Current:
General government 15,089,000       13,871,000       11,469,000       12,665,758       16,812,203       16,512,454       
Public safety 143,955,000    141,427,000    133,901,000    134,539,420    123,753,893    115,287,031    
Public works 13,936,000       11,965,000       3,541,000         3,515,999         7,438,423         6,805,947         
Library 10,695,000       9,937,259         3,977,759         3,907,000         
Parks and recreation 8,904,000         6,724,000         15,814,000       17,323,254       10,374,653       8,742,603         
Capital outlay 86,000               46,000               60,000               158,851             500,000             575,000             
Debt service: 3,013,468         978,560             
Principal retirement
Cost of issuance 30,000               99,000               177,000             
Interest and fiscal charges
Contingency 850,000             2,000,000         
Total expenditures 182,000,000    174,132,000    175,657,000    178,140,541    166,720,399    154,808,595    
Excess (Deficiency) of Revenues over Expenditures 5,287,000         13,094,000       2,127,000         (2,856,516)       (7,875,676)       1,184,655         
Total Other Financing Sources (Uses) (11,198,000)     (7,097,000)       (2,392,000)       7,053,572         1,578,515         836,528             
Special Items (6,340,000)       (4,793,000)       
Net Change in Fund Balances (5,911,000)       (343,000)           (5,058,000)       4,197,056         (6,297,161)       2,021,183         
Prior Period Adjustments 5,124,000         (15,088,027)     
Beginning Fund Balances 28,992,000       23,081,000       28,205,000       8,059,178         12,256,234       4,342,349         
Ending Fund Balances 23,081,000       22,738,000       23,147,000       12,256,234       5,959,073         6,363,532         
General Fund
Sources:  CAFRs, 2012-13 Adopted Budget (http://www.stocktongov.com/files/2012-13_Final_Budget.pdf); 2012-13 Budget Update 2Q 
(http://www.stocktongov.com/clerk/granicusagendas/citycouncil/20130319.pdf)  
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San Bernardino 
The City of San Bernardino filed a Chapter IX petition on August 1, 2012 (case 
number 6:12-bk-28006-MJ) after defaulting on a general fund debt service payment due 
July 20, 2012. 
Citing the exhaustion of the city’s general fund and an estimated fiscal year 2013 
general fund deficit of $45.8 million, San Bernardino staff recommended that the city 
declare bankruptcy and adopt an emergency budget that deferred debt service payments, 
retiree health contributions and other items. Staff argued that these steps were necessary 
to meet the City’s payroll on August 15. The affected obligations included Taxable Pension 
Obligation Bonds Series 2005-A and Refunding Certificates of Participation issued in 1999. 
All city obligations were insured so the defaults did not directly affect bondholders. The 
affected insurers, Ambac and National Public Finance Guarantee filed objections to the 
City’s bankruptcy filing.  
Ultimately, the City defaulted on a July 20, 2012 pension obligation bond debt 
service payment but appears to be continuing to perform on its COPs6. The City has defined 
the Pension Bond as part of its overall pension expense, which it has chosen to defer. 
As of this writing, the bankruptcy case is still being litigated, so the ultimate 
outcome is unknown. The court docket and media reports (summarized by Shafroth, 2012-
2013) suggest that the San Bernardino case is particularly contentious for a number of 
reasons (Reid, Podkul & McNeill, 2012): 
 
                                                          
6 An August 15, 2012 court filing on behalf of National said that the city had informed the insurer it would not be 
making an $861,000 payment due that date. However, the EMMA system shows no payment default for the 
affected bond. 
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• The City skipped the 60-day AB 506 creditor mediation process before filing, 
arguing that it has a right to do so because the City Council declared a fiscal 
emergency.   
• The City suspended payments to CalPERS at the time of its filing.   
• A total of 51 city employees (about 4% of the work force) retired in the three 
months prior to the filing, receiving $2 million for unused sick and vacation time  
 
In October 2012, the SEC announced an informal investigation into San Bernardino’s 
finances. In January 2013, both the interim city manager and finance manager resigned. 
Finally, in March 2013, the State Controller’s office accused the City of improperly 
transferring $529 million in former Redevelopment Agency assets to the San Bernardino 
Economic Development Corporation. Given these troubles, the City is very likely to face 
very large legal costs associated with the bankruptcy process. This outcome may deter 
other cities from filing Chapter IX petitions. 
The accompanying tables show San Bernardino’s total government and general fund 
revenues and expenditures leading up to the bankruptcy filing. As of this writing, the 2012 
CAFR has not appeared; incomplete data was obtained from budget documents. Since 
budget documents do not use the modified accrual basis of accounting employed in CAFRs 
the 2012 numbers are likely to vary somewhat from the final audited amounts that will 
appear in the CAFR. 
For the general fund, we provide both the original 2013 budget estimates presented 
to the Council in July 2012 when it authorized the Chapter IX filing and estimates presented 
in February 2013 as part of the 2013-14 budget presentation. The projected deficit shrank 
from $45.8 million to $6.3 million. While most of this change is the result of the city’s 
pendency plan implementation, the original deficit calculation appears to have been 
pessimistic. 
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Ci ty of San Berna rdino - Al l  Governmental  Funds
Statement of Revenues , Expenditures  and Cha nges  in Fund Balances
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 unaudited 2013 revi s ed
Revenues
Taxes 135,605,049 138,027,508 120,443,480 123,896,615
Licenses  and permits 11,116,513 10,048,833 8,796,052 8,516,516
Impact fees 5,268,475 1,065,305 2,036,352 618,030
Fines  a nd forfei tures 3,880,674 4,721,725 5,850,072 2,338,684
Inves tment Income 8,413,713 5,708,816 4,191,386 2,485,053
Intergovernmenta l 36,683,544 37,970,647 42,318,633 48,775,893
Cha rges  for services 13,465,003 11,020,644 10,932,430 12,886,715
Other 6,803,988 6,213,253 8,603,639 8,925,459
Total  revenues 221,236,959 214,776,731 203,172,044 208,442,965 197,344,437 206,698,054
Expendi tures
Current:
Genera l  Government 24,983,025 23,468,564 23,815,033 17,234,673
Publ i c Safety 100,534,357 105,613,213 96,130,768 101,657,184
Streets 27,129,532 25,150,386 20,267,012 24,433,688
Cul ture and Recreation 9,480,585 6,842,658 5,228,540 6,579,287
Community Development 9,363,769 11,777,679 12,817,428 15,901,097
Community Service 6,914,615 4,329,133 9,150,336 10,266,256
Economic Development 18,165,689 22,276,482 34,168,768 29,735,854
Debt service:
Principa l  retirement 10,759,184 11,223,004 12,285,742 12,627,234
Interes t a nd fis cal  cha rges 13,146,478 14,101,348 13,420,944 13,745,859
Total  expendi tures 220,477,234 224,782,467 227,284,571 232,181,132 213,429,031 209,268,929
Excess  (defi ciency) of revenues  over expends 759,725 (10,005,736) (24,112,527) (23,738,167) (16,084,594) (2,570,875)
Tota l  other financing s ources  (us es ) 7,325,889 5,873,219 10,191,103 29,139,935
Net change in fund balances 8,085,614 (4,132,517) (13,921,424) 5,401,768
Beginning Fund Ba la nces 208,819,975 216,905,589 212,773,072 198,851,648
Ending Fund Balances 216,905,589 212,773,072 198,851,648 204,253,416
Pension Contributions 13,696,000 15,923,153 15,763,362 15,817,310
Annua l  Revenue Cha nge -2.92% -5.40% 2.59% -5.32% 4.74%
(Interes t + Pens ion) / Revenue 12.13% 13.98% 14.36% 14.18% NA NA
Sources: CAFRs and FY 2013-14 Budget Message (http://www.sbcity.org/civica/filebank/blobdload.asp?BlobID=14807)
Al l  Governmenta l  Funds
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Ci ty of San Bernardi no - General  Fund
Statement of Revenues , Expenditures  a nd Cha nges  i n Fund Ba la nces
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 unaudi ted 2013 budget 2013 revi sed
Revenues
Ta xes 100,443,781 94,030,428 83,518,733 85,428,247 87,209,311 89,775,443 89,326,711
Licenses  and permi ts 10,122,997 9,385,470 8,387,017 8,091,822 9,045,223 9,441,900 9,221,900
Fi nes  and forfei tures 1,499,214 2,250,060 3,379,135 2,283,426 1,904,360 2,104,300 2,204,300
Investment income 1,441,416 736,536 789,438 609,721 794,158 733,000 733,000
Intergovernmental 9,181,679 8,916,249 7,213,053 7,718,864 2,614,369 7,297,722 1,734,259
Charges  for services 6,388,869 6,419,995 6,509,637 7,423,815 6,008,881 6,898,400 5,499,000
Other 4,181,440 4,122,007 6,051,308 4,341,597 6,317,022 4,173,400 7,461,600
Tota l  revenues 133,259,396 125,860,745 115,848,321 115,897,492 113,893,323 120,424,165 116,180,770
Expenditures
Current:
General  government 24,307,456 22,936,346 23,540,159 16,910,683 17,486,830 38,659,593 18,400,960
Publ i c safety 95,611,918 100,610,784 89,121,424 92,732,629 96,657,228 106,754,372 86,475,347
Streets 9,666,812 8,280,754 7,356,336 8,318,267 8,127,566 9,971,142 8,259,249
Culture and recreation 6,899,521 5,770,269 4,301,541 5,067,528 5,551,123 5,425,725 4,656,966
Community development 2,482,040 2,039,117 - -
Community servi ce - - 1,426,189 1,244,529
Economic devel opment - - - -
Debt servi ce: 5,551,123 5,425,725 4,656,966
Princi pa l 1,780,591 1,824,372 2,290,508 1,623,576
Interest a nd fi scal  charges 2,219,639 2,590,600 3,054,448 2,516,407
Tota l  expendi tures 142,967,977 144,052,242 131,090,605 128,413,619 133,373,870 166,236,557 122,449,488
Excess  (defi ciency) of revenues  over expends (9,708,581) (18,191,497) (15,242,284) (12,516,127) (19,480,547) (45,812,392) (6,268,718)
Tota l  other financing sources  (uses) 7,264,977 4,746,772 12,944,258 10,924,230 8,708,983 4,829,642 10,371,754
Net cha nge in fund ba la nces (2,443,604) (13,444,725) (2,298,026) (1,591,897) (10,771,564) (40,982,750) 4,103,036
Begi nning Fund Bal ances 18,596,648 16,153,044 2,708,319 410,293 (1,181,604) (11,953,168) (11,953,168)
Endi ng Fund Ba la nces 16,153,044 2,708,319 410,293 (1,181,604) (11,953,168) (52,935,918) (7,850,132)
Sources: CAFRs, Attachment A to City of San Bernardino Budgetary Analysis and Recommendations for Budget Stabilization
(http://www.sbcity.org/civica/inc/displayblobpdf2.asp?BlobID=13856) and FY 2013-14 Budget Message (http://www.sbcity.org/civica/filebank/blobdload.asp?BlobID=14807)
Genera l  Fund
 
The cases presented above do not account for all recent California city defaults. The 
following two sections address defaults which were not accompanied by municipal 
bankruptcy filings. 
Special District Bond Defaults 
Over the past 20 years, there have also been a number of special assessment district 
bond defaults. While special assessment districts are often administered by a city, our focus 
is on city-wide tax revenue supported obligations so a detailed study of these situations is 
beyond the current scope. California cities experiencing recent payment defaults by special 
assessment districts in include Borrego, Lathrop, Palmdale and Ione. Descriptions of these 
situations may be found on the MSRB EMMA system. 
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Redevelopment Agency Defaults 
In June 2011, the legislature passed and the governor signed ABX1 26, a law that 
mandated dissolution of local redevelopment agencies (RDAs). The Supreme Court upheld 
the law and allowed the dissolutions to take effect on February 1, 2012 (California State 
Association of County Auditors, 2012). Redevelopment agency assets and liabilities mostly 
reverted to the cities and counties that created them. 
Many California cities took on significant amounts of bonded debt as a result of the 
dissolution act, but also began to receive incremental property tax revenues necessary to 
service them. While most of these transitions did not impact RDA bondholders, the cities of 
Hercules and Monrovia did experience temporary defaults. 
On February 1, 2012, Hercules defaulted on $2.4 million of interest payments on 
RDA Tax Allocation bonds. The default did not directly impact municipal bondholders 
because payment was made by Ambac, the agency’s municipal bond insurer. Ambac filed 
suit against the city claiming it had failed to remit RDA related property tax collections to 
the bond trustee as required. Instead the proceeds were placed in a Pooled Cash Account 
(Hercules Redevelopment Agency, 2012). In March 2012, Ambac and the City settled the 
litigation with the City pledging two parcels of land to the insurer (Kearney, 2012). The City 
further agreed to place these two properties on the market, apparently to offset the $4.05 
million property tax remittance the city had failed to make earlier (City of Hercules, 2012). 
The fact that city assets had to be sold to clear the RDA default situation shows that 
the Hercules episode is indicative of a fiscal insolvency. Although the City’s population is 
slightly below 25,000, its fiscal indicators may be relevant to the larger cities in this study. 
Unfortunately, the City had yet to publish 2011 or 2012 CAFRs at the time of this writing. 
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The city’s 2010 CAFR showed total governmental funds revenue of $37,740,183 and 
interest expenses of $10,268,495. Pension expenses were $1,596,456. Interest and pension 
expenses thus accounted for 31.44% of revenue. 2010 total revenues were 10.04% below 
prior fiscal year revenues of $41,667,224. The city’s general fund balance was relatively 
healthy but it was running a substantial deficit. 
The failure to file CAFRs on a timely basis is part of a larger financial management 
issue in Hercules. In May and November 2012, the State Controller’s Office issued three 
audits highly critical of the city’s fiscal controls. One report “found the City of Hercules’ 
administrative and internal accounting control deficiencies to be serious and pervasive.” 
(State Controller’s Office, 2012a). These insufficient controls may explain why RDA tax 
revenues could be directed away from debt service, thereby subjecting the city to costly 
litigation. 
On June 1, 2012, Monrovia failed to redeem $11,750,000 in maturing RDA bonds. On 
February 22, 2013, the City paid off the overdue principal with 12% interest (which 
included a 3% default penalty rate). Funds to pay off the defaulted bonds came from the 
proceeds of a refunding issue floated by the city (EMMA, 2013). According to news 
accounts, the bonds were not refunded upon maturity because state law did not permit it 
(Smith, 2012). On June 27, 2012, Governor Brown signed AB 1484 which specifically 
allowed successor agencies to issue RDA refunding bonds. 
City Fiscal Emergencies 
Press reports indicate that 13 California cities have declared fiscal emergencies of 
which eight have more than 25,000 residents. The cities are listed below. 
 
 DRAFT 71 DRAFT 
 
City Declaring Emergency 2010 Population 
Arvin 19,304 
Atwater 28,168 
Culver City 38,883 
El Monte 113,475 
Fairfield 105,321 
Grover Beach 13,156 
La Mirada 48,527 
Lancaster 156,633 
Monrovia 36,590 
Riverbank 22,678 
San Fernando 23,645 
Stanton 38,186 
Tehachapi 14,414 
Sources: Buchanan (2012), Garcia (2013), Taxin and Dreier (2012), White (2012) 
 
 
Some press accounts suggest that these declarations constitute an official 
notification to the municipal bond market (see, for example, Buchanan, 2012). But the 
MSRB EMMA system does not have a section for fiscal emergency declarations, and it does 
not appear that the cities in question have made event disclosures to this effect. 
Instead, these declarations should be understood in the context of the state 
constitution. Normally, tax increases may only be approved by voters during a general 
election. However, Article 13 Section 2 permits one exception. If the city council (or 
equivalent legislative body in another local agency) unanimously declares a fiscal 
emergency, a special election may be held to consider a tax increase.7  
Fiscal emergency declarations may also be employed to alter collective bargaining 
agreements and other contracts. Although this prerogative is not specifically granted in the 
                                                          
7 Section 13B also allows a local agency to exceed its appropriation limit by declaring a fiscal emergency. 
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state constitution, Holtzman, Dickey & Cikes (2011) identify cases in which it has been 
invoked by local agencies and supported by courts. 
Consequently, fiscal emergency declarations may be seen as a way of balancing 
budgets or avoiding spending reductions when a regular election is not imminent. A fiscal 
emergency declaration is thus not necessarily a precursor to default or bankruptcy. 
Concluding Comments 
General fund exhaustion – a factor not considered in the Depression-era survey 
seems to be a significant driver of recent city bankruptcies and their attendant bond 
defaults. Other factors accounting for recent default activity such as adverse court 
judgments and the dissolution of redevelopment agencies should be less relevant for the 
purpose of modeling major city defaults. Cities below the 25,000 population threshold, like 
Mammoth Lakes, are more vulnerable to lawsuit-driven defaults or bankruptcies because 
their revenue base is less able to absorb multi-million dollar awards. The two RDA-related 
defaults appear to be, at least in part, transitional issues. 
While we have enumerated a significant number of payment difficulties in this 
section, it is important to put these in context. California currently has 480 cities, and it has 
had at least 200 cities through most of its history as a state. With the exception of 1933, it 
appears that the municipal default rate has not exceeded 1% in any given year. In the vast 
majority of years, the rate has been zero.  
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City Bond Defaults and Bankruptcies outside California 
Since California’s city bond default experience is relatively limited, we supplement 
the previous chapter with information regarding cities in other states. First, we consider 
two high profile defaults from the 1970s and then we provide an overview of municipal 
credit quality issues in other states over the last 25 years. 
The 1970’s 
Between the Depression and Vallejo’s 2008 bankruptcy, we are aware of only two 
defaults by major US cities – both of which occurred in the 1970s. These two cases are 
described in some depth in a 1984 report by the US Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations entitled Bankruptcies, Defaults and Other Local Government 
Financial Emergencies. After summarizing these narratives we review these cities’ financial 
statistics as reported by the US Census. 
In November 1975, New York City temporarily suspended debt service payments on 
short term obligations after the state legislature passed a Moratorium Act shielding the city 
from bondholder lawsuits. The ACIR narrative attributes the city’s fiscal crisis to persistent 
operating deficits starting in fiscal 1971. The city became increasingly dependent on short 
term borrowing to fund its operations. After declaring the moratorium, New York State 
took a number of actions to improve the city’s finances including the imposition of a 
financial emergency control board, provision of short term loans and establishing the 
Municipal Assistance Corporation to issue new bonds on behalf of the city. As a result of 
these actions, the city’s budget was balanced and short term debt was replaced by longer 
term obligations. 
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In December 1978, Cleveland defaulted on a $15 million bond anticipation note as 
part of a larger fiscal crisis that enveloped the Ohio city. The ACIR report attributed 
Cleveland’s fiscal distress to persistent operating deficits as well as poor accounting and 
fiscal management practices. A June 30, 1978 audit revealed that the city had used capital 
funds and other restricted funds to pay general fund obligations and that the city’s financial 
records were in disarray. Cleveland’s bond ratings were then lowered and suspended, 
preventing the city from rolling over its bond anticipation notes, thereby triggering the 
December default. The city’s default was cured after the state auditor declared a fiscal 
emergency (which allowed for the provision of state loans) and the city raised its income 
tax, producing surpluses in fiscal 1980 and 1981. 
The Census Bureau has been reporting city financial data since 1904. Report format, 
scope and measurement definitions have changed over time, so data are not necessarily 
comparable across periods. Earlier, we used Census data to obtain independent variables 
for the Depression era default modeling. While two defaults are not sufficient for to create a 
model, it may be useful to see how the defaulting cities ranked against peers according to 
selected metrics. 
During the 1970s, the Census published detailed financial statistics for cities with 
population greater than about 300,000 – a class that includes New York and Cleveland. In 
fiscal 1975-76, New York had the 11th highest interest-to-revenue ratio out of 48 cities in 
that year’s survey. In 1978-79, Cleveland ranked 8th out of 46. While the two defaulters 
were not the most indebted relative to revenue, they did place in the upper quartile of peer 
cities on this measure of debt burden. 
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The Annual Revenue Change rankings were less indicative – New York was 30th and 
Cleveland 21st in their respective years of default.  In this case, a lower ranking (i.e., a lower 
revenue change) should reflect greater risk, but in both cases, the impacted cities were 
near the middle of the distribution. 
The Census also reported Employee Retirement Expenditure, but the numbers do 
not appear to be accurate. For example, Cleveland’s Employee Retirement Expenditure was 
listed as 0 for 1978-79. Several other cities in the survey also reported zero values.  
According to ACIR (1984), Cleveland did not have its own employee retirement system 
during the 1970s, apparently relying on the Ohio Public Employee Retirement System 
(OPERS) to manage its pension obligations. It appears that employer contributions to state 
systems were excluded from the Census figures. In 1975-1976, New York’s Employee 
Retirement Expenditure ranked 15th of 42 cities with non-zero values. 
While General Fund balances don’t appear in the Census data, General Revenues and 
General Expenditures are reported thereby allowing a calculation of General Fund 
surpluses or deficits. While the Census shows New York running a surplus during the year 
of its default, the city experienced substantial deficits in three of the four prior fiscal years – 
consistent with the ACIR report. Cleveland had a substantial deficit in its default year and in 
each of the four preceding years.  In three of those years, the City’s deficits exceeded 10% 
of revenue, placing it near the bottom of peer cities in the measure of general fund balance 
relative to revenue. 
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More Recent Experience in Other States 
Contemporary data related to municipal bond defaults from other states could 
potentially be used for default probability modeling. However, there have been few 
relevant defaults over the last 25 years. Since media reports often conflate state takeovers 
and bankruptcies with defaults, we include these kinds of municipal fiscal crises in this 
section. In the next chapter, we use some of these observations to supplement California 
data to perform additional logistic regression analysis. 
Although the list includes 32 municipal bankruptcies, many involved small towns 
that did not issue municipal bonds. In other cases, a larger city filed a petition but the case 
was dismissed without a default or rescheduling of debt. The list also includes a number of 
defaults that occurred without a bankruptcy filing as well as several state takeovers, most 
of which occurred in Michigan. Since takeover situations may have resulted in defaults 
absent intervention from a higher level of government, the financial statistics of cities 
requiring takeovers might also be considered for modeling purposes. 
City, State (Year) 
Population 
Type of Event Bonds 
Notes 
Source(s) 
Allen Park, MI (2012) 
Population:  28,210 
State appointed emergency 
financial manager 
Yes 
 
In November 2009, the city issued $31 million in long 
term General Obligation bonds to finance the creation of 
a movie studio which failed. Debt service on these 
bonds has contributed to persistent general fund 
deficits. 
 
Sources: 
Report of the Allen Park Financial Review Team (2012). 
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/treasury/Al
lenPark-ReviewTeamReport-_8-8-12_417419_7.pdf 
Burton. Paul (2013 Mar 20). Michigan Treasurer: Orr's 
the Right Man. The Bond Buyer. 
http://search.proquest.com/newsstand/docview/
1317819784# 
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City, State (Year) 
Population 
Type of Event Bonds 
Notes 
Source(s) 
Alorton, IL (2005) 
Population: 2,549 
Bankruptcy 
No The closure of Alcoa Aluminum in the 1960s and the 
loss of the Cahokia Downs Race Track in 1978 
prompted the economic decline of the Village.  Lawsuits 
from various individuals compounded fiscal issues, 
leading to the Village’s bankruptcy. 
 
Source: 
Levin, Richard, Jonathan Solomon & Campell Ayapong. 
(2011). Some Causes of Municipal Distress and 
Bankruptcy. 
http://html.documation.com/cds/NCBJ2011/asset
s/PDFs/VI_D.pdf 
Benton Harbor, MI (2013) 
Population: 10,047  
State appointed emergency 
financial manager 
No Formerly an economically vibrant manufacturing center 
of 20,000, Benton Harbor’s per capita income is now 
roughly $10,000 and 60% of its population is on public 
assistance. 
 
Sources: 
Report of the Benton Harbor Financial Review Team 
(2010). 
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/treasury/B
entonHarbor-ReviewTeamReport-1-29-
10_417426_7.pdf 
Mahler, Jonathan (2011 Dec. 15). Now that the factories 
are closed, it’s tee time in Benton Harbor, Mich. 
New York Times. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/magazine/
benton-harbor.html?pagewanted=all 
Bridgeport, CT (1991) 
Population: 141,719 
Bankruptcy 
 Yes 
 
Dismissed. Court found that the city was not insolvent. 
No interruption in payments to creditors. The state 
backed "$53 million in bonds to balance Bridgeport's 
books".  
 
Sources: 
Mills, M. (2011). Bridgeport – Distressed but not 
insolvent. Bankruptcy Blog. http://business-
finance-restructuring.weil.com/chapter-
9/bridgeport-%E2%80%93-distressed-but-not-
insolvent 
 
Duby, Christopher. (1995 Oct 9). Bridgeport finally 
sheds Financial Review Board. Fairfield County 
Business Journal. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/216380696  
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City, State (Year) 
Population 
Type of Event Bonds 
Notes 
Source(s) 
Brighton, AL (2011) 
Population: 2,947 
Default 
Yes  The city was unable to make a $22,783 interest 
payment or comply with a mandatory redemption. The 
default was attributed to the failure of many residents 
to pay bills due to the city. Some residents had recently 
been laid off by Jefferson County – also in bankruptcy. 
 
Sources: 
Sigo, Shelly (12 Aug 2011). Brighton Ala. Defaults on 
General Obligation Warrants from 2003. The 
Bond Buyer. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/8843262
44 
Brooklyn, IL (2003) 
Population: 626 
Bankruptcy 
No  The small town was suffering from declining 
population, internal corruption, and the closure of 
several strip clubs. The strip clubs had provided much 
of the tax base for the village but were shut down. Initial 
estimates showed the town had $100,000 in assets and 
$500,000 in debts -- but a 2006 news report places total 
debt at $1,600,000.  
 
Sources: 
Shaw, Michael (2003 Oct 15). Brooklyn Goes Broke, 
Files for Bankruptcy. St. Louis Post-Dispatch. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/402336061 
 
Hollinshed, Deneice (2006 Dec. 29). Allegations of 
corruption cast pall over Brooklyn. St. Louis Post-
Dispatch. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/403054028 
Camden, NJ (1999) 
Population: 79,904 
Bankruptcy 
Yes  An act of brinksmanship during a debate over a 
potential state takeover. Petition withdrawn shortly 
after filing. No default. 
 
Source: 
Couloumbis, Angela and Dwight Ott (1999 July 25). 
Camden’s Bankruptcy Drama Ends But Self-
sufficiency is still far off. The Philadelphia Inquirer. 
http://articles.philly.com/1999-07-
25/news/25521825_1_mayor-milton-milan-
camden-residents-aid-agreement 
Camp Wood, TX (2005) 
Population: 822 
Bankruptcy 
Yes  Camp Wood Convalescent Center did not generate 
sufficient revenue to service certificates of obligation.  
“The municipality refinanced its debt with bonds and 
other obligations, but was unable to make payments on 
its debt due to continued underperformance of the 
Convalescent Center.” 
 
Source: Levin, Solomon & Ayapong (2011). 
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Central Falls, RI (2011) 
Population: 19,376 
Bankruptcy 
Yes  The city was placed into receivership in 2010 under a 
Financial Stability Act passed by the state legislature.  
The receiver filed a Chapter IX bankruptcy petition in 
2011. Central Falls had about $21 million of outstanding 
general-obligation bonds at the time of its filing and 
faced a $4.8 million budget gap for fiscal 2012. The city 
continued to service its bonds in bankruptcy, but raised 
health insurance deductibles and copayments for city 
employees and retirees. By altering collective 
bargaining agreements, the city was able to emerge 
from bankruptcy within a year. Avoidance of default 
was credited to a 2011 state law giving bondholders the 
right to place liens on Rhode Island municipal tax 
revenues. 
 
Sources: 
Bidgood, Jess (2012 Sep. 6). Plan to End Bankruptcy in 
Rhode Island City Gains Approval. New York Times. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/07/us/central
-falls-ri-to-emerge-from-bankruptcy.html 
City of Central Falls (2012 June 30). Continuing 
Disclosure Report Rhode Island General Obligation 
Debt. http://emma.msrb.org/ER644731-
ER500139-ER902895.pdf 
Nolan, Kelly (2011 Aug 1). Rhode Island City Files for 
Bankruptcy. Wall Street Journal. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/880200621 
Copperhill, TN (1988) 
Population: 450 
Bankruptcy 
 No Factory closings and a declining population left the 
town with no way to pay even the interest on a 
$400,000 construction loan for a sewage plant. 
 
Source: 
 Uzelac, Ellen (1991 June 17).  A year after bankruptcy, 
Tenn. town was flooded. The Baltimore Sun. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/407130678 
Detroit, MI (2013) 
Population: 706,585 
State appointed emergency 
financial manager 
 Yes A long term population decline, political corruption and 
inflexible union contracts are cited as general causes for 
the city’s secular fiscal decline. The financial review 
team identified insufficient cash, eight consecutive 
general fund deficits, long term liabilities including 
pension and OPEB obligations and bureaucratic 
inflexibility as causes for the state takeover. 
 
Sources: 
Afford, Harry C. (2013 Mar 15). Long in decline, Detroit 
can’t outrun its past. The Philadelphia Tribune. 
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http://search.proquest.com/docview/1321681728 
Report of the Detroit Financial Review Team (2013). 
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/treasury/R
eview-Team-Report-2-19-13_415662_7.pdf 
East St. Louis, IL (1990) 
Population: 40,944 
State Supervision 
 No City was declared to be financially distressed by the 
state, received a state loan and was placed under 
supervision by a Financial Advisory Authority. 
Subsequent bond issuance, starting in 1994, has taken 
place under state supervision - most recently by the 
Illinois Finance Authority.  
 
Source: 
Harrison, Eric (1990 Aug. 9). East St. Louis: Illinois Bails 
Out Troubled City Close to Bankruptcy. Los Angeles 
Times. http://articles.latimes.com/1990-08-
09/news/mn-375_1_east-st-louis. 
Ecorse, MI (2009) 
Population: 9,512  
State appointed emergency 
financial manager 
Yes  City mayor and controller both arrested for corruption 
related to public works contracts. The financial review 
team noted four consecutive general fund deficits and a 
negative general fund balance in its report. 
 
Source: 
Report of the Ecourse Financial Review Team (2009). 
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/treasury/E
corse-ReviewTeamReport-8-19-09_417433_7.pdf 
Egan, Paul (2009 Sep 26).  Bribery scandal rattles 
Ecorse: Mayor, controller arraigned on federal 
corruption charges. Detroit News. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/404426108 
Flint, MI (2011) 
Population: 101,558  
State appointed emergency 
financial manager 
Yes  Review team declared a fiscal emergency because the 
city was running persistent and increasing general fund 
deficits, had insufficient cash to meet short term 
obligations and lacked a credible plan for addressing its 
financial problems. The city was also under state 
emergency financial control from 2002 to 2006. 
 
Sources: 
Michigan Radio (2011). 7 things to know about 
Michigan’s financial emergency law. 
http://www.michiganradio.org/post/7-things-
know-about-michigans-emergency-manager-law 
Report of the Flint Financial Review Team (2011 Nov 7). 
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/treasury/Fl
int-ReviewTeamReport-11-7-11_417437_7.pdf 
Gould, AR (2008) 
Population: 1,305 
Bankruptcy 
No  The town owed more than $900,000 to the IRS, the 
Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration, 
Arkansas Natural Resources, a mosquito-control 
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company, the Lincoln Country jail, and the US 
Agriculture Department’s Rural Development agency in 
St. Louis.  With assets totaling only $300,000, Gould 
filed a Chapter IX petition. 
 
Source: 
Hale-Shelton. Debra. Bankruptcy filed, tiny town hopes 
to rise again. Northwest Arkansas Times. 
http://freerepublic.com/focus/f-
chat/2007387/posts 
Harrisburg, PA (2011) 
Population: 49,528 
Bankruptcy and Default 
Yes  A failed incinerator project generated roughly $300 
million in city guaranteed debt, while the city relied on 
sewerage charges to offset a persistent general fund 
deficit. The city filed a Chapter IX petition in October 
2011 but the filing was dismissed because it violated a 
state moratorium on certain municipal bankruptcies. 
The city has defaulted on three general obligation bond 
debt service payments since March 15, 2012. 
 
Sources: 
Barnes, Tom (2011 Nob 24). Harrisburg’s Petition for 
Bankruptcy Protection Rejected. Pittsburgh Post-
Gazette.  
EMMA (2013). Continuing Disclosure for Harrisburg 
Refunding Notes. 
http://emma.msrb.org/IssueView/IssueDetails.asp
x?id=F68DABD8F80120CF1482B5AD2CB1D695 
Unkovic, Steve (2013). Municipal Financial Distress: 
Causes and Solutions. Bond Buyer Distressed 
Municipalities Conference. 
http://www.bondbuyer.com/media/pdfs/BBdistre
ssed13-presentations-Unkovic-Municipal-Physical-
Distress.pdf 
Hillsdale, MO (2001) 
Population: 1,477 
Bankruptcy 
No  The city had over $250,000 in debt and under $100,000 
in assets. Upon being ordered to pay $88,000 to an 
officer after he slipped on ice the city filed chapter 9.  
 
Source: 
O’Neil, Tim (2001 Dec 11). Hillsdale files for bankruptcy 
after order for injury award; village has been 
scraping by, lawyer says. St. Louis Post-Dispatch. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/402025863 
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Inkster, MI (2012) 
Population: 25,111 
State appointed emergency 
financial manager 
No  Financial review team cited negative cashflow, 
unrealistic budgets and high debt levels. City laid off 
20% of its police force shortly before the state takeover. 
 
Sources: 
Hullett, Sarah (2011 Dec 14). Michigan Town Grapples 
with Shrinking Public Sector. National Public Radio. 
http://www.npr.org/2011/12/14/143705814/mi
chigan-town-grapples-with-shrinking-public-
sector 
Report of the Inkster Financial Review Team (2012). 
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/treasury/In
kster-ReviewTeamReport-3-1-12_417444_7.pdf 
Kendleton, TX (2001) 
Population: 466 
Bankruptcy 
 No Texas officials seized the town's bank account and 
withdrew what cash was left -- about $18,600. "The 
seizure of the city's money was based on a 1997 court 
ruling that Kendleton owed the state $660,000 as its 
portion of traffic fines collected between 1990 and 
1996." 
 
Source: 
Hanson, Eric (2001). Kendleton files for bankruptcy. 
Houston Chronicle. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/395856622 
Kinloch, MO (1994) 
Population: 2,699 
Bankruptcy 
 No City population decreased from 2699 to 449 between 
1990 and 2000 due to the airport buying up homes in 
the town as part of its expansion. The bankruptcy 
petition was a response to a dispatching firm's move to 
garnish the city's income from sales tax. 
 
Source: 
Bryant, Tim. Bankruptcy will help Kinloch, Mayor Says. 
St. Louis Post-Dispatch. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/303919247 
Lipscomb, AL (1991) 
Population: 2,800 
Bankruptcy 
Yes  Declining tax base. Defaulted in 1985. "Defaulted on 
$832,000 GO bond and $353,000 GO refunding warrant 
from Farmer's Home Administration." The FmHA filed 
suit in 1987 and 1988 with awards totaling $120,000. 
"In 1991, FmHA filed suit again asking for city to turn 
over keys to City Hall, 3 police cars and its 1976 and 
1954 fire trucks." 
 
Source: 
Deal, Keren (2010). Municipal Bankruptcy in Alabama. 
http://www.gfoaa.org/docs/CGAT/CGAT%20Muni%20
BR%20Presentation.pdf 
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Macks Creek, MO (2000) 
Population: 267 
Bankruptcy 
 No Macks Creek was financing operations using traffic fines 
(they accounted for 75-85% of revenue). This was 
deemed excessive and the state enacted the so-called 
Macks Creek Law in 1995, capping the maximum 
revenue permissible from fines at 45% (excess going to 
county schools). A 1997 state audit found "major 
financial problems". After this was revealed, almost 
every town official resigned. 
 
Source: 
Frankel, Todd C. (2009 May 17). Speed trap law is full of 
loopholes in Macks Creek, the town that inspired 
the measure, has passed into oblivion. St. Louis 
Post-Dispatch. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/403205030 
Marion, MS (2007) 
Population: 1,305 
Bankruptcy 
 No Filed bankruptcy petition to avoid paying a $400,000 
judgment won by neighboring Meridian, MS for waste 
water treatment. Dismissed. 
 
Source: 
Brown, Ida (2009 July 27). Editorial board. Meridian 
Star. 
http://meridianstar.com/local/x681086861/Edito
rial-Board 
Marshall Creek, TX (2006) 
Population: 430 
Bankruptcy 
 No Loss of contract to patrol Marshall Creek Park and the 
loss of federal police grants resulted in bankruptcy 
consolidation with neighboring Roanoke, Texas. 
 
Source: 
McGowen, Lorraine (2011). Presentation to Sovereign & 
Municipal Debt Roundtable. 
http://bankrupt.com/DI2011/Docs/doc/0840McG
owen.pdf 
McCurtain Municipal Authority, 
OK (2007) 
Population: 466 
Bankruptcy 
 Yes The authority, which provides water and sewer services 
to the town, lost a contractor lawsuit over a disputed 
bill.  Case dismissed after the Authority reached an 
agreement with the contractor. 
 
Sources:  
Levin, Solomon & Agyapong (2011),  
McGowen (2011). 
U.S. Bankruptcy Court Eastern District of Oklahoma 
(Okmulgee) (2007). Court Documents related to 
Bankruptcy Petition #: 07-80363. Available on 
PACER at https://ecf.okeb.uscourts.gov/. 
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Menasha, WI (2009) 
Population: 17,442 
Default 
Yes  The city defaulted on debt from the spiraling 
construction costs associated with a steam plant that 
would not be profitable. Three years later, agreements 
were made allowing the city to repay $17.5 million in 
debt over the course of twenty years.  
 
Source: 
King, Michael (2012 Mar 6). Menasha steam plant 
debacle, uncertainty wind down. Appleton Post-
Crescent. 
http://www.postcrescent.com/article/20120316/
APC030208/120305182/Menasha-steam-plant-
debacle-uncertainty-wind-down 
Millport. AL (2004) 
Population: 1,000 
Bankruptcy 
Yes Defaulted on $1.3 million of general fund obligations, as 
well as a $2 million loan from the US Department of 
Agriculture to improve the town’s water and sewer 
systems. Default attributed to declining population and 
employment opportunities as well as financial 
mismanagement under previous administration. 
  
Sources:  
Deal (2010). 
 
US Fed News Service. Information issued by U.S. 
Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of 
Alabama on April 15; US Settles Action to Appoint 
Receiver for Millport, Alabama’s Sewer, Water 
System. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/472147666 
Moffett. OK (2006) 
Population: 400 
Bankruptcy 
No  Town was recognized as a speed trap and no longer 
allowed to finance its operations using traffic fines as its 
primary revenue source. "Court records show that the 
town owe[d] nearly $200,000 in secured and unsecured 
claims from nearly 50 businesses. Moffett generate[d] 
only about $20,000 in annual sales-tax revenues, a 2004 
filing from the state Auditor's Office shows."  
 
Sources:  
Walton, Rod. Moffett files for bankruptcy. Tulsa World. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/400285035 
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Muldrow, OL (2005) 
Population: 3,104 
Bankruptcy 
 No “The immediate cause of the chapter IX filings was the 
likelihood that Muldrow faced significant fines and 
penalties from ODEQ [Oklahoma Department of 
Environmental Quality] for past and ongoing violations 
of the Clean Water Act and its Oklahoma counterpart.” 
 
Source: Levin, Solomon & Ayapong (2011). 
North Bonneville, WA (1991) 
Population: 350 
Bankruptcy 
 No In the 1970s the town was condemned and relocated to 
allow for construction of a dam. The Army Corp of 
Engineers moved the town and 20 years later claimed 
that it still owed $365,000 in maintenance and 
operations costs for the municipal facilities. Due to a 
declining tax base since the move and city assets 
totaling only $258,000, the town filed for bankruptcy. 
The issue was settled with the signing of the 1993 
Defense Appropriations Act. The "measure calls for the 
corps to cancel the city's debt, convey title to the town 
for the relocation lands and facilities and clean up a 
hazardous waste site on Hamilton Island, a peninsula on 
the town's south side. In return, North Bonneville 
agreed to accept the facilities "as is." The city also loses 
its right to sue the corps for failure to perform 
according to the terms of the relocation agreement."  
 
Source: 
Senior, Jeanie. North Bonneville’s fight with the army 
ends. The Oregonian. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/416587177 
North Courtland, AL (1992) 
Population: 1,000 
Bankruptcy 
No  Court awarded $100,000 to a former employee of the 
city on a discrimination claim. Plaintiff began garnishing 
the city's tax revenues. City could not pay the judgment 
which amounted to over one third of the town’s annual 
$290,000 revenue.  
 
Source: Deal (2010) 
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Ozan, AK (1995) 
Population: 69 
Bankruptcy 
 No City in decline due to a water system that yielded 
undrinkable water. The town financed the construction 
of a new water system, but two unexpected stop orders 
delayed the project. The contractor sued for $55,000 in 
lost income and the town did not have the resources to 
pay or fight the suit. "The water system is being paid for 
with a $291,700 loan from the Rural Economic 
Development Corp., some $645,782 in grants from the 
Arkansas Industrial Development Commission and 
$7,300 from town coffers."  
 
Source: 
Copeland, Larry (1995 July 23). Ozan’s solution became 
problem. Tulsa World. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/399523993  
Pontiac, MI (2009) 
Population: 59,515  
State appointed emergency 
financial manager 
Yes  GM plant closings resulted in fewer jobs and a declining 
population.  The financial review team cited persistent 
large general fund deficits and a deteriorating cash 
position. 
 
Source: 
Holeywall (2012 May). Emergency Financial Managers: 
Michigan’s Unwelcome Savior. Governing.  
http://www.governing.com/topics/mgmt/gov-
emergency-financial-managers-michigan-
municipalities-unwelcome-savior.html 
Report of the Pontiac Financial Review Team (2010). 
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/treasury/P
ontiac-ReportToGovernor-_6-23-08_417450_7.pdf 
Prichard, AL (1999/2009) 
Population: 28,633 
Bankruptcy 
No  Dwindling population, persistent deficits and 
substantial pension obligations forced Prichard to file 
for bankruptcy in 1999. After emerging from 
bankruptcy in 2007, the city filed again in October of 
2009, in an effort to further reduce pension payments. 
While the city’s petition was dismissed in 2010, it 
drastically reduced pension benefits. Although the city 
does not have any municipal bonds listed on EMMA, the 
bankruptcy court docket indicates that it had a lease 
arrangement with Region’s Bank at the time of its 1999 
filing. 
 
Sources: 
Chang, Semoon (2012). A tale of the Prichard (AL) 
pension program, Pensions, 17(2), 112-120. 
http://media.al.com/live/other/Prichard%20Pensi
on%20Article%20Semoon%20Chang.PDF 
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Deal (2010).  
 
Heck, Hannah (2011). Solving Insolvent Public 
Pensions: The Limitations of the Current 
Bankruptcy Option. Emory Bankruptcy 
Developments Journal 28(1), 89-133. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/923754470 
 
U.S. Bankruptcy Court Southern District of Alabama. 
Court Documents related to Bankruptcy Petition #: 
99-13465. Available at 
http://ia600400.us.archive.org/26/items/gov.usco
urts.alsb.49664/gov.uscourts.alsb.49664.docket.ht
ml. 
 
Watson, Douglas, Donna Handley and Wendy Hassett. 
Financial Distress and Municipal Bankruptcy: The 
Case of Prichard, Alabama. Journal of Budget, 
Accounting and Financial Management, 17(2), 129-
150. 
Reeds Spring, MO (2002) 
Population: 465 
Bankruptcy 
No  A 1998 lawsuit won by a woman who slipped on a city 
sidewalk left the city owing $100,000 to her and 
$25,000 in legal fees. The town was also running a 
deficit: its 2002 revenue of $205,000 was $30,000 less 
than expenditures.  
 
Source: 
Bengali, Shashank (2002 Nov. 17). Suit pushes town 
into bankruptcy.  Charleston Sunday Gazette-Mail. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/332227135 
Rio Bravo, TX (2002) 
Population: 5,553 
Bankruptcy 
 No Town was unable to pay on a $180,000 loan and 
$800,000 owed to former police chief. 50% of residents 
not paying taxes or fees.  
 
Taylor, Erinn (2003 Sept. 18). Rio Bravo mayor wants 
taxes paid. Laredo Morning Times. 
http://madmax.lmtonline.com/textarchives/0918
03/s5.htm 
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Scranton, PA (2012) 
Population: 76,089 
Default 
Yes On June 1, 2012 the City failed to make a required lease 
payment to the Scranton Parking Authority causing 
authority bonds to go into default. In addition, the city 
temporarily reduced employee salaries to the statutory 
minimum wage in order to conserve cash. Later in the 
year, the city’s cash crisis was alleviated by state aid, a 
loan from a union-owned bank and proceeds from 
additional bond issues. 
 
Sources: 
Shafroth, Frank (2012 July 13) The Week that Was. 
Singleton, D. (2012 Dec. 30) Scranton’s Financial Crisis 
Tops 2012 News, The Times-Tribune, 
http://thetimes-tribune.com/news/scranton-s-
financial-crisis-tops-2012-news-1.1422801. 
Wells Fargo Bank (2012 Aug. 17), Notice of Defaults, 
Event of Default and Appointment of Receiver. 
http://emma.msrb.org/EP678369-EP528610-
EP929851.pdf. 
Tyrone, OK (2000) 
Population: 880 
Bankruptcy 
 No "The Texas County town of about 880 has filed for 
Chapter IX bankruptcy, which will allow it to stave off 
claims and attorney’s fees that now equal the town's 
annual budget of about $150,000." The suits were filed 
by two police officers over the town's noncompliance 
with federal wage laws.  
 
Source: 
Oklahoma City Journal Record (2000 Oct 6). Lawsuits 
force Oklahoma Panhandle town into bankruptcy. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/259442432 
Vadnais Heights, MN (2012) 
Population:  12,302 
Default 
Yes  The city issued $27 million in bonds on behalf of an 
entity that was to build and operate a sports arena. The 
city was to then lease the facility "for a rental payment 
equal to its annual operating budget, which includes 
debt-service costs." The facility brought in significantly 
less revenue than expected and the city terminated its 
lease for 2013, triggering a default event. 
 
Source: 
Shields, Yvette (2012 Sept 11). Minnesota City Cancels 
Sports Lease Backing $27M of Bonds. 
http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/121_176/moo
dys-downgrades-Vadnais-Heights-to-junk-status-
1043840-1.html 
 DRAFT 89 DRAFT 
City, State (Year) 
Population 
Type of Event Bonds 
Notes 
Source(s) 
Warrens, WI (2010) 
Population: 366 
Default 
Yes  The village of Warrens defaulted on general obligations 
as well a $3.6 million sewer bond held by the state of 
Wisconsin. It is in forbearance until April 2013. The 
bonds were issued in part to finance infrastructure 
associated with a new hotel and water park complex. 
The development went into foreclosure before it could 
be completed, significantly impacting tax revenues. 
 
Sources: 
Village of Warrens (2012). Financial Statements as of 
December 31, 2011. 
http://emma.msrb.org/ER586883-ER456192-
ER858928.pdf 
Warrens Finance Committee Report (2012 June 20). 
http://www.co.monroe.wi.us/wp-
content/uploads/2012/01/20120625100401063.
pdf 
Washington Park, IL (2004) 
Population: 5,451 
Bankruptcy 
 No The 2004 filing after losing an employee harassment 
lawsuit but was dismissed after the town’s finances 
temporarily improved. The city filed again in 2009 
claiming assets of less than $50,000 and debts of over 
$1 million. The second filing occurred after two village 
workers were convicted of embezzling a total of over 
$300,000 from the town. Second filing was dismissed on 
the grounds that Chapter IX filings were not authorized 
under Illinois state law. 
 
Sources: 
McGowen (2010). 
Suhr, Jim (2009 Aug. 4). Illinois village seeks 
bankruptcy protection. 
http://dailyreporter.com/2009/08/04/illinois-village-
seeks-bankruptcy-protection/ 
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Westfall Township, PA (2009) 
Population: 2,500 
Bankruptcy 
 No "Supervisors in rural Westfall Township., with annual 
revenues of about $1 million, sought Chapter IX 
protection . . . to force negotiations on a $20 million 
federal judgment granted to a developer. The 
compromise under the bankruptcy plan allows the 
township to make $75,000 quarterly payments over 20 
years, funded through a dedicated property tax hike 
that raises taxes by about $200 a year for the average 
homeowner."  
 
Source: 
McConnell, Steve (2010 Mar. 22). Westfall Township's 
first-in-the-state bankruptcy may not be Pennsylvania's 
last. Scranton Times Tribune.  
http://search.proquest.com/docview/458423160 
Westlake, TX (1997) 
Population: 250 
Bankruptcy 
No  "Westlake's woes began this spring after [Ross] Perot -- 
whose family owns the 2,500-acre Circle T ranch that 
makes up more than half of Westlake -- was unable to 
reach agreement on development plans with city 
officials, notably former Mayor Scott Bradley. The flap 
ultimately resulted in two Westlake aldermen and Perot 
sympathizers being voted out of office. But before they 
left office, the aldermen removed Mr. Bradley from 
office, approved Mr. Perot's request that his property be 
disannexed and then approved a separate 
disannexation request by the owners of the Solana 
[office] complex." That office complex was responsible 
for 99% of the town's revenue.  A state pool and local 
bank both temporarily froze the town’s accounts while 
the disannexations were adjudicated. However, because 
the town had had $1,895,321 in cash and only $122,199 
in outstanding obligations, the bankruptcy court 
dismissed the case. 
 
Sources:  
Wall Street Journal (1997 June 10). Town near Dallas 
files for bankruptcy protection. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/398562382 
 
In Re: Town of Westlake, Texas. US Bankruptcy Court ND 
Texas (1997 July 25). 
http://www.leagle.com/xmlResult.aspx?page=2&x
mldoc=19971071211BR860_1943.xml&docbase=C
SLWAR2-1986-2006&SizeDisp=7 
 
 DRAFT 91 DRAFT 
City, State (Year) 
Population 
Type of Event Bonds 
Notes 
Source(s) 
Westminster, TX (2000) 
Population: 390 
Bankruptcy 
 No "Twice, the city of Westminster sought to declare for 
bankruptcy; the first effort, in 2001, failed after 
creditors rejected a payout plan. In early 2004, the state 
agencies agreed to relinquish their claims, provided 
that Westminster disincorporate."  
 
Source: 
Collin County Station (2013). Westminster, Texas History 
and Information. 
http://collincountystation.com/westminsterh.html 
Winstonville, MS (1997) 
Population: 277 
Bankruptcy 
No  "Court records show Winstonville has had financial 
problems for at least two decades, and filed for 
bankruptcy in 1997." "The town also owed $323,759 to 
the USDA for a community facilities loan. After 
negotiations, the USDA agreed to let Winstonville pay 
$100 to clear its obligation for the loan". 
 
Mississippi Business Journal (2011 Dec. 2). Delta town 
finally gets gas after failing to pay bill. 
http://msbusiness.com/blog/2011/12/02/delta-town-
finally-gets-gas-after-failing-to-pay-bill/ 
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Recent Data Analysis and a Hybrid Model 
The case study evidence provided in earlier suggests that general fund exhaustion 
played a pivotal role in recent California defaults and bankruptcies. While interest over 
revenue and annual revenue change remain intuitively attractive, they seem to have had a 
lesser role in these more contemporary situations. Outside California, pension costs appear 
to have played a major role in the Prichard and Central Falls bankruptcy filings. 
Addressing Public Employee Pensions and OPEBs 
As discussed in the Great Depression Review chapter, pensions were not seen as a 
significant contributor to the spate of municipal bond defaults that occurred in the 1930s.  
Since that time, California courts have repeatedly ruled that public employees and their 
beneficiaries have a right to receive pension benefits according to the rules that prevailed 
at the time of their employment. For example, in Kern v. City of Long Beach (29 Cal.2d 848, 
1947), the California Supreme Court ruled that a fireman could not be deprived of his 
pension benefits by a change to the city charter. In Betts vs. Board of Administration (21 
Cal.3d 859, 1978), the Court ruled that a public agency could not apply a new benefit 
formula lowering benefits to a vested employee unless it also provided a comparable, 
offsetting advantage. 
Pension benefits earned by existing employees thus enjoy legal protections similar 
to debt service payments. Although we lack strong statistical evidence of pensions causing 
municipal bond defaults, it seems appropriate to add pension expenses in the numerator of 
the interest to revenue ratio. This new ratio of “uncontrollable costs” to revenues provides 
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a parsimonious way to incorporate a variable that has been the subject of extensive 
political discussion. 
On the other hand, we do not apply this approach to OPEB costs. As the Government 
Accountability Office noted in a 2007 report, relative to pensions, “state and local law 
provides much less protection for retiree health benefits. Retiree health benefits are 
generally treated as an operating expense for that year’s costs on a pay-as-you-go basis and 
managed together with active employee benefits.” Since OPEBs appear to be junior to debt 
service and pension obligations, it seems inappropriate to include them in a ratio intended 
to predict municipal bond defaults. 
Since much of today’s municipal solvency discussion focuses on public employee 
pension costs, it is worth taking a moment to explain how they enter into our model. We 
use actual employer contributions obtained from the city’s CAFR. For California cities, this 
amount is generally the same as Actuarially Required Costs (ARC) because most cities 
belong to CalPERS which sets employer contribution rates based on ARC. 
Since our goal is to estimate one year default probabilities, a city’s Unfunded 
Actuarially Accrued Liabilities (UAAL) are less relevant. The UAAL represents the present 
value of future payments needed to bring a pension system to full funding.  It is not 
necessary for cities to remedy pension underfunding in one year. Indeed, in the case of a 
single employer system, it is not necessary for a city to remedy underfunding at all. 
Pensions, like OPEBs, may be funded on as a pay-as-you-go basis, although doing so may 
place an unsustainable burden on the city’s revenue base.  
The model implementation we present later may be used with current balances and 
annual cash flows or with projected future balances and cash flows. The latter option 
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provides forward looking default probability estimates which should be more useful to 
investors. For CalPERS member cities, it is possible to obtain future employers contribution 
rates from actuarial reports published on the system’s web site at 
http://www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=/about/forms-pubs/calpers-reports/actuarial-
reports/home.xml. These reports also include a sensitivity analysis showing the effect of 
different portfolio return rates on future employer contribution rates. 
In April 2013, CalPERS (2013) changed its method for amortizing UAAL with the 
goal of achieving full funding within 30 years. For cities and other local agency CalPERS 
members, this new approach results in higher annual pension costs relative to what they 
would have been under the existing actuarial method. The change will be phased in starting 
in fiscal year 2016.  At that time, the employer contribution rates for the median public 
safety employee plan will increase from 29.3% to 30.8%. In FY 2020, the expected increase 
will be from 33.9% to 39.5%. This means that, all other things being equal, an average city 
will face an increase in pension costs of 5% in FY 2016 and 17% in FY 2020. In fiscal 2011, 
pension costs accounted for about 7% of total governmental revenues, so the budgetary 
impact of this change should average roughly 1% of revenues by FY 2020. 
Statistical Analysis of Contemporary Data 
We collected financial statistics for 261 California cities with population greater 
than 25,000 for fiscal year 2011. Two of these cities, Stockton and San Bernardino, 
defaulted the following year. Unfortunately a sample containing 2 defaults out of 261 cities 
does not contain enough variation to be conducive to modeling.  
We addressed this problem by making a number of additions and alterations to the 
sample.   Each of these changes adds default observations at the cost of compromising the 
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consistency of the data set. To preserve variation, we also added non-defaulting cities to 
the sample that are comparable to the defaulting cities that were added.  These alterations 
are reviewed in the following table. 
 
Alteration Defaults Added Drawbacks 
Reclassified cities 
declaring fiscal 
emergencies as 
defaults 
Atwater, Culver City, El 
Monte, Fairfield, La 
Mirada, Lancaster, 
Monrovia, Stanton (8 
cities in all) 
As discussed in the California survey, a fiscal 
emergency is not necessarily a precursor to 
default. While it is reasonable to assume that 
these cities are closer to default than most 
others, the degree of relative proximity is 
unclear. 
Added data for Vallejo 
from the time of its 
2008 default  
Vallejo Inconsistent time period; database contains 
no other 2008 California data. 
Added 19 cities in 
Pennsylvania including 
2 that defaulted 
Harrisburg and 
Scranton 
Each state has unique laws governing 
municipal finance, so these observations may 
not be comparable. 
Added 16 cities in 
Alabama including 1 
that filed a bankruptcy 
petition 
Prichard Same as above; also Prichard did not have 
municipal bonds outstanding at the time of its 
2010 bankruptcy filing. 
Added 14 cities in 
Rhode Island including 
1 that filed a 
bankruptcy petition 
Central Falls Same as above; also Central Falls did not 
default during its bankruptcy and has less 
than 25,000 people. Some Rhode Island cities 
have large general fund surpluses because 
they collect tax revenues on behalf of school 
districts whose operations are consolidated 
on their CAFRs. 
Added 35 cities in 
Michigan including 5 
that had state 
takeovers 
Allen Park, Detroit, 
Flint, Inkster, Pontiac 
None of the Michigan cities actually defaulted, 
and may not have defaulted in the absence of 
state intervention. The timing of a state 
takeover is likely to differ from the timing of a 
bankruptcy filing or default if state 
intervention had not occurred. 
  
In addition to reclassifying "default" for California cities, we also added cities from 
four other states.  For Alabama, Michigan, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island we added 2011 
CAFR data for all cities with population above 25,000.  These states are similar to California 
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in that they too have cities that have experienced serious financial stress.  Data for non-
defaulters were obtained from 2011 CAFRs. Data for “default” observations came from the 
fiscal year prior to the default or emergency. Since all independent variables are stated in 
ratio form, changes in CPI across years do not need to be considered.  
We tested four fiscal ratios with this new sample of 346 observations, which contain 
a total of 20 observations classified as defaults (which include 13 fiscal emergency 
declarations not associated with actual defaults or bankruptcies as well as two 
bankruptcies not associated with defaults).  The ratios were: 
• Interest plus Pension Expenses over Revenue 
• Annual Revenue Change 
• General Fund Surplus over General Fund Revenue (a measure of the relative size of 
a city’s general fund surplus or deficit) 
• General Fund Balance over General Fund Expenditure (a measure of the relative size 
of a city’s general fund balance) 
 
The first two variables are identical to those we included in the final Great 
Depression-era model.  The third and the fourth variables listed above are meant to be 
analogs to this cash variable; accounting differences across the two time periods make it 
difficult to select a single current-period variable to correspond to the Depression-era 
variable, thus we selected two that are similar.   
It is worth noting that the final variable, General Fund Balance over General Fund 
Expenditure, is highly correlated with the San Bernardino and Stockton defaults. Of the 261 
California observations from fiscal 2011, these cities rank 259th and 251st respectively. In 
other words, the two defaulters both rank in the bottom 4% of this variable’s distribution. 
It would be tempting to use this single variable as a standalone indicator of impending 
default, but the very limited record of municipal defaults in California suggests caution. 
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The following tables present summary statistics for the focus variables for the entire 
346 city sample as well as the subsample consisting of just the 261 California observations 
from 2011. 
Category n 
(Interest 
+ Pension) 
/ Revenue 
Annual 
Revenue 
Change 
GF Surplus / 
GF Revenue 
GF Balance / 
GF Expenditure 
Entire Multi-State Sample 346 11.96% 2.52% 1.65% 54.12% 
"Defaults" 20 11.60% -1.06% -10.56% 24.95% 
Non-Defaults 326 11.98% 2.74% 2.40% 55.91% 
Category n 
(Interest 
+ Pension) 
/ Revenue 
Annual 
Revenue 
Change 
GF Surplus / 
GF Revenue 
GF Balance / 
GF Expenditure 
California 2011 Sample 261 12.44% 2.69% -0.44% 63.67% 
Stockton & San 
Bernardino 2 13.01% 1.56% -6.21% 2.98% 
All except Stockton and 
San Bernardino 259 12.39% 2.71% -0.33% 65.42% 
Cities Declaring 
Emergency 8 15.24% 0.14% -13.13% 77.68% 
Cities Not Defaulting or 
Declaring Emergency 251 12.30% 2.80% 0.08% 65.03% 
 
In most cases, relative means are consistent with expectations. One exception is 
(Interest + Pension) / Revenue for the overall sample. The defaults and quasi-defaults have 
a somewhat lower ratio than the cities that performed without incident. In the California 
sub-sample, Stockton, San Bernardino and the emergency declarants have higher 
uncontrollable cost burdens than the remaining cities. 
The table below shows summary statistics for the sample constructed in the manner 
described above. 
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Table: Summary Statistics, Current Period Sample 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
DEFAULT 346 0.06 0.23 0 1 
Annual Revenue Change 346 0.03 0.10 -0.36 0.64 
GF Surplus / GF Expenditure 346 0.02 0.16 -0.70 0.68 
GF Balance / GF Revenue 346 0.54 0.54 -0.60 3.72 
  
Next, we present estimates of logit models.  Other than the addition of the two general fund 
variables, this is the same model presented in the section on the Great-Depression.  The 
separation problem did not prevent including state fixed-effects and so all four 
specifications presented below make use of logit estimation.  
Table: Logit Analysis, Current-Period Sample 
VARIABLES DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT 
   
  
Annual Revenue Change -4.539* 
  
-3.9 
 
(2.439) 
  
(2.678) 
GF Surplus / GF 
Expenditure 
 
-5.217*** 
 
-4.468*** 
  
(1.390) 
 
(1.565) 
GF Balance / GF Revenue 
  
-1.908 -1.032 
   
(1.806) (1.371) 
Constant -1.877*** -1.925*** -1.448*** -1.746*** 
 
(0.515) (0.551) (0.561) (0.658) 
Estimation strategy logit Logit logit logit 
State fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 346 346 346 346 
chi2 10.08 21.29 5.123 21.76 
     Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As one can see from the table above, all of the coefficient estimates have the 
theoretically expected sign.  As for statistical significance, only GF Surplus / GF Expenditure 
is consistently significant at the 1% level.  However, while the standard errors on GF 
Surplus / GF Expenditure are large, it is important to remember that the magnitude of the 
effect of each variable is a product of the coefficient’s estimate and the variation in the 
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variables.    Mathematically, a one standard deviation increase in GF Surplus / GF 
Expenditure (which is 0.16) turns out to increase the number inside the logit function by -
4.468*0.16 or 0.72.  In contrast, although the coefficient on GF Balance / GF Revenue is only 
-1.032, a one standard deviation in this variable (equal to 0.54) increases the number 
inside the logit function by -1.032*0.54, or -0.56. Thus although GF Surplus / GF 
Expenditure has a lower standard error and is thus statistically significant, the effects of 
both GF Surplus / GF Expenditure and GF Balance / GF Revenue are similar in magnitude 
when evaluated at their standard deviations. 
In summary, the general fund surplus/deficit variable is the strongest predictor of a 
fiscal emergency in the multi-state data set.  However for the two California defaults in 
2012, general fund balance was the strongest indicator, and even in the multi-state sample 
the magnitude of the effect is nearly as large as the surplus variable. Given the limited 
evidence available it appears that some combination of accumulated deficits from prior 
years (expressed in the general fund balance) and current deficits trigger the type of fiscal 
crisis that leads to default. 
Creating a Hybrid Model 
We now have two statistical models:  (1) a Depression era model that uses an 
internally consistent data set with a relatively high number of defaults, but which is 80 
years old, and (2) a contemporary model that relies on convenience sampling to get a 
smaller proportion of default observations – most of which are not actual defaults.  
Neither of these models are entirely satisfactory, but both highlight the role of 
independent variables that are supported by strong intuition and/or recent case study 
evidence. Consequently, we believe that the best approach under the circumstances is to 
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create a hybrid of the two models – one that uses all four of the variables we have 
highlighted: (1) interest plus pension expense over revenue, (2) annual revenue change, 
(3) general fund surplus/(deficit) over general fund revenue and (4) general fund balance 
over general fund expenditure. 
Creating a hybrid model is challenging. One possibility would be to combine the 
Depression-era and recent data sets and then run regression analysis on the aggregate data 
set. Unfortunately, this is complicated by the lack of comparability between the older and 
newer data sets. One source of incompatibility is the accounting basis used – Census data in 
the 1930s was cash based while modern CAFRs use the modified accrual standard. 
However, it is not clear that this accounting standard issue would introduce any systematic 
bias in the ratios we are studying and could arguably be assumed away. More problematic 
is the fact that 1930s era Census data does not separate general fund revenues, 
expenditures and balances from those in other funds. 
While fund accounting was developed and considered to be a best practice well 
before the Depression (Bureau of Municipal Research, 1913), it is not clear that it was 
widely used in the early 1930s. To the extent that fund level data from that period are 
available at all, they would have to be collected from financial reports produced by 
individual cities which may no longer be available and would lack the standardization 
imposed by modern Government Accounting Standards. 
Finally, even if comparable Depression-era data were available, there would be a 
question of how to weight them against modern data. For that matter, even within our 
contemporary data set, there is the question of how to weight the California 2011 data 
against the out-of-state data and the 2008 Vallejo default observation which we added.  
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After discussing several possible ways to select coefficients for our default 
probability model, we decided that the best option is to assign coefficients subjectively 
based on our reading of the case studies and statistical evidence.  Ultimately, any choice of 
coefficients is subjective but we believe our choice of coefficients is strongly supported by 
the evidence we have presented.   
The general fund balance variable most effectively predicts the San Bernardino and 
Stockton models. It is also strongly associated with the 2008 default in Vallejo and the 1999 
default in Desert Hot Springs and was cited (conceptually if not by name) as a justification 
by a couple of the defaulting cities. Therefore this variable is dominant in our model.8 The 
other three variables are assigned coefficients intended to give them roughly equal weights 
in the default probability calculation. The interest plus pension to revenue variable is 
assigned a higher coefficient than the other two variables (general fund surplus and annual 
revenue change) because its range and standard deviation are lower. 
We also exclude constants from the subjectively determined model. Although 
constants were highly significant in the empirical models shown above, there is no obvious 
way to combine them in a meaningful way. Instead of using constants, we apply a 
calibration procedure to the model generated default probabilities so that they fall within a 
reasonable range. 
This last step requires some elaboration. In 2012, two of the 265 cities in the target 
population (California cities with over 25,000 residents) defaulted on city obligations 
                                                          
8 We also note that fund balance factors were assigned higher weights in a recent Fiscal Stress Monitoring System 
published by the New York State Comptroller’s Office (2013). 
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yielding a default rate of just over 0.75%. The goal of the calibration is to ensure that the 
mean city default probability matches this rate.  
Admittedly, this is a controversial assumption. On the one hand, the 2012 default 
rate among California cities with population greater than 25,000 is the highest in 140 
years. On the other hand, many observers believe that the recent defaults represent the 
beginning of a much larger wave.  
We are skeptical of this latter view. City pension reforms and the recent stock 
market rally are likely to reduce pressure on city retirement costs in the intermediate term. 
Further, the recent rebound in property prices that started in 2012, lower unemployment 
and continued low interest rates are all positive influences on city solvency. Finally, as of 
this writing, no city in this class has initially defaulted or filed for bankruptcy in 2013. 
Thus, we believe that 0.75% is a pessimistic mean assumption, but we see the 
benefits of conservatism in this regard and lack a rigorous approach to estimating a future 
default rate.  Thus, this 2012 mean appears to be the best option for model calibration. 
We calibrate the modeled default probabilities by raising them to a power such that 
the mean probability of the 261 city 2011 sample equals the 2012 default rate of 0.75%. 
This exponent was 5.76. Thus, if the initial calculation yielded a default probability of 50%, 
the calibrated probability would be 0.5(5.76) = 0.0185 = 1.85%. This process is more 
attractive than simply dividing all the probabilities by a fixed amount because it still allows 
for a full range of probabilities between zero and one, since one raised to any power 
remains one. 
The hybrid model presented here places both Stockton and San Bernardino in the 
top decile of default probability estimates published in Appendix 3 – an unsurprising 
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outcome given that their default data is in-sample and the variable most associated with 
their defaults has been over weighted in our model. All but one of the reported 
probabilities are below 3% due to the calibration process. 
Limitations and Future Research 
We have marshaled case study and statistical evidence to produce a quasi-empirical 
logistic model of city default risk based on fiscal accounting ratios. Since ours’ appears to be 
the first recent attempt to produce such a model, we are confident that other researchers 
can improve upon our results. In this section, we briefly consider some opportunities for 
enhancement. 
First and foremost, replacing our subjective coefficient estimates with ones deriving 
from a more rigorous empirical method would be attractive. As we have seen, this is a 
challenge complicated by the relative paucity of defaults and heterogeneity of fiscal data 
across states and time periods. We also caution researchers against succumbing to the 
temptation of using ratings as a proxy for default probabilities in order to obtain a larger 
pool of current observations. Earlier we raised questions about the responsiveness of 
ratings to changing municipal financial conditions. 
Second, other researchers may find opportunities to alter our list of independent 
variables, through either substitution or addition. Two variables that we would have liked 
to have analyzed further were cash and unrestricted general fund balances. While cash has 
a very strong intuitive basis, we are concerned that cash levels may be quite volatile on a 
daily basis. Thus, the cash on a city’s balances sheet reported at the end of the fiscal year 
may be unrepresentative of the amount of cash it will have on hand when it has to make 
interest or pension payments a few weeks later.  We would of course caution against 
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creating a long list of predictors given the possibility that imperfect multicollinearity may 
lead to imprecise estimates. In preparing this study, our team has gained substantial 
experience with collecting and handling CAFR data, and we welcome inquiries from other 
researchers on how to cost-effectively gather this data. 
A third opportunity for improvement is to use forward looking inputs with our 
models. In Appendix 3, we report default probabilities derived from CAFR data as of June 
30, 2011 and June 30, 2012. Since our default probability estimates have been designed to 
cover one year, the numbers in the Appendix are essentially historical values. It is possible 
to collect data from various sources that would support more current and even forward 
looking estimates of the independent variables we have highlighted. These include city 
budgets, monthly or quarterly cashflow reports, pension system actuarial reports (which 
include future employer contribution rates) and socioeconomic variables. These forecast 
values could be used with our model specifications to produce forward looking default 
probability estimates.  
A common objection to the use of budgets in gathering forecast independent 
variables is that the quality of budget estimates can suffer from political manipulation or 
the inexperience of financial analysts who prepare them. These concerns are likely to apply 
differently across cities: some cities have highly professionalized budgeting processes 
resistant to political interference, while others do not. Also, tools are available to 
researchers to assess the validity of budgets. First, CAFRs contain comparisons of budgeted 
and actual results, so it is possible to gauge the effectiveness of the budget process in prior 
years. Second, the interim financial results produced by many larger cities can enable a 
closer to real time assessment of budget accuracy.  
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Conclusion 
While statistical models of corporate credit risk have become quite common over 
the past fifty years, municipal credit risk modeling has remained relatively undeveloped. 
Our hope is that this situation begins to change with the release of this study. 
Many observers emphasize that municipal default and bankruptcy is a political 
decision. But political decisions are not immune to modeling. Substantial research has 
explained and demonstrated how political actions can be predicted based on the conditions 
faced by political actors. 
Standing at the intersection of financial modeling and political analysis, we suggest 
that a model based on fiscal indicators can improve our ability to predict municipal credit 
crises. Gaining the ability to predict such events is the first step toward minimizing them. 
Once a municipal scoring mechanism gains acceptance, it can be used to proactively 
identify the cities most at risk, thereby creating the opportunity for remedial action. 
In this connection, it is worth dwelling on the “to do” list created by our project. Our 
default probability estimates rely on Comprehensive Annual Financial Report data typically 
filed 4-8 months after the end of the fiscal year. While these reports are more standardized 
and thus easier to exploit, there is no reason that the model cannot be used with forecast 
variables. All cities publish budgets and many provide interim financials that can be used to 
project current and out year fiscal results. Ratios based on these projections can be loaded 
into our model to obtain more forward looking default probability estimates. 
Our analysis focuses only on the issuer level, abstracting from the variations in risk 
associated with different bond issues. While we know that general obligations are less risky 
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than other types of issues, it would be useful to quantify these risk differentials for any 
given city. 
Thus, this admittedly long study just scratches the surface of what is possible in the 
area of quantitative municipal default probability modeling. We believe that further work 
will benefit not only municipal bondholders, but also the political leaders, taxpayers, public 
employees and beneficiaries who are all victims in a city credit crisis. 
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Appendix 1: Extending the Depression-Era Default Model 
 
The Depression-era model presented in the main text did not include socioeconomic 
variables and contained a varying number of observations per city. In this Appendix, we 
present additional models derived from the Depression data set that explore the effect of 
altering these characteristics of the model.  We estimate the following cross-sectional 
model by ordinary least squares (OLS): 
	
 = * + +, + -  
 
where 	
  is an indicator variable equal to one if city  defaulted in 1931, 1932 or 
1933,9   is a matrix of independent variables for city  and * is a vector of coefficients to 
be estimated,  +,  is a state-specific intercept (i.e. all cities in the same state have a common 
intercept) and - is an error term with the usual properties.  Although using OLS to 
estimate this linear probability model has well-known problems it also has the advantage 
that it allows for each state  to have its own intercept + (i.e. state fixed effects).  In the 
main text we used firthlogit to enable fixed-effect estimation, although this came at the 
expense of not being able to estimate robust standard errors.  Therefore we estimate linear 
probability models here so that we can include both fixed effects and estimate robust 
standard errors.  In addition OLS coefficients are easy to estimate and to interpret.  We 
have performed various robustness checks on the functional form and estimation strategy 
of this model and these results are available upon request.  In short, the choice of OLS over 
logit does not alter our general conclusions. 
                                                          
9 3 cities defaulted in 1930, 6 in 1934, 1 in 1935 and 1 in 1936.   We dropped these cities from our sample. 
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 We have identified eight independent variables that all have theoretical justification 
for including in the matrix .  Four of these variables are socioeconomic, and four are fiscal 
ratios.  We discuss all of these in detail below.  A major goal of this research is to develop a 
municipal default model that is parsimonious, i.e. a model that explains default well, using 
the fewest possible variables.  To this end, our strategy is to estimate various restricted 
versions of equation (1), in particular to estimate eight versions of equation (1) which 
include each of the independent variables separately, and then to retain only those 
variables that are statistically significant.10   
Our first task is to develop two “semi-final” models, where one semi-final model 
includes socioeconomic variables only, and the other includes fiscal ratio variables only.  
The motivation for this approach is that, as we described in the literature review, previous 
studies have used both sets of variables.  We are interested in running a “horse race” 
between these two sets of variables to determine whether socioeconomic or fiscal ratio 
variables have greater explanatory power.  After estimating these two semi-final models, 
we pull together all significant variables into a final model, which we will then use as the 
basis for predicting current-era and future defaults. 
 We begin by estimating the socioeconomic-only model.  Table A1 below describes 
each socioeconomic variable, as well as the source from which we obtained it. 
 
 
                                                          
10 We understand this method of variable selection is not ideal for several reasons, including that it runs the risk of 
excluding variables that are not significant in the restricted versions due to omitted variable bias.  In future work 
we will think more carefully about better approaches to variable selection.  However the advantage of retaining 
only significant variables is that it will tend to result in a model with the greatest predictive power.  
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Table A1: Variable Descriptions, Socioeconomic Models 
Variable Description Source 
DEFAULT 
 
An indicator of whether city defaulted in 1931, 1932 
or 1933 
Authors calculations 
 
lnPOP The natural logarithm of city population in 1930 IPUMS 
HOMEVALUE 
 
Average value of owner-occupied housing in city in 
1930 
Authors calculations 
using data from IPUMS 
HOMEOWNER 
 
Fraction of households in city living in owner-occupied 
housing in 1930 
Authors calculations 
using data from IPUMS 
SEI 
 
Average level of Duncan’s socioeconomic index 
among city residents, 1930 
Authors calculations 
using data from IPUMS 
 
As mentioned above, the variable DEFAULT is the dependent variable and it is an indicator 
equal to one if the city defaulted; extensive review of media reports was used to determine 
whether or not each of the largest 311 cities in the United States (as per the 1930 Census) 
defaulted over the subsequent years.  The remaining four variables are the socioeconomic 
variables we selected based on theoretical appeal, their use in previous research, and data 
availability.  The source for each of these is the 1930s integrated public use microdata 
series (IPUMS) available from the University of Minnesota (https://usa.ipums.org; see 
Ruggles et. al., 2010).  This data set includes 1930 population and the individual responses 
to Census interviewers from the 1930 Census.  We use these individual-level data to 
construct aggregate city-level measures for HOMEVALUE, HOMEOWNER and SEI. 
The first socioeconomic variable is lnPOP.  This is the natural logarithm of city 
population based on the 1930 Census.  Rather than including this variable in levels, we take 
the log transformation primarily so extreme values (e.g. New York City) do not overly-
influence the resulting estimates.  This is an alternative approach to the method of ranking 
cities by population that we employed in the main text.  Literature we reviewed included 
suggestions that large cities were less likely to default than smaller ones.  Larger cities 
would generally be expected to have more diverse economies rendering them less 
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vulnerable to the collapse of any given industry.  Also, larger cities may be more able to 
attract state or federal bailouts, due to their greater importance and political power.  Next, 
HOMEVALUE is the average value of owner-occupied housing in the city.  We expect that 
cities with high values will be less likely to default as property tax revenue will be greater 
in these cities allowing governments to more easily service debt.   
The variable HOMEOWNER is the fraction of residents that own their home (either 
outright or have a mortgage.)  It is possible that voters in cities with a high homeownership 
rate will pressure politicians to not default, as they are worried that bad publicity resulting 
from a default will lower the value of what for most of them is their single largest asset.  On 
the other hand, if default allows cities to “wipe the slate clean”, it could be in the financial 
interest of homeowners for the city to default.  Thus determining the effect of 
homeownership on default probability is an empirical question.  Finally, SEI stands for 
socioeconomic index.  This particular index is the Duncan SEI and is contained in the IPUMS 
data.  The 1930 Census did not ask questions about income, and so SEI is the closest 
available proxy for income at the city level that is available.  Like HOMEVALUE, we expect 
that richer cities will be less likely to default, as governments will be able to more easily 
raise revenue from richer citizens.   
Table A2 below presents summary statistics for these variables.  As can be seen, our 
sample size is 299, which excludes the eleven cities that defaulted in 1930, 1935 or 1936, 
and also Honolulu for which IPUMS data was not available.  Twelve percent of cities in this 
sample are classified as defaulting.  About 46% of citizens were homeowners, and this 
value ranged from 22% to 74%.  These and other facts about our sample can be seen in the 
table below. 
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Table A2: Summary Statistics, Socioeconomic Models 
 Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
DEFAULT 299 0.12 0.32 0 1 
lnPOP 299 11.25 0.86 10.32 15.77 
HOMEVALUE 299 7.37 3.55 2.11 35.80 
HOMEOWNER 299 0.46 0.10 0.22 0.74 
SEI 299 33.84 4.05 21.94 51.13 
 
We next present the results of estimating the socioeconomic-only versions of 
Equation (1) in Table A3.  This table lists the coefficient estimates with the 
(heteroskedastic-robust) standard errors in parentheses.   
 
Table A3: Socioeconomic Linear Probability Models 
   VARIABLES DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT 
lnPOP 
 
0.0549** 
   
0.0587** 
  
(0.026) 
   
(0.026) 
HOMEVALUE 
  
-0.00213 
   
   
(0.004) 
   HOMEOWNER 
   
-0.500* 
  
    
(0.280) 
  SEI 
    
-0.00962** -0.0109** 
     
(0.005) (0.005) 
Constant 0.5 -0.148 0.512 0.684* 0.809* 0.155 
 
(0.382) (0.514) (0.384) (0.401) (0.420) (0.537) 
       Observations 299 299 299 299 299 299 
R-squared 0.27 0.29 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.30 
adjusted R-
squared 0.15 0.17 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.18 
State fixed 
effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
 
The first column of Table A3 presents a model with no independent variables but does 
include state-specific intercept terms (i.e. fixed effects.)  Here we see that the adjusted R-
squared is 0.15.  This is an indication of how well the model explains defaults and this value 
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serves as a benchmark for the incremental explanatory power of the independent 
variables.  In the second column, we see that the coefficient on lnPOP is positive 
(suggesting greater default risk with increased population; not the expected sign) which is 
significant at the 5% level.  The adjusted R2 is 0.17, a slight improvement over the fixed-
effect only specification in column one.    
In column three we see that the coefficient on HOMEVALUE is -0.00213.  However, 
while the sign is consistent with our expectations, the estimate is not statistically 
significant.  In column four, the coefficient on HOMEOWN is -0.5.  The sign is consistent 
with a situation where homeowners view defaulting as eroding the value of their single 
largest investment, and the estimate is marginally significant.  However, as our cutoff value 
for including variables in the semi-final model is the 5% level, we consider the estimated 
coefficient on HOMEOWN to be statistically insignificant (i.e. we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that the true population coefficient is zero with 95% confidence.) 
 In column five the coefficient on SEI is -0.00962.  This estimate is significant at the 
5% level.  The sign is consistent with our expectations.  The adjusted R2 is 0.16, an even 
slighter improvement over the fixed-effect only specification in column one then the model 
that included only lnPOP.   
 After reviewing the estimates on each of the coefficients from columns two through 
five, we determined that two socioeconomic variables meet the threshold for inclusion in 
the socioeconomic-only semi-final model, and we present this in column six.  Both 
estimates retain their statistical significance, and the magnitudes of the estimates do not 
change much.  The adjusted R2 increases to 0.18, the highest of any of the models presented 
in Table A3.  However, this is still a rather modest increase over the fixed-effect model from 
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column 1.  In sum, we find that two socioeconomic variables are statistically significant.  
However, as measured by adjusted R2, they do not explain defaults very well.11 
 Do fiscal ratio variables predict default better than socioeconomic variables?  To 
answer this question we turn next to the estimating the fiscal ratio-only models.  Table A4 
below describes the four fiscal ratio variables we selected for this analysis. 
 
Table A4: Variable Descriptions, Fiscal Ratio Models 
Variable Description Source 
INT_BY_REV 
 
 
 
./	12	322	1	1931
./	362	1	1931
 
 
CENSUS 
 
 
REV_CHANGE 
 
 
./	362	1	1931 − ./	362	1	1930
./	362	1	1930
 
 
CENSUS 
 
 
SURPLUS 
 
 
./	362	1	1931 − ./	9:1;1	322	1	1931
./	362	1	1931
 
 
CENSUS 
 
 
ASSETS_BY_REV 
 
 
.999.	.222	1	1931
./	362	1	1931
 
 
CENSUS 
 
 
The first two fiscal ratio variables INT_BY_REV and REV_CHANGE are the same 
variables analyzed and described in the Depression-era discussion of the main text.  The 
variables SURPLUS and ASSETS_BY_REV are different than the cash variable described in 
the main text, but we include them here given their theoretical appeal.  The SURPLUS 
variable reflects the difference between government-wide revenues and expenditures 
divided by government-wide receipts; ASSETS_BY_REV is similar to the cash variable from 
                                                          
11 A few words about the interpretation of the constant term are in order.  As cities in each state all have a 
common intercept (or constant) term, the reported constant has meaning for only one state.  To avoid perfect 
multicolinearity, we excluded one state fixed-effect, namely Alabama.  So, the reported Constant term is correctly 
interpreted as the intercept for cities in Alabama.  Although reporting the intercept for cities in Alabama (and not 
Ohio, California or another state) is arbitrary, we report it to remind readers that our model includes state fixed 
effects. 
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the main text in that it provides a measure of the financial assets possessed by the city, 
scaled by its revenue.    Table A5 below presents summary statistics for the variables 
described above. 
 
Table A5: Summary Statistics, Fiscal Ratio Models 
   Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
INT_BY_REV 299 0.110797 0.055343 0 0.334087 
REV_CHANGE 299 -0.00735 0.098319 -0.2547 0.5215 
SURPLUS 299 -0.07465 0.176743 -1.0212 0.247061 
ASSETS_BY_REV 299 3.632558 0.999222 0.139465 9.781581 
 
Table A5 documents a large amount of variation in the fiscal health of city governments 
during the start of the Great Depression.  The average city in our sample had interest 
expenses equal to 11% of revenue, however some cities had interest to revenue ratios 
three times this value.  Moving to REV_CHANGE, we see that the average city saw its 
receipts fall by about one percent from 1930 to 1931, however some cities saw as much as 
a 25% fall in revenues, while still others saw revenues rise by as much as 50%.   
 Table A6 below presents the results of estimating restricted versions of equation 
(1).  We follow the same approach below as we took with the socioeconomic-only semi-
final model, namely we include each of the four fiscal ratio variables one at a time, then 
evaluate the statistical significance of the variables, and then combine all variables with 
statistically significant estimates into the semi-final fiscal ratio model.  
 
 
Table A6: Fiscal Ratio Linear Probability Models 
  VARIABLES DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT 
INT_BY_REV 2.840*** 
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(0.600) 
   REV_CHANGE 
 
-0.174 
  
  
(0.198) 
  SURPLUS 
  
-0.0226 
 
   
(0.130) 
 ASSETS_BY_REV 
   
0.0156 
    
(0.025) 
Constant -0.0429 0.497 0.494 0.433 
 
(0.322) (0.392) (0.382) (0.391) 
     Observations 299 299 299 299 
R-squared 0.35 0.27 0.27 0.27 
adjusted R-squared 0.24 0.15 0.14 0.15 
State fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In the first column we see that the coefficient on INT_BY_REV is 2.84.  The positive value of 
this is consistent with our expectations and the estimate is highly significant.  If a city’s 
interest expenses rose and caused INT_BY_REV to increase by 0.055 (one standard 
deviation from Table A5), then the estimate in column one suggests its default probability 
will increase by 0.055*2.84, or 15.6%.  The adjusted R2 is 0.24 and this is much higher than 
we saw for any of the socioeconomic models in Table A3. 
 None of the other fiscal ratio variables are statistically significant.  Therefore, the 
semi-final fiscal ratio model is the one presented in column one of Table A6.  As already 
noted, as measured by adjusted R2, this model explains defaults much better than the semi-
final socio-economic model. 
 Before concluding our discussion of fiscal ratios and presenting the final model, we 
consider an extension of the fiscal ratio only model.   This extension recognizes that default 
may be a function of multiple aspects of city government financial statements.  In 
particular, default may not happen when just interest payments are high, or just when 
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revenues fall, for example, but instead may result when both of these conditions occur at 
the same time.  In other words, we are interested in determining if city defaults in the Great 
Depression were the result of a “perfect storm”, evidenced by poor indicators of multiple 
fiscal measures.   
 To explore this possibility, we first construct dummy variables for each city, 
indicating whether they were in the upper or lower quintile of the distribution for each of 
the four fiscal ratio variables.  We have given these dummy variables intuitive names and 
they appear in the descriptions in Table A7.  Then, we interact each of these dummy 
variables that indicate poor fiscal state.  Table A7 describes the six variables that result 
from interacting the poor quintile indicator variables. 
Table A7: Variable Descriptions, Perfect Storm Models 
Variable Description 
INTERACT1 HIGH_INT_BY_REV  * NEG_REV_CHANGE   
INTERACT2 HIGH_INT_BY_REV * NEG_SURPLUS 
INTERACT3 HIGH_INT_BY_REV * LOW_ASSETS_BY_REV 
INTERACT4 NEG_REV_CHANGE * NEG_SURPLUS  
INTERACT5 NEG_REV_CHANGE * LOW_ASSETS_BY_REV 
INTERACT6 NEG_SURPLUS * LOW_ASSETS_BY_REV 
 
An explanation of one of these interaction variables should serve to clarify our approach.  
Take for example the variable INTERACT1, which is equal to one if a city was one of the 60 
worst cities in our sample with regard to interest over revenues, and was also one of the 
worst 60 cities in our sample with respect to revenue change.  That is, if the value of 
INTERACT1 is equal to 1 for a city, that means this city was in the top quintile for interest 
over revenues, and also was in the bottom quintile for revenue change.  If these two 
conditions occur simultaneously for a city, then it could be that this is a perfect storm, and a 
city in this situation will be very likely to default.  To provide a picture of how many cities 
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were in these potential perfect storm situations, we present summary statistics for the six 
interaction variables below in Table A8. 
 
Table A8: Summary Statistics, Perfect Storm Models 
 Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
INTERACT1 299 0.064 0.244 0 1 
INTERACT2 299 0.047 0.212 0 1 
INTERACT3 299 0.014 0.115 0 1 
INTERACT4 299 0.040 0.197 0 1 
INTERACT5 299 0.027 0.162 0 1 
INTERACT6 299 0.027 0.162 0 1 
 
 
Table A8 reveals that between 1.4 and 6.4 percent of cities found themselves in at least one 
of the six possible perfect story situations we have identified.  To examine which of these 
situations really was a perfect storm, we include each of these indicator variables in a 
model that is similar to those presented above.  These results are presented in Table A9. 
Table A9 reveals that only one of the six possible perfect storm situations we have 
identified is a statistically significant predictor of default during the Great Depression.  As a 
result we restrict our attention to this variable, INTERACT2.  As shown in Table A7, the 
variable INTERACT2 is equal to one if the city is in a situation where it had one of the 
highest interest over revenue values in our samples, and had one of the lowest surpluses.   
Although each of the interaction variables represents reasonable perfect storm situations, 
the situation behind INTERACT2 is one where a city faces high interest expenses relative to 
its revenues, and it had a negative budget surplus at the same time.   
Table A9: Perfect Storm Linear Probability Models 
  VARIABLES DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT 
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INTERACT1 0.0829 
     
 
(0.132) 
     INTERACT2 
 
0.306** 
    
  
(0.130) 
    INTERACT3 
  
0.0557 
   
   
(0.182) 
   INTERACT4 
   
0.0621 
  
    
(0.099) 
  INTERACT5 
    
0.0403 
 
     
(0.081) 
 INTERACT6 
     
0.172 
      
(0.139) 
Constant 0.459 0.347 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
 
(0.420) (0.273) (0.383) (0.383) (0.383) (0.383) 
       Observations 299 299 299 299 299 299 
R-squared 0.27 0.296 0.268 0.269 0.268 0.274 
adjusted R-
squared 0.147 0.177 0.144 0.145 0.144 0.152 
State fixed 
effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The variable INTERACT2 is statistically significant and of the expected sign.  
However, the adjusted R2 is only 0.18, not higher than the semi-final socioeconomic only 
model presented above.  Part of this low explanatory power is due to the relatively crude 
way of categorizing variables as indicators.  Nonetheless, although this variable performed 
as expected, it is not possible to say that this or any of the perfect storm variables 
contribute substantial explanatory power. 
 This completes our analysis of the fiscal ratio only models.  The remaining 
discussion and analysis in this section is concerned with moving from semi-final to final 
models.  In all the tables presented above, we found four estimated coefficients that were 
statistically significant, namely those on lnPOP, INT_BY_REV, SEI and INTERACT2.  
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Therefore, we collect these four variables together and include them in a linear probability 
model along with state fixed effects.  The results are reported in Table A10 below. 
 In the first column of results in Table A10 we see that two of the coefficient 
estimates retain their statistical significance in the combined model, namely SEI and 
INT_BY_REV.  Because, as emphasized above, we are interested here in presenting the most 
parsimonious model possible, we estimate one final model.  This is presented in the second 
column of results in Table A10.  We include SEI and INT_BY_REV only and we do not 
include state fixed effects.  The coefficients of the two independent variables retain their 
statistical significance.  Moreover, while their magnitude changes slightly, the change is less 
than 20%.  Therefore, we feel comfortable in using the results presented in the second 
column of Table 10 as our final model for this Appendix. 
Table A10: Final Linear Probability Models, Great Depression Era 
VARIABLES DEFAULT DEFAULT 
   lnPOP 0.0404 
 
 
(0.027) 
 SEI -0.0117** -0.00933** 
 
(0.005) (0.004) 
INT_BY_REV 2.537*** 2.065*** 
 
(0.645) (0.378) 
INTERACT2 0.163 
 
 
(0.134) 
 Constant -0.169 0.204 
 
(0.446) (0.132) 
   Observations 299 299 
R-squared 0.38 0.15 
adjusted R-squared 0.27 0.14 
State fixed effects? Yes No 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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We have used this final model to predict current-era defaults as an alternative to the hybrid 
model described in the main text.  The equation below presents the model from the second 
column of Table 10 in equation format: 
 
	
 = 0.204 − 0.00933 ∗ >? + 2.065 ∗ ?B_DE_FG	 
 
We used this equation to predict current-period defaults, by plugging in the interest 
divided by revenue variable from the 2011 CAFR data set described in this report.  
Although Duncan’s SEI index is not available for these cities in 2010, we use median family 
income in its place.  Data on median family income for cities is taken from the 2009-2011 
three year estimates from American Community Survey.  To make median family income 
more comparable to Depression-era SEI values, we divide by 2,000.   
Using this equation to predict current-period defaults allows us to shed light on the 
extent to which we should have confidence in the ability of a historical model that only 
relies on statistical evidence to predict future defaults.  To do this we make use of the 2012 
defaults by San Bernardino and Stockton; if this model is able to predict defaults in these 
cities, or at least if our model could have indicated that these cities were at risk based on 
2011 data, then one can have confidence that the model can be used as the basis for 
predicting future defaults. 
 Would this analysis have predicted defaults in Stockton and San Bernardino?  Table 
A11 below describes the location of these two defaulting cites in the default likelihood 
ranking produced by following the procedure described above.  Table A11 is divided into 
quintiles, which we have labeled Very safe, Safe, Moderately safe, At risk and Highly at risk.  
Our model did a fairly good job of placing San Bernardino, as our rankings put it in the 
“Highly at risk” category.  Only 30 cities were predicted to be more likely to default than 
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San Bernardino in our rankings.  On the other hand, our rankings placed Stockton only in 
the “At risk” category.    
 
Table A11: Location of Defaulting Cities in Default Likelihood Ranking 
Cites ranking Risk level Number of 
defaults 
1-50 Very safe 0 
51-100 Safe 0 
101-150 Moderately safe 0 
151-200 At risk 1 
201-259 Highly at risk 1 
  
Thus the ranking produced from the analysis of the Great Depression data only, which did 
not take into account any case study evidence or analysis of any current period data, 
correctly placed San Bernardino and Stockton in the bottom two quintiles.  Of course, this is 
hardly a perfect ranking, and the hybrid model we described in the text did a far better job 
of ranking these cities.  This illustrates the virtues of our hybrid approach, which 
incorporated case study evidence and analysis of current period data.  However, the 
extensions we have presented in this Appendix illustrate how analysts could have 
predicted defaults after Vallejo but before Stockton, by leveraging historical data.  Our 
hybrid model thus incorporates all relevant information, not just Depression-era historical 
evidence. 
We also note that a socioeconomic variable reached our final specification. Thus, 
while the main text excludes socioeconomic variables and offers a case against their use, 
we understand that other researchers may wish to build upon our work by including SEI as 
an independent variable. 
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Appendix 2: Comparing data: CAFRs and the SCO’s Cities Annual 
Report  
The State Controller’s Office (1912, 2012b) has been collecting fiscal data from all 
California cities on an annual basis since 1911 and publishes this data in a document 
entitled the Cities Annual Report. Since the report leverages a long established collection 
mechanism and cooperation from cities is legally mandated, it could theoretically serve as 
the data source for a default probability modeling tool. Unfortunately, some aspects of the 
SCO reporting mechanism limit its effectiveness for this purpose. 
The report is published shortly after September 1 on a one year lag. Since the data 
pertain to the fiscal year ending June 30, the report becomes available at least 14 months 
after the year closes. For example, data as of June 30, 2012 will be available around 
September 1, 2013. By contrast, CAFRs for the last fiscal year began appearing in late 2012, 
and most were available by the end of April 2013.  
On the other hand, some cities file audited financials on a very long delay. As of April 
2013, the City of Adelanto had yet to publish any CAFR more recent than 2008, while 
Maywood’s most recent audited financials were as of 2009. Both of these cities did provide 
2011 fiscal data for the SCO report.  At the same time, Cities Annual Report coverage for 
2011 is also incomplete. The cities of Beaumont, Hawthorne, La Habra and Stockton did not 
provide SCO with 2011 financial data. 
Another concern is that the Cities Annual Report data are collected through a 
process separate from that used to create the city’s audited financials. City finance 
personnel enter data into a custom data collection instrument provided by SCO. Since the 
reporting process is divorced from the CAFR filing, the data may not be consistent. 
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To assess the applicability of the Cities Annual Report data to municipal default 
probability modeling, we compared data from the report to selected data obtained from 
four 2011 CAFRs. Since our proposed model is driven in part by interest expenses, pension 
contributions and total revenues, we investigated these data items. CAFR data presented in 
these comparisons is not the same data we used in our modeling. Our models are based on 
governmental fund totals; here we also included proprietary fund data for greater 
comparability with the SCO reporting scope. 
Interest expenses and pension contributions do not appear on the printed reports 
issued by SCO. Expenditures are only presented by function, and apparently these two 
categories are distributed across a variety of functions. However, the Controller’s data 
collection instrument includes a form for reporting city expenditures by major object. This 
form provides fields for interest and retirement expenses. Data from these forms is 
aggregated into a Microsoft Access database available from SCO. 
The following table compares CAFR and Cities Annual Report interest expense data 
(from the Access database) for four cities: 
City 2011 Interest Expenditure in 
City’s CAFR 
2011 Interest Expenditure in 
Cities Annual Report 
Los Angeles 789,232,000 783,740,036 
San Francisco 426,809,000 476,954,176 
Twenty-Nine Palms 43 185,541 
Walnut Creek 0 269,960 
 
None foot precisely, but Los Angeles is quite close. Small discrepancies may be 
explained by the use of the modified accrual basis in CAFRs and budgetary basis in the SCO 
filings. Walnut Creek was one of many cities that did not report interest expense in the 
Cities Annual Report. According to Walnut Creek’s CAFR, its 2011 Interest Expense is 
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attributable to the Redevelopment Agency. It is possible that finance department personnel 
did not recognize the RDA as an entity of the city when it filed the SCO survey. 
The following table compares CAFR and Cities Annual Report retirement expense 
data for four cities: 
City 2011 Pension Contributions in 
City’s CAFR 
2011 Retirement Expenditure 
in Cities Annual Report 
Los Angeles 909,831,000 796,818,827 
San Francisco 308,823,000 343,717,123 
Twenty-Nine Palms 462,025 481,867 
Walnut Creek 5,174,324 7,398,862 
 
In this case, orders of magnitude are consistent, but there are some significant 
differences. In the two instances in which the CAFR is significantly lower than the Cities 
Annual Report, it does not appear that OPEBs explain the difference. The survey includes a 
space for employee benefits, and it is likely that OPEBs are being included in this area. 
Total annual revenues also show significant differences. The following table 
compares totals from the Statement of Revenues, Table 3 of the Cities Annual Report with 
aggregated revenues from CAFRs. The CAFR figures include governmental activities, 
business type activities and (in the case of Los Angeles and San Francisco) discretely 
reporting components. Had discretely reporting components been excluded the differences 
would have been larger. 
City 
2011 Total Revenue 
from CAFR 
2011 Total Revenue in 
Cities Annual Report 
Percentage 
Difference 
Los Angeles 12,487,588,000 15,350,476,263 23% 
San Francisco 7,194,037,000 8,527,657,110 19% 
Twenty-Nine Palms 13,496,119 11,506,379 -15% 
Walnut Creek 78,954,620 72,568,863 -8% 
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The Cities Annual Report divides revenue into two classifications: General and 
Functional. This appears to be similar to the distinction made in CAFRS between General 
and Program Revenues. The next two tables provide comparisons of these two revenue 
classifications. 
City 
2011 General Revenue 
from CAFR 
2011 General Revenue in 
Cities Annual Report 
Percentage 
Difference 
Los Angeles 3,772,484,000 3,179,675,409 -16% 
San Francisco 2,800,234,000 2,367,318,396 -15% 
Twenty-Nine Palms 9,479,104 7,861,060 -17% 
Walnut Creek 48,773,218 43,398,485 -11% 
 
City 
2011 Program Revenue 
from CAFR 
2011 Functional Revenue in 
Cities Annual Report 
Percentage 
Difference 
Los Angeles 8,715,104,000 12,170,800,854 40% 
San Francisco 4,393,803,000 6,160,338,714 40% 
Twenty-Nine Palms 4,017,015 3,645,319 -9% 
Walnut Creek 30,181,402 29,170,378 -3% 
 
Given both the delayed appearance of the Cities Annual Report and significant 
differences from audited financials, we do not believe the SCO report provides a viable 
platform for a credit scoring system using the variables we have identified. 
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Appendix 3: Default Probability Scores for California Cities 
In this appendix we present default probability estimates for 262 California cities 
with population over 25,000 that have filed Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports in 
fiscal year 2011 or 2012. 
In 2012, there were 265 California cities with population in excess of 25,000. All of 
these cities had filed 2011 Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports by April 2013 with the 
exception of Adelanto, Bell and Maywood. We do not report results for these three cities, 
but note that their apparent failure to produce audited financials 22 months after the close 
of the 2011 fiscal year should be a cause for concern. Eastvale, a new city, did not have 
prior year revenues in 2011, so we exclude it from the 2011 reported population as well. 
CITY 2011 DP 2012 DP 
Alameda 0.88% #N/A 
Alhambra 1.28% 1.45% 
Aliso Viejo 0.01% 0.01% 
Anaheim 1.55% 1.61% 
Antioch 1.39% 1.26% 
Apple Valley 0.10% 0.18% 
Arcadia 0.59% 0.65% 
Atascadero 0.80% 0.81% 
Atwater 2.44% 4.28% 
Azusa 0.65% #N/A 
Bakersfield 0.87% 0.91% 
Baldwin Park 0.35% 0.41% 
Banning 0.23% #N/A 
Beaumont 0.50% #N/A 
Bell Gardens 0.02% 0.02% 
Bellflower 0.09% 0.11% 
Belmont 0.98% 0.96% 
Benicia 1.32% 1.14% 
Berkeley 1.02% 1.11% 
Beverly Hills 0.40% 0.39% 
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CITY 2011 DP 2012 DP 
Brawley 0.93% #N/A 
Brea 0.72% 0.58% 
Brentwood 0.65% 0.69% 
Buena Park 0.37% 0.51% 
Burbank 0.49% 0.64% 
Burlingame 0.84% 0.71% 
Calexico 1.09% 0.87% 
Camarillo 0.03% 0.03% 
Campbell 0.41% 0.43% 
Carlsbad 0.05% 0.05% 
Carson 0.82% 0.68% 
Cathedral City 0.90% 1.07% 
Ceres 0.77% 1.06% 
Cerritos 0.00% 0.03% 
Chico 1.47% 1.68% 
Chino 0.43% 0.49% 
Chino Hills 0.37% #N/A 
Chula Vista 1.11% 1.33% 
Citrus Heights 0.05% 0.07% 
Claremont 0.48% #N/A 
Clovis 1.25% 1.28% 
Coachella 0.46% 0.52% 
Colton 1.71% 1.89% 
Compton 6.52% #N/A 
Concord 1.18% 1.40% 
Corona 0.40% 0.49% 
Costa Mesa 0.58% 0.58% 
Covina 0.77% 0.98% 
Culver City 0.36% 0.49% 
Cupertino 0.48% 0.32% 
Cypress 0.15% 0.13% 
Daly City 0.50% 1.08% 
Dana Point 0.41% 0.37% 
Danville 0.02% 0.03% 
Davis 1.41% 1.54% 
Delano 0.64% 0.80% 
Desert Hot Springs 0.27% 0.65% 
Diamond Bar 0.40% 0.35% 
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CITY 2011 DP 2012 DP 
Downey 1.06% 1.15% 
Dublin 0.06% 0.07% 
East Palo Alto 0.10% 0.08% 
Eastvale #N/A 0.27% 
El Cajon 0.81% 0.91% 
El Centro 0.49% 0.33% 
El Monte 0.60% #N/A 
El Paso de Robles (Paso Robles) 0.83% 0.54% 
Elk Grove 0.57% 0.54% 
Encinitas 0.17% 0.28% 
Escondido 0.73% 0.67% 
Eureka 1.62% #N/A 
Fairfield 1.55% 1.45% 
Folsom 1.91% 1.84% 
Fontana 0.26% 0.71% 
Foster City 0.40% 0.41% 
Fountain Valley 0.18% 0.17% 
Fremont 1.20% 1.11% 
Fresno 1.58% #N/A 
Fullerton 1.43% 1.53% 
Garden Grove 0.54% 1.06% 
Gardena 1.16% 1.16% 
Gilroy 0.32% 0.36% 
Glendale 0.32% 1.00% 
Glendora 0.32% 0.48% 
Goleta 0.01% 0.34% 
Hanford 0.44% #N/A 
Hawthorne 0.37% #N/A 
Hayward 0.77% 1.01% 
Hemet 1.57% 0.51% 
Hesperia 0.40% 0.36% 
Highland 0.41% 0.42% 
Hollister 1.36% 1.74% 
Huntington Beach 1.01% #N/A 
Huntington Park 0.15% #N/A 
Imperial Beach 0.05% #N/A 
Indio 1.90% 1.70% 
Inglewood 1.33% #N/A 
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CITY 2011 DP 2012 DP 
Irvine 0.35% 0.38% 
La Habra 0.70% #N/A 
La Mesa 0.64% 0.63% 
La Mirada 0.02% 0.02% 
La Puente 0.02% 0.33% 
La Quinta 0.00% 0.00% 
La Verne 0.96% 0.87% 
Laguna Hills 0.70% 0.75% 
Laguna Niguel 0.00% 0.00% 
Lake Elsinore 0.49% 0.67% 
Lake Forest 0.05% 0.29% 
Lakewood 0.06% 0.05% 
Lancaster 0.14% 0.41% 
Lawndale 0.05% #N/A 
Lemon Grove 0.85% 0.81% 
Lincoln 0.88% #N/A 
Livermore 0.92% 0.92% 
Lodi 1.33% 1.35% 
Lompoc 1.27% 1.39% 
Long Beach 1.38% #N/A 
Los Altos 0.99% 1.02% 
Los Angeles 1.51% 1.48% 
Los Banos 0.58% 0.55% 
Los Gatos 0.26% 0.30% 
Lynwood 1.20% 1.35% 
Madera 0.95% #N/A 
Manhattan Beach 0.80% 0.81% 
Manteca 0.77% 0.69% 
Martinez 0.91% 0.88% 
Mendota 0.18% 0.22% 
Menifee 0.62% 0.76% 
Menlo Park 0.72% 0.53% 
Merced 0.68% 0.74% 
Milpitas 0.13% 0.60% 
Mission Viejo 0.38% 0.59% 
Modesto 1.36% 1.42% 
Monrovia 1.82% 3.75% 
Montclair 0.75% #N/A 
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CITY 2011 DP 2012 DP 
Montebello 1.75% 1.71% 
Monterey 0.54% 0.55% 
Monterey Park 0.84% 0.73% 
Moorpark 1.13% 0.88% 
Moreno Valley 0.51% 0.59% 
Morgan Hill 1.08% 1.16% 
Mountain View 0.25% 0.23% 
Murrieta 0.38% 0.61% 
Napa 1.04% #N/A 
National City 0.79% 0.63% 
Newark 0.99% 0.91% 
Newport Beach 0.60% 0.51% 
Norco 1.65% 1.41% 
Norwalk 0.35% 0.46% 
Novato 0.21% 0.17% 
Oakland 0.67% 0.61% 
Oakley 0.19% 0.13% 
Oceanside 1.04% 1.01% 
Ontario 0.59% 0.59% 
Orange 0.54% #N/A 
Oxnard 1.03% 1.10% 
Pacifica 1.44% 1.41% 
Palm Desert 0.02% 0.02% 
Palm Springs 0.98% 1.03% 
Palmdale 0.48% #N/A 
Palo Alto 0.91% 0.94% 
Paradise 1.45% #N/A 
Paramount 0.24% 0.25% 
Pasadena 1.20% 1.14% 
Perris 0.16% 0.13% 
Petaluma 2.01% 1.88% 
Pico Rivera 0.08% 0.05% 
Pittsburg 0.61% 0.54% 
Placentia 1.03% 1.14% 
Pleasant Hill 0.29% 0.59% 
Pleasanton 1.00% 1.03% 
Pomona 1.78% 2.04% 
Porterville 0.18% 0.38% 
 DRAFT 131 DRAFT 
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Poway 0.05% 0.06% 
Rancho Cordova 0.37% 0.37% 
Rancho Cucamonga 0.20% 0.15% 
Rancho Palos Verdes 0.14% 0.11% 
Rancho Santa Margarita 0.15% 0.13% 
Redding 1.55% 1.72% 
Redlands 0.70% 0.67% 
Redondo Beach 1.26% 1.27% 
Redwood City 0.99% 1.15% 
Rialto 0.42% #N/A 
Richmond 0.97% #N/A 
Ridgecrest 2.14% 4.58% 
Riverside 0.50% 1.32% 
Rocklin 0.18% #N/A 
Rohnert Park 0.93% 0.79% 
Rosemead 0.27% 0.27% 
Roseville 0.56% 0.65% 
Sacramento 1.54% 1.35% 
Salinas 1.50% 1.67% 
San Bernardino 2.09% #N/A 
San Bruno 0.96% 0.76% 
San Buenaventura 0.82% 0.98% 
San Carlos 0.38% 0.28% 
San Clemente 0.45% 0.51% 
San Diego 1.30% 1.23% 
San Dimas 0.03% 0.02% 
San Francisco 1.38% 1.30% 
San Gabriel 0.95% 1.34% 
San Jacinto 0.03% 0.03% 
San Jose 1.30% 1.20% 
San Juan Capistrano 0.73% 0.63% 
San Leandro 0.90% 1.24% 
San Luis Obispo 1.03% 1.06% 
San Marcos 0.29% 0.44% 
San Mateo 1.35% 1.15% 
San Pablo 0.09% 0.07% 
San Rafael 1.60% 1.83% 
San Ramon 1.34% 1.19% 
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Santa Ana 1.74% 1.55% 
Santa Barbara 1.03% 1.09% 
Santa Clara 0.64% 0.15% 
Santa Clarita 0.09% 0.29% 
Santa Cruz 1.17% 0.74% 
Santa Maria 0.13% 0.29% 
Santa Monica 0.15% 0.08% 
Santa Paula 1.15% #N/A 
Santa Rosa 1.11% 1.00% 
Santee 0.99% 1.08% 
Saratoga 0.65% 0.47% 
Seaside 1.13% 1.25% 
Simi Valley 0.34% 0.39% 
Soledad 1.68% #N/A 
South Gate 0.10% 0.11% 
South Pasadena 0.39% #N/A 
South San Francisco 1.15% 1.14% 
Stanton 0.02% 0.09% 
Stockton 1.72% #N/A 
Suisun City 0.39% #N/A 
Sunnyvale 0.32% 0.25% 
Temecula 0.42% 0.57% 
Temple City 0.00% 0.00% 
Thousand Oaks 0.10% 0.09% 
Torrance 0.97% 0.99% 
Tracy 0.56% 0.60% 
Tulare 0.73% 0.85% 
Turlock 0.43% #N/A 
Tustin 0.00% 0.00% 
Twentynine Palms 0.03% #N/A 
Union City 1.03% 1.20% 
Upland 1.51% 2.06% 
Vacaville 1.78% 2.07% 
Vallejo 1.12% #N/A 
Victorville 1.82% 1.73% 
Visalia 0.55% 0.71% 
Vista 0.64% 0.31% 
Walnut 0.08% 0.11% 
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Walnut Creek 0.62% 0.75% 
Wasco 1.39% 1.22% 
Watsonville 2.02% 1.61% 
West Covina 0.59% 0.69% 
West Hollywood 0.07% 0.08% 
West Sacramento 0.56% 0.43% 
Westminster 0.49% 0.59% 
Whittier 0.40% 0.50% 
Wildomar 1.30% 1.25% 
Windsor 0.19% 0.25% 
Woodland 1.19% #N/A 
Yorba Linda 0.02% #N/A 
Yuba City 0.39% 0.66% 
Yucaipa 0.00% 0.00% 
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